Moving or mimicking the market?: the opportunities and constraints of state public employee health plans by McKethan, Aaron Nance
MOVING OR MIMICKING THE MARKET? 
THE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS OF STATE PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE HEALTH PLANS  
 
Aaron Nance McKethan 
 
A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 













Aaron Nance McKethan 




AARON NANCE MCKETHAN:  Moving or Mimicking the Market? The Opportunities and 
Constraints of State Public Employee Health Plans 
(Under the direction of Daniel Gitterman, Jon Oberlander,  
Sudanshu Handa, Michael Sparer, and Alain Enthoven) 
 
State public employee health plans (PEHPs) are large employer-based health 
purchasers.  Despite their size, little is known about the roles that PEHPs, as major 
purchasers, can or do play in the state health care environment.  This dissertation explores 
two competing images of PEHPs to understand: 1) what accounts for different views on the 
roles that PEHP purchasers play within state health care systems, 2) how have different states 
leveraged the purchasing practices of PEHPs in an attempt to broadly influence aspects of 
state health care systems, and 3) what factors have characterized the experiences of these 
efforts.  
This dissertation finds that PEHPs represent potentially important actors in very large 
and sophisticated state health care systems.  However, the “purchasing power” of PEHPs is 
not universal and immutable and is highly contingent on key political and market influences 
that may likewise drive PEHP policy variation across other states.  It remains puzzling that 
policy scholars have largely ignored the roles that PEHPs, as major purchasers, can and do 
play in the state health care environment.  Based on this initial study of PEHP policymaking 
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in two states, however, much more research is needed to fully understand the factors driving 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Public employee health plans (PEHPs) are large employer-based health plans 
providing health care benefits for about 13 million people across the United States, including 
active state employees, covered dependents, and retirees in state governments and 
participating local governments and other quasi-public entities.  PEHPs are financed through 
general state revenues and premium contributions from participating public sector 
employers, employees, and their dependents. 
As major employers (or more precisely, as the health care purchasing agents of 
public employers), PEHPs are responsible for an increasingly large share of state health care 
spending, second only to state Medicaid programs.  In fiscal year 2003, the most recent year 
for which fifty-state comparative data are available, state spending on public employee and 
retiree health benefits accounted for about 16% of total state health spending (excluding the 
federal share), on average, up from 10% in FY 1997 (Milbank Memorial Fund 2004).  
Moreover, this figure does not include employer contributions from a wide range of local 
governments and other quasi-state entities that also purchase health benefits through PEHPs.
2The “Purchasing Power” of Public Employers? 
Beyond providing health care benefits for public employees and their covered 
dependents, it is not clear what, if any, other major roles PEHPs may play in state health 
policy environment or the health care market.  By contrast, given their size and perceived 
purchasing influences, Medicare and other government purchasers have been the subject of 
scholarly attention regarding the broad impacts of their purchasing behaviors and contracting 
approaches.  Specifically, such studies emphasize the “market leadership” potential of 
Medicare and other major public sector health care purchasers to use their purchasing and 
contracting processes to (instrumentally or inadvertently) induce private actors (such as 
managed care organizations, physicians, hospitals, and other components of health care 
delivery systems) to engage in activities or behaviors that they would not have engaged in 
otherwise.    
For example, Gitterman (2000) and Mayes and Berenson (2004 and 2006) describe 
different aspects of the “purchasing influence” exerted by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS), which is the largest buyer of hospital and physician services in 
the United States.  Gitterman describes how CMS, by operating in an institutional and 
political framework under the direct control of elected officials and their political appointees, 
is not always motivated by the same relatively narrow profit-oriented or cost containment 
concerns that drive private sector purchasers (Gitterman 2000).  Specifically, Gitterman 
explains that one consequence of the federal government establishing certain purchaser 
requirements for managed care organizations (MCOs) doing business with the federal 
3government was to lead MCOs to voluntarily adopt uniform standards for non-government 
business (even when not explicitly required to do so).  
Mayes highlights the similar, but more dramatic (if unintended), case of Medicare’s 
own purchasing and contracting strategies inducing behavioral responses from private 
employers, who in turn sought change from providers (Mayes 2004).  Specifically, they 
argue that the key factor influencing the private sector to move away from a fee-for-service 
indemnity paradigm toward managed care practices was not purely their own cost 
containment imperatives per se, but rather a new prospective payment system that Medicare 
introduced to rationalize its own costs.  According to Mayes and Berenson, “In other words, 
before business behavior triggered the managed care revolution, it largely responded to and 
was an unintended consequence of [federal] government policy making: in this instance, of 
Medicare payment reforms” (Mayes and Berensen 2006).  In turn, the growth of managed 
care plans stimulated a wave of hospital mergers and the formation of many large physician 
group practices (Gabel 1997).  These examples suggest that large public purchasers can exert 
influence (instrumentally or inadvertently) and can achieve policy objectives outside of the 
traditional boundaries of public policymaking.  
Other analysts have described how large private purchasers and business coalitions 
have also been an important “driving force” for health system change.  For example, 
Etheredge and colleagues have suggested that large private “[e]mployers drive the health 
care market through a tough, price-focused competitive process to select the plans offered to 
workers” (Etheredge et al. 1996).  Other scholars have sounded similar themes regarding the 
role of large employers and employer coalitions in influencing health system change at a 
local or regional level (Darling 1991; Lipson 1996; Lichiello 1996).  Some health care 
4leaders have even explicitly called on employers to play a more assertive role in advancing a 
“high performance” health care system using their own purchasing and contracting 
requirements with various delivery system entities.  For example, the president of The 
Commonwealth Fund recently wrote that, “As the largest collective purchasers of health 
insurance, employers can and should drive the fundamental health system reform our 
country needs—and that Americans want” (Davis 2007).  
So what role do PEHPs play at the state level and what forms of influence do they 
have on the larger market?  These issues raise important questions about the degree to which 
PEHPs, as large employer-based health plans, can leverage their positions within states to 
pursue varying state-level delivery system “reforms”.  Specifically, opportunistic public 
purchasers may be able to leverage their own market power to seek certain policy objectives 
not via regulatory fiat or through statutory processes, but rather by exercising their roles as 
major health care purchasers.  However, it is not clear at the outset of this dissertation 
whether PEHPs are well positioned to exert any such statewide purchasing impacts.  The 
available literature is strangely silent on this issue.  Despite the large (and growing) 
enrollments and budgets of PEHPs at the state level, little scholarly attention has focused on 
the key drivers of PEHP policymaking.  This dissertation seeks to increase our 
understanding of the important role of public employee health purchasers within state health 
policy and the broader state health care marketplace. 
What Do We Know About PEHPs? 
To date, the relevant literature on public employee health plans has largely focused 
on employer premium contributions, purchasing strategies, and benefit design issues.  
5Maciejewski (1997) and Long and Marquis (1999) offer comparisons of the health benefit 
plans sponsored by public and private employers.  Both studies find that in general, 
premiums for state and local governments are roughly equivalent to those found in the larger 
commercial marketplace.  However, the authors find that public employees have been 
shielded from a greater proportion of premium costs (relative to private employees) as 
PEHPs typically offer larger employer contributions toward health insurance than private 
sector counterparts.  
More recently, Maxwell and colleagues (2004), using interview data with senior 
benefit managers from PEHPs in all fifty states, explicitly compared the cost containment 
practices of PEHPs with large corporations in the private sector (Maxwell 2004).  Consistent 
with other studies, the authors find that public employers typically offer employees a greater 
choice of carriers and pay a higher percentage of premiums, relative to typical large 
corporations.  The Maxwell study adds that public employees have come to interpret rich 
health and other benefits as important components of total compensation in lieu of the higher 
salaries that are typically available in the private sector.  While growth in state PEHP 
budgets is attracting increasing attention at the state level, in general there has been 
considerable reluctance on the part of PEHP leaders and policymakers to cut relatively 
generous benefits and cost sharing arrangements or to modify eligibility affecting PEHP 
members.   
Hurley and colleagues (2006) investigate similar trends and find that even in the 
midst of sometimes difficult state budget challenges, modifications to health care benefits 
among PEHPs, including levels of cost sharing and coverage and types of offered products, 
have been modest (Hurley 2006).  By contrast, in the private sector, employers have 
6embraced the thinning of benefits and more aggressive member cost sharing (Moran 2005).  
Thus, there is a consensus among these studies that the gradual erosion and thinning of 
private employer-based health benefits compared to the relative stability of public health 
benefits has created a lingering gap between public and private employers in the actuarial 
value of health benefits offered. 
Only one study to date, by Watts and colleagues (2003), has (briefly) moved beyond 
benefit design, premiums, and related issues to consider the broader role that public 
employers play in the state’s health care marketplace (Watts et al. 2003).  Watts and 
colleagues conducted site visits to twelve U.S. communities to investigate how public 
employers make benefit decisions and how they have altered their decisions in response to 
rising health care costs.  Like previous authors, they explore the premium contribution 
strategies of state and local government employers, the extent of premium cost sharing with 
(or “cost shifting” to) PEHP members, and other strategies to reduce the impact of rising 
premiums on public budgets.  The unique contribution of this study, however, lies in the 
authors’ brief discussion of the leadership role that public employers can play in the larger 
health care marketplace.  As the authors describe, state governments in particular are often 
among the largest employers in any given state.  Thus, public employers may have the 
potential to be market leaders through their benefit decisions.  For example, their purchasing 
behaviors can reflect existing public values or signal new directions in public policy.   
Without explicitly testing a PEHP market leadership hypothesis, Watts argues that 
public employers are more likely than large private employers to specifically consider the 
impact of their purchasing decisions on the broader health care market.  By contrast, as 
Trude and colleagues note, the trend toward nationalization of private employers often 
7results in the centralization of private sector benefit decisions and a lack of direct 
involvement with or concern for local or state market issues (Trude 2003).  By definition, 
public employers are much more connected to their own states.  PEHPs thus have a 
potentially larger stake in the activities of local markets, creating opportunities and 
incentives for them to be involved in state and local health care issues over the long term.  
On the other hand, Watts concedes that public employers face unique constraints “arising 
from their ‘publicness’” that may limit their ability to effectively exercise forms of market 
leadership.  In general, PEHP health care benefit decisions are made in a much more 
political context than those of private employers.  PEHPs also face fixed budgets set by 
elected officials who must be cognizant of the impact of their decisions on taxpayers and 
other public priorities.   
The brief presentation in the state health policy literature about PEHPs leaves 
important questions unanswered about the role that PEHPs play in state health care systems 
and the other key factors driving PEHP policymaking.  As major purchasers of health care, 
PEHPs may be in a position to exhibit market leadership in important ways that could have 
spillover effects beyond public employees and other traditional PEHP constituencies.  If so, 
the gap in the literature on PEHPs has overlooked an important opportunity for states 
considering ways to promote cost containment, health care quality, and other policy goals 
beyond the uses of state regulation, direct statutory change, and other efforts.  On the other 
hand, given the size and complexity of the larger health care market, with generous (and 
costly) benefits liabilities, with sometimes difficult state budgetary conditions, and with the 
“politicization” of benefit decisions that Watts alludes to, perhaps even large and assertive 
8PEHPs are fairly constrained in their ability to exert market leadership in any meaningful 
way that could contribute to achieving important policy goals at a state level.  
Exploratory Research  
To supplement the existing knowledge base about PEHPs in preparation for this 
dissertation, I conducted exploratory research on a subset of twelve of the largest PEHPs in 
the country. a For each of the twelve large PEHPs, I conducted structured telephone 
interviews with and collected data from PEHP executives and senior staff members.  Beyond 
understanding the sheer enrollment/size of PEHPs, the major purpose of these interviews 
was to gain a more complete picture of some of the major issues and challenges that PEHPs 
are addressing than was available in the published literature.  Additionally, I sought to better 
understand what roles state PEHP leaders claim that public employee purchasers play in the 
larger state health care marketplace.   
The PEHPs in the case states collectively provided health benefits for more than 6.6 
million people in 2005, including active employees, covered dependents, and retirees in state 
governments and participating local and other quasi-public entities (Exhibit 1.1).   
 
a A list of interviewees is included in the appendix. The sample states were selected by comparing the results of 
two recent national surveys (Kaiser Family Foundation/Health Educational Research Trust 2003; Segal 
Corporation 2003). that reported recent PEHP enrollment data. Given different enrollment accounting strategies 
and some missing data in these surveys, some excluded PEHPs could have larger enrollments than some that 
were included.  
9Exhibit 1.1: Enrollment in Selected State Public Employee Health Plans 
(PEHPs), By Member Type, 2005 
 
Enrollment by Member Type State (PEHP) Employee Dependent Retiree Total* 
New York State Health Insurance Program 349,405 633,274 222,186 1,204,865 
California Public Employees Retirement 
System 363,108 647,144 178,585 1,188,837 
New Jersey State Health Benefits Program 241,051 441,569 118,401 801,021 
Georgia Division of Public Employee 
Health Benefits 240,880 291,004 113,002 644,906 
North Carolina State Employees’ and 
Retirees’ Health Plan 295,704 153,729 127,692 577,125 
Texas Group Benefits Program 
 179,123 201,061 68,212 448,396 
Florida Division of State Group Insurance 159,598 246,172 31,500 437,270 
South Carolina Employee Insurance 
Program 172,874 170,931 58,703 402,508 
Illinois Group Insurance Program 113,206 157,971 74,770 345,947 
Massachusetts Group Insurance 
Commission 76,395 113,429 64,451 254,275 
Mississippi State and School Employees’ 
Health Insurance Program 118,102 51,050 18,947 188,099 
Minnesota State Employee Group 
Insurance Program 47,420 63,518 3,577 114,515 
Total 2,356,866 3,170,852 1,762,666 6,607,764 
Source: Enrollment data provided by each PEHP 
*Sequence based on descending order of total enrollment 
**Texas data exclude enrollment in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) which account for about 
10% of total TGBP enrollment. 
According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, these sample states account for 
approximately half of state and local government employment in the United States (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census 2005).  I therefore estimate that total PEHP enrollment nationwide—
including active employees, dependents, and retirees in all participating government 
entities—exceeded 13 million in 2005.  This estimate greatly exceeds previous estimates that 
are derived from national surveys on PEHPs because these studies do not include (or project 
enrollment for) all states and exclude covered dependents and retirees.  While counting 
PEHP members nationwide is a difficult undertaking, it is clear that omitting retirees and/or 
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dependents from total enrollment figures vastly understates the population of individuals 
receiving health care benefits through PEHP at a national level.    
Financed by state-only dollars, state policymakers exercise broad discretion to design 
their PEHP administrative and governance structures.  Discretion also includes who should 
be eligible for PEHP benefits, what medical benefits should be provided, and how providers 
should be compensated.  As a result of this discretion, there is variation among states in 
numerous aspects of PEHPs, including governance structures, eligibility criteria, included 
populations, and other issues.   
Not surprisingly, and consistent with previous studies, the primary and common 
challenge identified by PEHP leaders was the perennial difficulty of maintaining high 
quality benefits for a diverse and aging workforce given inflationary trends and occasional 
state budget shortfalls and/or recessions.  As noted above, state budgets have become 
increasingly dominated by health care spending, most notably on Medicaid programs.  PEHP 
spending (the second largest category of state health care spending) does not compare with 
spending on Medicaid programs in absolute dollars or as a percentage of total state health 
spending (Milbank Memorial Fund 2004).  Nonetheless, PEHP spending has been growing 
as a percentage of total health care expenditures.  Rising health care costs raise difficult 
questions for PEHP leaders and state policymakers required to balance state budgets each 
year.   
Given the common challenge of rising health care costs, cost containment is high on 
the agenda of all PEHP leaders and policymakers.  Like major private employers, PEHPs are 
experimenting with numerous cost containment strategies, including disease and case 
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management, more aggressive management of pharmacy benefits, and contracting with 
managed care plans.  Cost containment issues and strategies are discussed in more detail in 
the brief literature on PEHPs discussed above.   
Importantly, interviewing state PEHP leaders about their cost containment options 
and choices revealed different attitudes and views regarding state PEHPs’ roles in their 
respective state health policy environments.  In three of the 12 case states that I examined in 
exploratory research – including Massachusetts, Minnesota, and California – PEHP leaders 
described how their recent cost containment and broader purchasing efforts were either 
designed specifically with the larger state market in mind or were nonetheless expected to 
have important spillover impacts on the larger state health care marketplace.     
For example, facing annual premium increases that averaged 14% per year for the 
last four years, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) recently 
launched several new cost containment efforts, including the Narrow Network Initiative 
(NNI) in 2004 (Grevious 2006).  Specifically, CalPERS’ NNI has the goal of yielding cost 
savings and quality improvement by, in conjunction with Blue Shield of California (BSC), 
restricting the BSC health maintenance organization (HMO) provider network to hospitals 
and affiliated medical groups that demonstrate lower costs and certain quality process 
outcomes. The NNI relies on all patient refined–diagnosis-related groups (APR-DRGs) to 
assess network providers’ relative cost and quality.  Affected members must either stop 
using out-of-network hospitals and affiliated physicians or enroll in different CalPERS plan 
options that retain these providers in network and cost more.  
12 
According to the interview, the NNI initiative is primarily focused on achieving cost 
savings for constituent employers that purchase health benefits through CalPERS.  However, 
CalPERS is a very large health care purchaser in California.  Moreover, private employer 
groups, not just CalPERS, contract with the Blue Shield network.  Thus, CalPERS officials 
discussed the potential spillover impacts that the NNI is expected to have on the larger 
health care marketplace in California if the initiative is successful.  Specifically, the impacts 
associated with providers changing their practice patterns to accommodate CalPERS 
purchaser requirements would presumably affect non-CalPERS members as well since 
providers and other delivery system stakeholders would be unlikely to differentiate CalPERS 
members from other patients.  Again, this is a theory that requires testing, but it does speak 
to the broader issue about PEHPs’ potential roles in the state health care arena. 
A similar (but still distinctive) initiative is underway in Minnesota.  In 2002, the 
Minnesota State Employee Group Insurance Program (SEGIP) introduced a new self-insured 
purchasing model (Advantage) that tiers providers at the group-practice level (Haugen 
2006). All SEGIP members are enrolled in the program, which grew out of the earlier efforts 
of a state coalition of large private and public employers in the Buyers Health Care Action 
Group (BHCAG).  The Advantage program ranks more than fifty “care systems” based on 
their risk-adjusted costs.  Care systems are then assigned to one of four cost tiers as 
determined by claims experience, risk adjustment, actuarial models, and collective 
bargaining. Members select their care system and pay higher co-payments, deductibles, and 
coinsurance when using higher-cost clinic groups. 
Three private carriers are contracted as third-party administrators providing a uniform 
and comprehensive set of benefits.  Instead of differentiating members’ premiums among 
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health plans, the Advantage program differentiates price distinctions among care systems at 
the point of service delivery.  PEHP executives in Minnesota claimed that as a result of the 
Advantage program, the SEGIP experienced no cost increase from 2005 to 2006 (which, if 
directly attributable to Advantage, is certainly noteworthy).  Like the California effort 
described above, the PEHP effort in Minnesota suggests (but does not confirm) the 
important role that the PEHP has played by participating in a large employer coalition (the 
Buyer’s Health Care Action Group) and helping to structure the new Advantage plan in a 
way that is said to benefit both state government (i.e., the SEGIP) as well as other private 
employers participating in the initiative.  Again, it is important to assess and verify the 
claims made by PEHP executives that were interviewed.  Nonetheless, the Minnesota effort 
also speaks to a potentially broader role for PEHPs beyond their traditional constituencies. 
Finally, the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) recently undertook 
an initiative to profile and tier individual providers based on their relative quality and cost-
effectiveness (Mitchell 2006).  The Clinical Performance Improvement (CPI) initiative 
requires participating private health plans to submit aggregate medical, mental health, and 
pharmacy claims data to create a consolidated database to support individual-level provider 
profiling.  All participating GIC health plans use this information, based on longitudinal 
episode treatment groups (ETGs), to assign physicians and hospitals to two tiers.  Members 
pay different co-payments depending on whether they select providers assigned to different 
tiers.  Three of the participating health plans are also tiering hospitals.  In sum, the GIC, as a 
large health care purchaser, requires participating health plans to submit data and adopt new 
practices in their relationships with consumers and providers.  Because the GIC is the single 
largest customer in Massachusetts for several of the private health plans participating in the 
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GIC, interviewees claim that the state’s new purchaser requirements are inducing 
participating health plans to change their contracting relationships with health care providers 
in ways that, in turn, are affecting the practice patterns of non-GIC delivery system 
stakeholders.  Once again, these claims require further analysis and careful scrutiny, but like 
the California and Minnesota efforts, they do suggest the broader role that PEHP executives 
and policymakers have in mind when they make purchasing and other decisions for the 
PEHP. 
These approaches did not originate with state PEHPs in recent years.  Private 
employers experimenting with similar efforts in the last several years have reported major 
administrative difficulties and other hurdles (Mays 2003; Draper, Liebhaber, and Ginsburg 
2007).  Similarly, even in brief exploratory interviews, it is apparent that the recent PEHP 
efforts profiled above have also been technically challenging, necessitating sizable 
investments to develop the data capacity necessary to collect and analyze risk-adjusted 
clinical information at the individual provider or group level.  Moreover, based on initial 
exploratory research, these PEHPs have also faced numerous political obstacles, including 
resistant provider groups wary of methodologies used to rate individual providers based on 
efficiency. 
Despite these challenges and obstacles, given that some PEHP leaders explicitly 
couch their initiatives with “half an eye on the larger market in the state”, these claims are 
noteworthy for any examination seeking to better understand the roles that PEHPs play or 
are perceived to play in state health care markets and policy environments (Mitchell 
interview 2006).  Beyond these three ambitious states, however, most other PEHP 
interviewees in sample states were less sanguine about the broader roles of PEHPs within the 
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larger health care market.  These PEHPs described their cost containment and other 
initiatives mainly in terms of achieving policy objectives (e.g., mitigating cost increases) 
specifically for the state PEHP itself, with much less explicit focus on influencing the larger 
state health care marketplace or contributing significantly to the larger state health policy 
goals.   
Thus, from the available literature and from my early exploratory research on trends 
in the twelve largest state public employee health plan purchasers, two competing views 
emerge of PEHPs and their roles in state health care policy.  First, the three “snapshots” of 
recent PEHP initiatives in California, Massachusetts, and Minnesota derived from early 
exploratory research suggest a potentially broader role for PEHPs in the larger state health 
care policy arena than merely providing health care benefits for state workers and other 
traditional constituencies.  Thus, one view is that through their PEHP purchasing and 
contracting decisions, states may be able to pursue particular statewide policy objectives not 
via regulatory fiat or through statutory processes, but rather through their roles as health care 
purchasers.  A second view of PEHPs and PEHP policymaking has also emerged.  Namely, 
given myriad financial, political, and market constraints, PEHPs are unable to yield 
considerable influence in “reforming” the state delivery system or achieving other goals 
through their purchasing and contracting approaches and other activities.  This latter view 
was expressed by officials in several states, including North Carolina.  Interestingly, 
interviews in North Carolina suggested that even though North Carolina’s was a very large 
PEHP (with over 600,000 covered lives), previous efforts to use the PEHP as part of a larger 
state effort to “fundamentally alter the competitive landscape” fell victim to myriad political, 
market, and other challenges.  This dissertation will assess the competing views of the 
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opportunities and constraints of PEHPs in greater detail, with a specific focus on 
Massachusetts and North Carolina. 
Overview of Research Questions 
This dissertation explores recent policymaking activities among PEHPs in these two 
states to gain greater insight into the opportunities and constraints of PEHPs in state health 
care markets and policymaking environments.  Three key policy questions motivating this 
research are: 1) what accounts for the different roles (or the different views on roles) that 
PEHPs play within the state health care environment, 2) how have different states leveraged 
the purchasing practices of PEHPs in an attempt to broadly influence aspects of the health 
care delivery system, and 3) what factors help to account for the successes or limitations of 
the experiences of these efforts.  
These two case study states were selected to examine PEHP efforts to promote cost 
containment-related “reform” initiatives within two different policy and political 
environments (and at different times).  Specifically, according to preliminary exploratory 
research, Massachusetts stands out as a state currently and actively involved in an ambitious 
effort to exert its purchasing influence to benefit not only the state itself, but also the state’s 
health care system more broadly.  North Carolina, by contrast, stands out as a state that 
articulated a more limited view of the “role” of the PEHP in state health care policymaking, 
having previously attempted to use the PEHP as a platform for broad delivery system reform 
(case selection methods discussed in Chapter 3).  Exploring the efforts of these two state 
PEHPs affords an opportunity to examine PEHP decision-making and development in states 
of different sizes, states with different reputations for or inclinations toward health reform, 
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states with different political characteristics, and states with very different health care 
markets.  
This approach also allows for a specific focus on how politics and the features of 
PEHPs themselves help shape PEHP policymaking.  In Massachusetts, for example, the 
PEHP is driven by a strong-willed executive director and commissioners that exercise 
considerable political autonomy with little direct oversight from state legislators and the 
governor.  The PEHP in North Carolina, too, is governed by a board of directors, but state 
legislators historically have wielded much more political influence and oversight over the 
operations and strategy of PEHP policymaking.  Thus, this dissertation will explore how 
political influences affecting PEHPs are filtered or manifested in different ways in each state 
in part due to different (and evolving) governance structures and leadership.  I will explore 
how these issues may in turn influence the larger roles that these PEHPs play (or are 
perceived to play) in states’ health care policy arenas.  
In addition to exploring how the political features of PEHPs help shape their 
policymaking, this dissertation will also assess the degree to which PEHP politics and 
policymaking is rooted in the broader market environments in which PEHP leaders operate.  
State market conditions vary from state to state.  Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of 
ambitious PEHP efforts to “reform” the delivery system in their respective states, for 
example, even the most aggressive and assertive public (or private) purchaser is likely to 
face significant obstacles to overcome market “inertia” at the state level.   
The dissertation is divided into six chapters.  After this introductory chapter, Chapter 
2 reviews relevant literature on the key factors influencing cross state variation in state 
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health policy and contains the hypotheses that will be tested in a comparative analysis of the 
two case states.  Chapter 3 describes the research methods and data used in case studies of 
PEHP policymaking in Massachusetts and North Carolina.  These case studies appear in 
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  Finally, Chapter 6 provides cross-case conclusions, 
comparing and contrasting PEHP policymaking in each case state and considering the 
opportunities and limits of PEHPs as components of state health policy.  It also discusses 
some of the major challenges emerging on the horizon (e.g., new accounting standards) to 
draw additional conclusions about PEHP politics, public policy, and opportunities for 
additional research. 
 
Chapter 2: Key Research Questions  
 
Key Questions 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there has been a dearth of scholarship focusing on the 
factors influencing PEHP policymaking and the “purchasing influence” role that PEHPs play 
within state health care policy environments.  Given PEHPs’ large enrollments and budgets, 
some state PEHP leaders view PEHPs as especially important players in the state health care 
arena beyond the provision of insurance and other benefits to primary PEHP constituencies 
(including public employees, retirees, and their dependents).  By actively asserting the 
“purchasing influence” of the state as a major employer, some state PEHPs seek to explicitly 
use their respective contracting processes to yield cost containment and other benefits that 
are expected to benefit PEHPs themselves and also the state health care system as a whole.  
By contrast, preliminary exploratory research also identified other PEHPs whose leaders are 
much less sanguine about the larger roles that PEHPs play in the state health care 
marketplace.  These state PEHP leaders suggested a more limited ability for state PEHPs to 
assert meaningful influence to “reform” the state delivery system in various ways.  
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Three key policy questions are: 1) why do some state PEHPs (and not others) 
optimistically promote the “spillover effects” that their PEHP purchasing and contracting 
strategies may have to benefit the state market as a whole; 2) what are the key factors 
characterizing PEHP policymaking that enable state PEHPs to assert themselves in different 
ways as part of the broader state health policy environment; and 3) what are the key factors 
that may constrain or limit state efforts to use PEHPs to pursue broad statewide policy 
objectives. 
This dissertation is not a comprehensive evaluation of the various cost containment 
and other efforts undertaken by different states per se.  Nor is it an exhaustive historical 
account of PEHP political or institutional development.  Rather, it is a political and policy 
analysis that seeks to understand the different experiences of states in undertaking initiatives 
with the broader state health care market in mind and the factors influencing these 
experiences. 
This dissertation uses theory developed to explain cross-state policy variation and 
serves to define a context for better understanding PEHP policymaking.  Explaining cross-
state variation in numerous policy areas has been viewed and analyzed through the lens of 
political science and public policy literatures.  Specifically, scholars have noted the critical 
importance of various political, socio-economic, and cultural factors (discussed in detail 
below) that help to explain state-to-state policy variation.  Absent a developed theory of 
PEHP policymaking, these political science and public policy literatures were used to help 
develop an explanatory framework about PEHP policymaking and the variation in state 
experiences using PEHPs to address broad policy problems at the state level.   
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In addition to state level factors likely to influence variation in state PEHP policy, 
this dissertation also considers the role of particular PEHP-specific factors or variables (as 
distinct from state-level issues) that help to influence PEHP policy choices and experiences.  
These include the systems of governance (formal and informal) that characterize who 
controls PEHPs and how PEHP policy decisions are made.  Specifically, the key variables of 
interest for this dissertation, which include political, market, “cultural” and other factors, are 
discussed in specific detail below: 
Political
• Partisan political landscape 
• Interest groups 
• State political culture 
 
Market
• State wealth 
• State health care marketplace 
 
Cultural/Other
• State policy innovation  
• PEHP governance structure/bureaucratic autonomy 
• Policy entrepreneurship and leadership 
For the purposes of describing the literatures associated with each of these variables 
in the remaining portion of this chapter, as well as for analytical purposes in case studies, I 
have grouped political, market, and cultural/other factors based on their respective levels of 




• Partisan political landscape 
• State wealth 
• Interest groups 
• State political culture 
• State policy innovation  
• State health care marketplace 
PEHP-level factors:
• PEHP governance structure/bureaucratic autonomy 
• Policy entrepreneurship and leadership 
Some of these variables were used to help select case states by ensuring that variation 
exists among key independent variables.  Other variables were explicitly examined in the 
case analyses themselves.  In the next section, I describe each variable’s treatment in the 
broader political science and public policy literatures and explain how and why they were 
expected to play a role in this study.  Then, I explore the analytical approach of this 
dissertation and the rationale for selecting particular case states.  Finally, I discuss the 
expected outcomes of this dissertation and the strengths and limitations of the particular 
research approach. 
The rest of this chapter reviews the relevant political science and policy literatures 
concerning the factors that are appear likely to influence PEHP policymaking, including 





Partisan Political Landscape 
A longstanding theoretical tradition in political science, particularly studies of 
welfare policy variation at the state level, supports the notion that particular policy choices 
reflect two important features of state electoral systems.  The first is the degree of inter-party 
competition within states.  In his classic analysis, Southern Politics, Key (1949) argued that 
the policy process is more likely to respond to the needs of disadvantaged people, for 
example, when political parties are more evenly matched and forced to contend with one 
another by mobilizing and swaying voters.  According to Key, states in which two 
vigorously competitive political parties compete with each other are associated with more 
generous welfare programs than those states in which single parties dominate.  While this 
dissertation does not focus on welfare generosity per se, it incorporates partisan competition 
and political control within states since these issues represent longstanding explanations for 
cross-state public policy variation in the political science literature.  
Scholars in the 1950s and 1960s investigating similar phenomena reached similar 
conclusions as Key.  For example, Lockard (1959) and Fenton (1966) both found in their 
studies of regional politics that two-party states were more likely to be associated with 
particular policy choices relative to states in which one party dominates.  While some 
analysts have cast doubt on the general argument that political party configurations play an 
important role in different policy outcomes (Dawson and Robinson 1963; Boyne 1985), 
others have increasingly used fifty-state statistical analyses (as opposed to regional studies) 
and have continued to reach similar conclusions about the importance of political variables 
in explaining cross-state variation in public policy choices.   
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Scholars continued to cite the intensity and nature of state party competition into the 
late 1980s until the present.  For example, recent studies have suggested that states with 
more competitive elections tend to produce more liberal social policies (Brace and Jewett 
1995; Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993).  Other analysts have questioned, more generally, 
whether governments under divided political control can make difficult choices and respond 
effectively to budgetary crises (Cutler 1989; Sundquist 1988) or coordinate to raise taxes 
(Roubini and Sachs 1989).  Faced with a recession or budget deficit, states with split 
legislatures may act less aggressively to eliminate deficits more quickly relative to states 
where one party exercises greater political power (Alt and Lowry 1994; Poterba 1994).  
Other analysts have found that partisan effects on spending at the state level are more 
modest (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989).  Nonetheless, while these larger streams of 
studies contain numerous sub-debates and issues that scholars continue to explore, the more 
general insight for the purposes of this dissertation is that the nature of political party 
competition can contribute to cross state variation in public policy choices at the state level. 
In addition, scholars have found that the political performance and domination of 
particular parties matters as well.  For example, Paul-Shaheen has noted in her review of 
comprehensive state health care reform initiatives that “the predominance of Democrats 
among them is somewhat striking” (Paul-Shaheen 1998).  Democratically-controlled states, 
it has been argued, are more likely to be associated with the emergence of particular policy 
efforts (e.g., more expansive regulatory efforts or proposals to expand access to public health 
insurance coverage) while Republican states are associated with others.  For example, when 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 provided states with discretion in how they structured new 
federally-subsidized state child health insurance programs, Beamer (2004) noted that states 
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with Republican-led governments were more likely to enact separate children’s health 
insurance programs rather than Medicaid expansion programs.  This difference, he noted, is 
related to Republicans’ political and ideological concerns about cost cutting and expansive 
public programs for poor citizens.  There may be some validity to the theory that Democrats 
favor more government intervention than Republicans.  However, recent anecdotes in the 
health policy arena in Massachusetts and California, in which Republican governors and 
Democratic legislators have worked together to champion comprehensive health care reform 
initiatives (or proposals), suggest that political domination by one party or another may not 
be a sole factor in explaining cross state variation in health reform. 
Nonetheless, state partisan political environments are expected to impact the policy 
choices of PEHPs from state to state.  Absent a coherent body of theory addressing the 
politics of PEHPs, it is not clear at the outset whether Democrats or Republicans are more 
likely to be active participants in PEHP policymaking, and what partisan political 
configuration and identification might mean for their determination or motivation to 
leverage the purchasing power of PEHPs to pursue statewide policy goals.  Nor it is 
altogether clear what impact, if any, split legislatures may have on PEHP policymaking.  
Nonetheless, I hypothesize that states in which Democrats have more dominant and 
consistent control over state policymaking will be more likely to embrace an “opportunistic” 
view of PEHPs’ roles within state health policy and market environments.   
Accordingly, these states will be more likely to assert the purchasing influence of 
PEHPs to seek reforms of the state health care environment compared to states in which 
Republicans have achieved more electoral success.  Moreover, I further hypothesize that 
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split legislatures (in which partisan control of legislative and governor’s offices is split) will 
be less likely to view state PEHPs as avenues to achieve broad statewide policy reform. 
State Wealth 
In addition to political dynamics at the state level, another factor that has been 
evaluated extensively in the state policy literature as a determinant of cross state policy 
variation is the importance of the socio-economic conditions of states themselves.  State 
wealth has long been a fixture in state policy variation studies.  By including socio-economic 
data along with political data in their fifty-state models, for example, Dawson and Robinson 
(1963) concluded that variation in states’ per capita income is one of the most important 
factors influencing cross state variation in policy choices.  Others scholars that have 
supported the socio-economic thesis include Dye (1966), Lewis-Beck (1977), Davidson 
(1978).  According to these and other scholars, variation in the degree of state wealth is the 
most important predictor of a number of political and policy outcomes.  The latter scholar 
cited above, Davidson, explicitly explored the relationship between state wealth and 
Medicaid variation, and found that greater wealth is associated with more liberal Medicaid 
benefits and eligibility.  In the 1980s and into the 1990s, fewer scholars cited socio-
economic explanations as the predominant factor explaining cross-state policy variation.  
Rather, scholars have developed models that encompass both political and economic 
variables (Plotnick and Winters 1985; Barrilleaux and Miller 1988; Reutzel 1989; Peterson 
and Rom 1990).   
The consensus hypothesis with respect to state fiscal health is that the greater the 
amount of resources available to a state, the more likely it is that the state can afford to 
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undertake more stringent regulation or adopt policy innovations (Williams and Matheny 
1983; Lowry 1992).  Here again, the broader insight is that state wealth, or more 
specifically, the economic status of states’ citizens, are important factors influencing the 
policy direction of state policymakers.  Applied to PEHP policymaking, a state’s economic 
development and state wealth are expected to similarly influence more wealthy states to 
view PEHPs as important components of state health policy.  These states are likely to more 
aggressively use the purchasing influence of PEHPs to seek delivery system and other 
reforms at the state level. 
Interest Groups 
Political scientists have long studied the ability of organized interest groups to play a 
significant role in the policy process (Smith 1995).  The formulation and adoption of public 
policy is shaped by conflicts and competition between interest groups (Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998).  Thus, according to interest group theory, public policy can be viewed as 
reflecting the interests of dominant groups at any given time.  At the federal level, the classic 
interpretations about health care policy reform at the national level are dominated by 
discussions concerning the role of powerful interest groups loathe to have the policy system 
challenge the status quo.  This storyline lies at the heart of the standard view of the failure of 
Clinton Administration’s national health care plan in the early 1990s, for example.  Many 
scholars (West, Heith, and Goodwin 1996; Weissert and Weissert 2002; Jamieson 1994; 
West and Loomis 1999) and journalists (Johnson and Broder 1996) suggested that the 
influence of powerful interests representing the health care industry was an important reason 
that the legislation was not successful in even being voted upon before being permanently 
tabled. 
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At the state level, prior work on state health policy has generated conflicting results 
about the role of organized interests.  Recently, for example, a study by Gray, Lowery, and 
Godwin (2005) yielded mixed results when examining how the composition of state interest 
groups (or “interest communities”) influenced the adoption of managed care regulations 
during the 1990s.  However, in their previous examination of drug assistance laws, the same 
group of scholars found that the composition of state interest communities had little impact 
on policy adoption (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2004).   
In other policy areas, organized interests have long been seen as major forces in the 
policymaking process (Thomas and Hrebenar 1996).  According to several scholars, specific 
interest groups – representing business, labor, agriculture, local governments, and education, 
among others – dominated state policymaking before the 1960s (Thomas and Hrebenar 
1991, 1999; Zeigler 1983).  Since the 1960s, however, the number and types of organized 
interests working at the state level have expanded significantly (Gray and Lowery 1993; 
Nownes and Freeman 1998; Thomas and Hrebenar 1991, 1999).  As devolution has shifted 
enormous policy responsibility for many programs to the states, state interest group activity 
has increased correspondingly (Gray and Lowery, 1993; Thomas and Hrebenar 1991, 1996).  
However, despite the rise of new groups as well as new forms of interest group influence on 
the policymaking process, research has demonstrated that traditional organized interest 
groups, such as those representing business, remain the most influential in state 
policymaking (Thomas and Hrebenar 1991, 1996; Grogan 1994).    
Factors that help to influence why interest groups appear to play a more important 
role in some cases than others has to do with the nature of policy development of interest.  
Recently, scholars, including Gray (1993) and Grogan (1994) have recognized that the 
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political and other drivers of policy decisions can vary depending on the particular policy 
domain in question.  Grogan cites as an illustration the proposition that redistributional 
policies such as tax rates fit the rational-activist model because it is usually a high profile 
policy area receiving a significant amount of media attention that, symbolically at least, 
affects all voters.   
On the other hand, theories emphasizing interest groups provide more coherent 
explanations for distributive policies, such as physician or hospital payment issues.  Here, 
the interests of health providers are intense and important (as it directly affects their own 
incomes).  Health care spending represents these interests’ revenue, and hence they typically 
oppose efforts that threaten their income.  Moreover, such groups are typically well-
organized, well-funded, and politically connected.  They can thus can take advantage of 
political mechanisms, such as lobbying state legislators directly or via trade associations, to 
block efforts deemed hostile to their interests.  Provider groups are likely to be very 
interested and aware of issues associated with PEHP cost containment and contracting 
requirements.  After all, at a national level, numerous scholars have classified the American 
Medical Association (AMA) and the American Hospital Association (AHA) as among the 
most powerful and influential interest groups (Milbrath 1970; Starr 1982; Marmor 1983). At 
the state level, provider groups such as medical and specialty societies and hospital 
associations typically exert strong influence on public policy, particularly when they view 
policy change as a threat to their income, professional autonomy, or reputation (Begun, 
Crowe, and Feldman 1981).   
By contrast, within this policy domain, the interests of the general public are 
relatively diffuse.  I argue that the public at large is not particularly attentive to the ways in 
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which PEHP contain costs or enact purchaser requirements, such as provider reimbursement 
policies.  Stigler's (1972) theory of regulation and Lowi’s interest group and policy 
typologies (1964) are instructive in forming a basic rationale for this political dynamic.  The 
limited involvement of the voting public is due to low levels of public knowledge and 
limited direct connections to such policies (Stiglar 1972; Begun et al. 1981).  Instead of 
focusing on the rising costs of health care benefits for state workers and their dependents, 
taxpayers and organizations that are concerned about growing state health care costs 
typically direct their ire to a much larger component of state health spending: Medicaid.  
While most voters are not directly enrolled in Medicaid themselves, Medicaid politics 
generates broader symbolic appeal that is associated with states’ larger roles in welfare 
provision and budgetary growth.  Thus, the voting public is relatively more concerned about 
Medicaid policy (and specifically, Medicaid budget growth) than PEHP policy. 
By contrast, health care provider groups can recognize potentially significant gains or 
losses associated with PEHP provider reimbursement and other purchaser requirements or 
contracting approaches.  Hence, providers are more likely to engage in the political process 
over, for example, reimbursement issues.  I argue that the activity and mobilization of 
provider interest groups shape state PEHPs’ perceptions and expectations about the roles that 
PEHPs play within the larger state health care marketplace.  Assertive, well-organized, and 
well-financed provider groups can thus serve as a major constraint for PEHPs to leverage 
their purchasing influence seeking policy change at the state level.  Thus, I hypothesize that 
the activity and mobilization of provider interest groups is negatively correlated with state 
officials’ willingness or assertiveness to leverage PEHPs in ways that are perceived to 
directly affect providers’ income, professional autonomy, or reputation.  PEHP purchaser 
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efforts that are perceived to pose a serious threat to interests invested in maintaining the 
status quo (including physicians, hospitals, insurers, and others) are less likely to emerge in 
states in which these interests strongly influence the political and policy environment.   
Health care providers and health plans are not the only stakeholders or “interests” 
likely to express positions on PEHP policy efforts.  According to Zeiglar (1983), the most 
influential interest groups at the state level tend to be from business and professional 
associations (Zeiglar 1983).  According to Grogan and others, organized labor, including 
state teachers' associations, also continue to be among the most effective interests in the 
states (Grogan 1994; Thomas and Hrebenar 1991, 1996, 1999).  Research shows that these 
traditional organized interest groups have been able to retain their influence and power 
because they have maintained long-standing “insider relations” with state legislators 
(Thomas and Hrebenar 1999).  Traditional “insider” groups have developed symbiotic 
relationships with state legislators such that state governments have come to depend on them 
in the long-term. 
Labor unions or employee associations represent another type of “interest” present 
and active in some states and not in others.  While private sector union activity has waned in 
recent decades, many state and local government workforces are unionized to varying 
degrees, with union representatives playing sometimes powerful roles in employee 
compensation decisions (Watts 2003).  In some cases, union representatives sit on PEHP 
governing boards.  In other cases, union representatives play legally proscribed roles in 
collectively bargaining benefits and other policy choices.  In still other cases, unions have 
limited, if any, roles.  Strong public employee unions may influence the cost containment 
strategies of PEHPs in myriad ways.   
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For the purposes of this dissertation, it is not clear at the outset about how the 
presence of unions impacts state efforts to “leverage” the state PEHP to achieve broad public 
policy goals for the state.  That said, labor unions are unlikely to embrace policy efforts that 
are perceived to limit or reduce the generosity of benefits, provider access, or other issues for 
state workers and retirees.  States with a strong public employee union presence are likely to 
be slower (or more reluctant) to modify (heretofore generous) PEHP benefits and cost 
sharing.  According to a recent study of public sector purchasers, the impact of unions in 
communities with active unions was to maintain a richer benefit package than in the private 
sector (Watts 2003).  Thus, union leadership is expected to influence state PEHPs to focus 
their policy strategies on efforts that retain generous benefits and cost sharing provisions for 
PEHP members.  Additionally, assertive public unions wary of fewer provider options are 
also expected to oppose and actively work against any strategies that are perceived to limit 
provider networks or otherwise limit member access to health care providers (e.g., by higher 
co-pays for accessing certain providers).   
State Political Culture 
Numerous studies about state politics and policy have incorporated the concept of 
political culture to help shed light on the variations in state political characteristics or policy 
approaches (Elazar, Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969; Sharkansky 1970).  In general, states’ 
political cultures reflect their general levels of ambivalence about government and degree of 
support for public action in the policy arena.  These studies involve presenting evidence that 
cultural variations, independent from political or economic variations, help account for state 
political or policy characteristics.  
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Elazar (1966) famously developed a theory and classification of American political 
culture that depicts the boundaries of what states historically constitute as proper 
government action.  Specifically, he suggested that culture is a combination of three political 
sub-cultures: moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic.  Each embodies a different 
perspective about the “appropriate” role of government, citizens' roles in government, and 
the political process.  For example, those in moralistic states tend to view political activity as 
a way to improve the conditions of society.  Accordingly, policymakers in such states are 
most likely to champion or embrace broad public programs.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, public officials in predominantly traditionalistic states view political activity as 
more limited.  Politicians in individualistic states tend to occupy a middle ground between 
moralistic and traditionalistic states.  Individualistic cultures tend to support government 
intervention to the degree that it can maintain the order of the marketplace.   
Other “political culture” theorists criticize Elazar’s typology, arguing instead that 
classifying states as “liberal” or “conservative” is a more useful measure of political culture.  
The general argument here is that within the welfare arena, for example, liberal states are 
more likely to support more expansive or “generous” welfare programs (Klingman and 
Lammers 1984; Buchanan 1987). Analysts have written about the role of political culture in 
blocking health care reform at the national level.  Importantly, however, political culture is 
not homogeneous throughout the United States.  Previous research indicates that government 
culture and ideology vary significantly across the states (Berry et al. 1998).  Thus, one might 
expect state policy choices to be shaped by the ideologies of current elected officials, which 
itself is a reflection of states’ political culture.
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Ideology and political culture seem to have played a somewhat varied role in state 
health and welfare policy over the last two decades.  In the state welfare arena, for example, 
conservative states are more likely to support more meager benefit packages and restrictive 
eligibility rules (Rom 1999).  In the health policy arena, Barrilleaux, Brace, and 
Dangremond (1994) found state ideology to be the strongest predictor of a set of health 
policy reforms adopted by states.  Gray, Lowery, and Godwin (2004, 2005) found that 
opinion liberalism was strongly associated with the adoption of pharmaceutical assistance 
legislation, but had little impact on the adoption of HMO regulations.  The same authors 
found nearly the reverse pattern for partisan control of government, with Democratic control 
of the governor’s office and legislature having little impact on the probability of adopting 
pharmaceutical assistance programs, but a significant impact on HMO regulation.  Thus, 
ideology and partisan control can be viewed as separate phenomena for the purposes of 
investigating the factors influencing policy variation.  
In the domain of PEHP policymaking, states are not (as directly) affected by federal 
rules or financing (relative to Medicaid politics and policy).  Thus, states enjoy significant 
flexibility to make PEHP policy choices in accordance with their own political cultures.  
Accordingly, this dissertation will incorporate political culture by ensuring that the case 
states chosen for analysis vary according to Elazar’s (1966) and Sharkansky's (1969) much-
used political culture index measures as well as Klingman and Lammers (1984) and 
Buchanan’s (1987) liberal-conservative measures.  The standard method used to 
operationalize Elazar's conception of political culture is to use an additive scale developed 
by Sharkansky (1969) ranging from 1 (purely moralistic) to 9 (purely traditionalistic).  
Measures of state political culture operationalized using Elazar's political culture construct 
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have not changed much over many decades (Morgan and Watson 1991).  Therefore, I will 
ensure that case states selected for this analysis vary using Elazar’s political culture 
construct as developed by Sharkansky.  With respect to Klingman and Lammers (1984) and 
Buchanan’s (1987) liberal-conservative typologies, both assign Massachusetts to a “liberal” 
state and North Carolina as a “conservative” state.   
I have mixed expectations about the impact of state political culture on states’ efforts 
to achieve health care reform through the purchasing practices of state PEHPs.  On the one 
hand, I predict that more conservative, traditionalistic states, whose policymakers are in 
general more likely than counterparts in more liberal moralistic and individualistic states to 
have a more limited view of the role of government, will be less likely to hold an 
opportunistic view about the role of PEHPs in state policymaking.  On the other hand, 
individualistic and moralistic states are probably more likely to engage in innovative efforts 
wielding the purchasing clout of the state to help achieve broader policy goals.   
These expectations are compatible with the rather optimistic views of PEHP 
purchasing power that I identified in initial exploratory interviews in Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, and California.  However, this view counters what is known at the outset about 
North Carolina’s previous efforts to use the PEHP to help guide the development of HMOs 
in North Carolina.  Nonetheless, this view does fit the current pattern that emerged from 
exploratory interviews in traditionalistic states, including North Carolina, concerning the 
comparatively modest view of PEHPs’ larger roles in state health care policymaking.    
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State Policy Innovation  
Another important tradition in political science research suggests that states are 
characterized by general orientations toward innovation, with some tending to be policy 
leaders and others laggards.  According to Polsby (1984), policy innovations have three 
common characteristics: They are highly visible phenomena to political actors and 
observers, they are representative of a departure from past governmental practices, and they 
have lasting societal or institutional effects.  Most empirical research in this area has focused 
on the question of what factors predict state tendencies toward innovation (Walker 1969, 
1971; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 1990; Skocpol et al. 1993; Soule and Zylan 1997; 
Lieberman and Shaw, 2000).  
In a 1969 study, for example, Walker argued that states with higher incomes, higher 
levels of educational attainment, and greater degrees of urbanization are typically the most 
frequent leaders among states in policy innovation (Walker 1969).  By contrast, Gray (1973) 
responded that to understand state policy innovation, much depends on the particular policy 
arena under investigation.  In general, though, the key claim underlying this and other 
analyses has been that state responses to particular policy choices are likely to reflect a 
fundamental and somewhat stable propensity toward innovation (Gray 1973).  
While the general ideological and political shifts occurring over time at the state and 
national levels have been towards a more conservative, incremental politics, there has also 
been significant interest in some states in policy innovation, particularly in the heath policy 
arena.  This dissertation views PEHP policymaking as potential venues for policy 
innovation.  I hypothesize that state policymakers’ interpretations of the role of PEHPs in the 
37 
larger state health care marketplace and the innovative uses of PEHPs for larger policy 
purposes will be associated with states’ general reputations for innovation.  That is, states 
with a stronger tendency toward health and welfare policy innovation in general will be 
likely to view PEHP as important instruments of state health care policy and will attempt to 
wield PEHP purchasing power more assertively for broader policy purposes.   
State Health Care Marketplace 
State health care markets vary considerably from state to state.  For example, HMO 
penetration, a key measure of the structure and organization of state health care markets, is 
much greater in some states than others.  Theoretically, HMOs are designed to hold down 
the costs of medical care through their ability to restrict provider networks and use numerous 
medical management techniques.  In the early 1990s, HMOs were viewed by many as a key 
solution to the perceived crisis in health costs care by both liberals and conservatives.  
However, the severe backlash against HMOs’ restrictive provider networks and other 
restrictions on services developed by the mid-1990s.  As a result, HMO enrollments dropped 
by the end of the decade in most states.  
 Today, HMOs more closely resemble open-access preferred provider organizations 
(PPOs) by relaxing provider network and service restrictions.  Nonetheless, even if HMOs 
have lost much of their cost containment capacity in the post-managed care era, HMOs in 
some states are still viewed as influential organizations that are subject to state policy 
attention (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2005).  Despite rapid change in the HMO market, 
cross-state variation remains in the degree to which employers and consumers have 
embraced forms of managed care. 
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The policy options available to a given state will depend heavily on the nature and 
structure of the health care marketplace that exists within that state.  For example, in states 
with significant rural populations and few providers per capita, health care purchasers such 
as PEHPs may encounter greater difficulty negotiating aggressively with local provider 
groups because doing so could limit access to care for health care consumers.  The threat of 
network exclusion is attenuated when provider groups know that they are the “only game in 
town”.  However, in more densely populated metropolitan states in which numerous 
hospitals and physician groups compete for patient volume, employers may be able to wield 
the threat of network exclusion to yield different health care prices or contractual 
agreements.  Thus, different policy options may be available depending on the nature of the 
market itself. 
I expect to find that the political impetus for particular cost containment or other 
types of reforms using PEHPs will be closely associated with states’ market structures.  On 
one hand, policymakers in states with strong indemnity dominated marketplaces will be 
more likely than HMO-friendly states to use PEHPs instrumentally to stimulate broad health 
system change.  After all, states characterized by relatively high-cost and inefficient delivery 
systems have the most to gain by using PEHPs as instruments of reform.  On the other hand, 
the existence of broad health plan competition and overlapping provider groups and delivery 
systems gives states more options to use HMO competition within PEHPs for broader policy 
purposes.  States with few HMOs or low HMO penetration obviously have fewer 
opportunities to leverage HMO plan competition in an attempt to contain costs.   
The above discussion generates apparently conflicting expectations about how 
market characteristics (e.g., HMO penetration) may affect the strategies of policymakers to 
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leverage PEHPs to yield statewide policy or market change.  I argue that states with greater 
HMO market penetration are more likely to use HMOs as part of a broader strategy to yield 
cost containment benefits for the state as a whole.  I also argue, though, that states without a 
strong HMO presence have a strong political impetus for reform seeking to reduce the 
domination of traditional fee-for-service delivery systems.  This dissertation seeks to test 
these theories. 
PEHP-Specific Factors
In addition to the numerous state-level variables described above, this dissertation 
will also explore the impact of particular design features associated with PEHPs themselves.  
As noted in the previous chapter, PEHPs are financed by state-only dollars (as well as 
premium contributions from local employers and PEHP members) and states have broad 
discretion to make policy choices regarding institutional design, eligibility, benefit packages, 
and other issues.  Therefore, state PEHPs in particular states face different sets of 
institutional and political challenges according to their particular features.  Below I describe 
several such factors that are included in my analysis of PEHP policymaking.   
Governance Structure and Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Based on exploratory research, states appear to vary in the degree to which governors 
and legislatures are directly involved in PEHP policymaking and oversight, including the 
selection of governing boards or agencies.  From a cursory and very preliminary review of 
PEHP policymaking in several states, some state PEHPs appear to be governed by strong 
boards of directors or commissioners that exercise important powers or autonomy to make 
policy decisions and are insulated to some extent from day-to-day legislative politics.  A 
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good example of this kind of approach appears to be the Group Insurance Commission in 
Massachusetts.  In other states, such as North Carolina, legislators and other policymakers 
appear to have more direct involvement in PEHP oversight and decisionmaking than in 
states in which stronger boards set policy directions under broad mandates from legislative 
or discretion.  While all PEHP boards are subject to oversight from state legislators and 
governors as explicitly political entities, this oversight appears to express itself differently in 
different states.  I argue that these differences shape the policy options that are available and 
achievable in different states. 
To date, however, little is known about how differences across states in how PEHPs 
are governed shapes the perception of PEHPs as key actors in the broader state health policy 
environment of marketplace or in the actual policy efforts undertaken.  No study has focused 
extensively (or at all) on the variation across states in PEHP structures, design features, and 
degree of bureaucratic autonomy.  Thus, it is difficult at the outset of this dissertation to 
understand the range of variation across states, let alone how PEHP governance structures 
and other issues might play a role in the development of PEHP approaches or strategies in 
the larger state policy and market environments.  However, ignoring the role of governance 
structure and PEHP policymaking autonomy seems unwise.  Absent a coherent set of 
theories or empirical base related to the politics of PEPH policymaking and the role of 
governance structures, it may be helpful to glean some of the insights from the political 
science literatures on bureaucratic autonomy, which has previously focused mostly on the 
relationships between Congress and agencies.  
Some scholars such as Epstein and O’Halloran (1994) develop models that seek to 
explain why and when legislators are likely to limit agency discretion.  Bawn (1995) 
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examines a similar set of issues, focusing primarily on tradeoffs between taking advantage of 
the expertise that bureaucrats possess and controlling the tendency of agencies to “drift”.  
Bawn’s theory suggests that the level of discretion that legislators give to agencies depends 
on how closely aligned their interests are.  Scholars have explored several strategies 
regarding the legislature asserting control over bureaucracies, including the use of budget 
processes (Banks 1989; Bendor, Taylor, and Van Gaalen 1987), various forms of routine ex 
post oversight (Aberbach 1990 and Weingast and Moran 1983), and ex ante mechanisms 
whereby legislators use legislation itself to structure and control bureaucratic decision-
making processes (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; McNollgast 1992; Moe 
1990; Macey 1992). 
This previous research provides a potentially important foundation for understanding 
the degree of policymaking discretion afforded to PEHP leaders, focusing on both the 
preferences of the actors and the technical complexity inherent to the policy choice.  The 
benefits of granting discretion to PEHP governance structures is likely to increase as the 
objectives of policymakers and “agents” converge (Bawn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 
1994).  For example, if policymakers and PEHPs want to achieve the same outcomes, 
policymakers may grant PEHP boards and staffs with relatively greater political autonomy.  
If policymakers and PEHP boards and staffs seek to achieve different outcomes, however, 
policymakers may seek to grant PEHP boards and staffs with more limited autonomy and 
instead direct in explicit ways the specific policy strategies, policy boundaries, and outcomes 
to be pursued. 
Thus, understanding how to apply these insights to PEHP policymaking is difficult to 
address as it requires a great deal of understanding about the politics of PEHP policymaking 
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as well as the historical development of how PEHP governance structures emerged.  In this 
dissertation, I seek to better understand how PEHPs in different states are actually governed.  
In some cases, I expect to find that board members, appointed by governors and legislators, 
exercise broader control over PEHP policymaking and cost containment strategies than in 
other states.  Likewise, I expect to find variation in the degree of personal autonomy and 
authority exercised by PEHP staffs (e.g., administrators or executive directors).  While the 
ultimate cause of this variation is associated with historical political and other decisions 
associated with the establishment of PEHPs themselves (and many therefore might not be 
explicit strategies by current legislators and governors), I will seek to understand to the 
extent possible the source of this variation and its role in shaping the roles that PEHPs play 
as major purchasers.  
Understanding how PEHPs are governed, specifically the relationships between 
PEHP leaders and legislators and other policymakers, is important in understanding how and 
why policymakers may seek to use PEHPs for broad statewide policy purposes.  Moreover, I 
also argue that understanding issues related to PEHP governance structures and the degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy granted to PEHP boards and staff is important in understanding why 
and how particular strategies persist (or not) and their political impacts.  For example, to the 
degree that powerful hospital and other provider interests can essentially “capture” the PEHP 
policymaking process within the legislature through regular and direct legislative interaction 
and oversight regarding PEHP cost containment strategies, certain cost containment options 
may be more politically feasible or durable than others.   
A politically connected hospital executive, for example, may be able to use formal or 
informal legislative and “back channel” processes to forestall PEHP attempts to cut provider 
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reimbursement or otherwise regulate provider practices if PEHPs are not shielded to some 
extent from regular, ongoing, and direct oversight and monitoring from the legislature or 
particular legislators.  States in which PEHPs and their boards enjoy relatively more political 
autonomy may be able to set policy regarding cost containment and other issues in such a 
way that particular policy options are more feasible or durable.  Of course, it is possible that 
interest groups can also “capture” bureaucracies as well.  Nonetheless, the degree of 
bureaucratic autonomy in how PEHPs are governed is likely to yield differences across 
states in the political feasibility of certain policy strategies, and the durability of those 
strategies once implemented.   
I expect to find, quite generally, that states in which PEHP boards and staff members 
exercise relatively more political autonomy and authority in PEHP policymaking are more 
likely to wield PEHP purchasing power to pursue policy or market change that could 
threaten provider and other interests in various ways.  By contrast, such approaches may not 
be as politically feasible in states for which PEHP governance structures are more closely 
associated with political control through the legislative process. 
Policy Entrepreneurship and Leadership  
The presence (or absence) of particular political leaders and “policy entrepreneurs” is 
also expected to have an important impact on state policy approaches and strategies.  Policy 
change requires key leaders with the political capital to champion initiatives (McDonough 
2001).  As Thomas Oliver has noted: 
“[Policy reform] is driven not only by broad social forces, but also by leaders with 
specific ideas about the proper direction of public policy.  The activities of 
strategically placed individuals at a critical juncture in system development can 
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greatly influence the likelihood of policy change and especially the policy options 
given serious consideration” (Oliver 2004). 
Numerous studies highlight the importance of leadership in health care 
policymaking.  For example, Paul-Sheehan studied states that undertook various health 
reform activities and concluded that leadership is an “essential ingredient” of health reform 
and a major determinant of the particular policy paths that states have taken (Paul-Shaheen 
1998).  She also identified key tasks and strategies used by policy entrepreneurs in selected 
states and the important interactions of leadership with ideas, opportunity, and power.  
However, if leaders can shape public perceptions of public conditions and stimulate policy 
change, they can also serve as deterrents to change.  For example, Oliver describes how the 
resistance of a key legislative aide to the chair of the U.S. Senate Finance Committee led to 
the long delay of HMO options being introduced into the Medicare program (Oliver 2004).  
The agenda setting literature within political science has examined the action of 
policy entrepreneurs in shaping policy at the state and national levels (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Polsby 1984).  Policy entrepreneurs may or may not be elected 
or state officials.  Nonetheless, they seek to promote particular policy innovations using 
numerous approaches and efforts to sell their ideas to policymakers and other decision 
makers.  Policy entrepreneurs must be willing to invest political resources to attract 
sufficient support to win approval (Kingdon 1995).  Beyond merely interested citizens that 
petition government in various ways, policy entrepreneurs are distinguished by their well-
positioned decisions to take risks to skillfully change the terms of political or policy debates 
(Schon 1971).  These efforts include politically well positioned to argue that proposed policy 
innovations will produce more ideal policy outcomes or other benefits than maintenance of 
the status quo.  
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Some scholars investigating the activities of policy entrepreneurs in shaping political 
and policy outcomes at the state level have conducted surveys of key stakeholders to identify 
individuals that matched a description of policy entrepreneurship.  For example, Mintrom 
and Vergari (1998) sought to identify policy entrepreneurs and study the role of 
entrepreneurs so identified in Minnesota school choice policy arena.  They found that the 
presence and role of leaders and entrepreneurs varies by policy area, by state, and by time.  
Thus operationalizing the impact of entrepreneurs is difficult at best using regression 
methods.   
I expect to find in my analysis of PEHP policymaking that particular leaders inside 
and outside of state government have exerted their influence in setting the course of policy 
direction of PEHPs to impact the broader health care marketplace.  It is difficult to 
hypothesize more precisely about the influence and nature of policy leadership and 
entrepreneurship, but based on a review of the state policy literatures on agenda setting, 
among others, this is an important variable to consider in order to gain a better understanding 
of the key drivers of PEHP policymaking at the state level.    
Chapter 3: Research Design, Data, and Methods 
Research Design Overview 
This dissertation focuses on the key drivers influencing PEHP policymaking, with a 
particular focus on understanding how states “use” PEHPs to achieve broad public policy 
goals that extend beyond traditional PEHP constituencies.  Many of the variables that likely 
influence PEHP policymaking, discussed in Chapter 2, can be difficult to operationalize 
neatly into variables amenable to regression and other statistical techniques.   
One example of this is the degree to which the governance structures of PEHPs is 
subject to direct political influences from provider and other groups.  In some cases, 
researchers studying policy variation may have overlooked the degree to which 
bureaucracies are autonomous in making and/or implementing policy.  While fifty-state 
surveys allow for the testing of particular variables of interest, they can easily overlook 
idiosyncratic differences within states of important variables that may play a key role in 
shaping policy at the state level.  Moreover, very little is known about PEHP policymaking 
at the state level.  The questions addressed by this dissertation – and the data available on 
specific variables of interest – are most appropriately addressed using a multi-state case 
study approach.  Such an approach will allow for a clear illustration of recent cost state 
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policy decisions in included states to investigate why they were undertaken, how they were 
implemented, and their results within the larger state health care policy and political 
landscapes.   
An important part of this research is to examine the various political and other 
reactions or effects of such approaches (such as responses from participating health plans, 
provider groups, and other actors).  Thus, I focus not only on the current and recent policy 
efforts of state PEHPs, but also the “operational links” between policymakers, PEHP 
leaders, and other actors in the health care landscape that have influenced how and why 
states have developed or embraced particular strategies (Yin 1989).  Thus, the primary 
method of data collection is structured interviews with a broad range of health care 
stakeholders at the state level, including current and former PEHP executives and their 
staffs, policymakers, provider groups, private health plans, and others.  Specific interviewees 
for my early exploratory research and each case state are listed in the appendix. 
Several key benefits of case study research are particularly relevant for this study.  
While I have identified and test key variables of interest to address hypothesized outcomes, 
the process of case study research itself may help to identify or uncover additional 
explanatory variables than those presented in Chapter 2.  This is particularly true since, 
absent an existing theoretical base of PEHP policymaking, I am ultimately adapting insights 
from other substantive state policy areas to a study of PEHP policymaking.  The relevance of 
each variable were not known a priori; thus, additional factors influencing PEHP 
policymaking may emerge from the study itself.   
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A case study approach allows for a study of the complex interaction of political 
influences and policy choices that gave rise to particular uses of the purchasing influences of 
PEHPs within the broader state health care system.  Multiple data sources (primarily via 
interviews) provide assurance that reasons given for particular events or approaches 
appropriately reflect influences from different sources (“triangulation”).  A comprehensive 
case-based approach in each state ensures that appropriate market conditions and potentially 
complex social and political interactions are incorporated into each case study to the extent 
possible.  Conducting multiple interviews with a wide range of stakeholders and comparing 
results to each other and to published reports and other secondary data assures that any bias 
resulting from particular self-interests will be reduced to the extent possible. 
Primary and secondary data sources are used to test alterative interpretations. I 
evaluated the quality of the evidence of related conclusions and used pattern matching to 
distinguish and refine particular explanations for relevant events and policy choices from 
anecdotes and perceptions.  Moreover, this approach benefits from deriving (via structured 
interviews) the explanations of primary stakeholders in numerous positions, but generalizes 
from their personal experience by substituting anecdotes of unknown credibility for more 
objective information from other sources. 
Case Selection 
Specifically, this dissertation presents a comparative case study of PEHP 
policymaking in two case states: Massachusetts and North Carolina.  The selection of these 
states is based primarily on the desire to test a set of theoretical expectations about the uses 
of PEHP purchasing power in states with different political, market, and other conditions 
(Yin 1989; 1993).  Specifically, the selection of these states allows for an investigation of 
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how and whether PEHPs in states with different policy environments and health care 
markets and PEHPs with different institutional features and governance structures have had 
different experiences and outcomes attempting to harness the purchasing influence of PEHPs 
to yield broad delivery system change at the state level.  
The relative contribution of the some of the key variables identified in Chapter 2 are 
explicitly evaluated through case studies.  Others, however, were used to help justify the 
selection of particular case states.  Exhibit 3.1 below displays how each variable described in 
Chapter 2 is incorporated in this dissertation.   
For the dependent variable, I selected two states in which exploratory interviews 
revealed differing views of the “purchasing power” of PEHPs.  State PEHP perceptions were 
aligned with specific efforts currently undertaken by PEHPs to yield cost containment and 
other benefits for state as a whole.  Specifically, North Carolina’s PEHP interviewee 
suggested that state PEHPs can play only a modest role in contributing to or implementing 
broad changes in the state health care marketplace.  This particular perception is consistent 
with the North Carolina interviewee’s claim that the North Carolina State Health Plan (SHP) 
is not currently engaged in any efforts that have the potential to specifically influence the 
state’s broader delivery system.  Interestingly, however, the interviewee in North Carolina 
suggested that the state had, in fact, undertaken a major effort in the past using the SHP as an 
important vehicle or contributor to broader health system reform.  Perhaps North Carolina’s 
experience with this previous effort revealed important constraints on PEHP purchasing 
influence that in turn helped to shape a less sanguine view about the role of PEHPs in the 
broader health care market. 
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By contrast, the exploratory PEHP interview in Massachusetts revealed a much more 
optimistic view of the role of PEHPs.  In that state, the Massachusetts Group Insurance 
Commission (GIC) is engaged in a new purchasing and contracting strategy that is designed 
to yield cost containment benefits for the GIC itself as well as to affect the broader health 
care delivery system in the state.  
Thus, both Massachusetts and North Carolina have sought or are seeking to use the 
purchasing influences of their respective state PEHP to contribute to broader policy goals 
within the state.  The specific timing and direction of each state initiative varies, but the 
general notion of using or having used the PEHP as an important vehicle for health system 
reform is consistent in both states even while PEHP leaders’ in these states hold differing 
views about the roles that PEHPs can play in the broader state health care marketplace.   
For the key independent variables of interest outlined in the previous chapter, these 
states have different measures or values for several key explanatory variables, providing the 
ability to test the relative influence of each variable in different policy and market 
environments.  The “Used in Case Selection” column below displays the variables used to 
help select case states.  The “Interviews and Other Data” column shows variables that are 
specifically examined in detail in each case state.   
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Exhibit 3.1: Research Design: Use of Key Variables 
 Used in Case Selection Explored in Detail in Case 
Research  
Dependent Variable 
Perceptions about PEHP purchasing 
power to influence state health care 
system (from exploratory research) 
* *
Current or past efforts to use PEHPs to 
influence broader health care environment 
* *
Explanatory Variables  
(Factors Expected to Influence Variation in PEHP policymaking) 
State-Specific Factors: 




Interest groups * *
State political culture *
State policy innovation *
State health care marketplace * *
PEHP-Specific Factors: 
Governance structure and bureaucratic 
autonomy 
* *
Policy entrepreneurship and leadership  * 
Again, these variables were used to ensure that the case states selected vary in 
important ways.  For example, in selecting Massachusetts and North Carolina, I have 
selected two states with different partisan political environments, measures of state wealth, 
reputations for policy innovation, political cultures, health care markets, and traditions 
and/or legacies of policy innovation.  Exhibit 3.2 below shows more specifically how the 
Massachusetts and North Carolina state policymaking environments and PEHPs vary along 
the key variables defined above. 
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Exhibit 3.2: Research Design: Measures of Key Variables in Selected Case States 
 North Carolina Massachusetts 
Dependent Variable 
PEHP executives’ perceptions 
about PEHP purchasing power to 
influence state health care 
system  
• In early exploratory 
research, the PEHP 
interviewee in North 
Carolina described a 
“weak” role for PEHP 
purchasing power to 
influence state health care 
market 
• In early exploratory research, 
the PEHP interviewee in 
Massachusetts described a 
“strong” role for PEHP 
purchasing power to 
influence state health care 
market 
Current or past Efforts to use 
PEHPs to influence broader 
health care environment 
• Seeking to realize cost 
containment benefits for the 




HMOs in the state by 
offering the SHP population 
as a “hospitable” base of 
enrollment 
• Seeking to realize cost 
containment and quality 
improvement to benefit the 
GIC and the larger state 
health care system, the GIC 
used its contracts with  
private health plans to induce 
behavioral changes from the 
state delivery system  
Explanatory Variables  
(Factors Expected to Influence Variation in PEHP policymaking) 
State-Specific Factors: 
Partisan Political Landscape • Gubernatorial influence: 
46th out of 50 in terms of 
relative influence (2007) 
(Beyle Forthcoming) 
• Democratic governors 
(1993-present) 
• Republican House (1995-
1998) , Democratic House 
(1998-2001), shared rule in 
House (2001-2003), 
Democratic House (2003-
present) (Barone 2006) 
• Gubernatorial influence: 1st 
out of 50 in terms of relative 
influence (2007) 
• Republican governors (1991-
2007) 
• Solid Democratic House and 
Senate for decades 
State Wealth • Per capita gross state 
product ranking: 20 out of 
51 (2004) (U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis 2006) 
• Per capita income ranking: 
34 out of 51 (2005) (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2006) 
• Per capita gross state product 
ranking: 5 out of 51 (2004) 
• Per capita income ranking: 3 
out of 51 (2005) 
Interest Groups • “Strong” provider interests 
as defined by early 
exploratory interviews 
• Minimal role of service 
employee unions, but state 
employee representatives 
hold seats on board by 
statute 
• “Strong” provider interests as 
defined by early exploratory 
interview 
• Service employee unions 
hold seats on commission by 
statute  
State Political Culture • Elazar’s political culture • Elazar’s political culture 
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index as operationalized by 
Sharkansky: Traditionalistic 
(Elazar 1984) 
• Klingman and Lammers 




index as operationalized by 
Sharkansky: Individualistic 
• Klingman and Lammers 
(1984) and  Buchanan 
(1987)’s liberal-conservative 
scale: Liberal 
Policy Innovation • Traditionalistic (least policy 
innovation) (Savage 1987) 
• Individualistic (generally 
relatively more policy 
innovation than 
“Traditionalistic”) 
Health Care Markets • HMO penetration rate 
(2005): 9.9%, ranked 36 out 
of 51 (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2005) 
• Uninsurance rate (2005): 
15% (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2005) 
• HMO penetration rate 
(2005): 38.6% , ranked 3 out 
of 51 
• Uninsurance rate (2005): 
10% (Kaiser Family 
Foundation 2005) 
PEHP-Specific Factors: 
Governance Structureb • “Weak” board of directors 
with relatively strong 
legislative oversight 
• “Strong” commission with 
minimal direct legislative 
oversight 
Leadership and Policy 
Entrepreneurship 
• Unknown at outset • Unknown at outset 
In addition to general consistency in the dependent variable and variation in most key 
explanatory variables, the selection of Massachusetts and North Carolina as case states was 
also based on convenience.  I have had prior experience studying different aspects of health 
policy and/or PEHP policymaking in these two states.  This familiarity considerably aided 
the ability to secure interviews and other data necessary for the dissertation.   
Data  
I collected data in the form of numerous structured interviews in each case state with 
current and former PEHP administrators, private health leaders, health policy leaders, 
scholars, provider groups, consumer advocates, and current and former policymakers and 
 
b The assessment about governance structure is subjective based on preliminary interviews given dearth of other 
data. 
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senior legislative staff members.  Covering a broad range of public and private stakeholders, 
I used “snowball” techniques to identify appropriate interviewees to ensure that I covered 
numerous stakeholder positions and perspectives, including current and past executives from 
private health plans and, where possible, PEHPs.  These interviews shed light on the various 
aspects of the political process associated with management and development of PEHPs.  To 
a limited extent, interviews also covered the historical origins and development of each 
PEHP and the major political and other factors influencing the historical context of policy 
decisions for embracing or rejecting particular strategies to achieve broad policy goals. 
Following commonly accepted qualitative research methods, I developed detailed 
interview guides or protocols that facilitated consistent data collection across interviews.  In 
some cases when discrepancies emerged, excerpts from interview notes were independently 
reviewed, being careful to conceal key interviewee identities as necessary.  Then, I 
categorized responses across interviews mirroring the interview protocols.  The resulting 
analysis entailed comparing and contrasting the responses within each category, noting and 
discussing dominant themes and divergent opinions, and summarizing findings by topic 
area.   
After creating case studies of each state based on interviews and analysis of 
secondary data, I circulated relevant excerpts of the case studies among a selected group of 
diverse interviewees in each state.  I then revised the case studies using the comments 
received. Interviews assisted me in determining whether or not included variables 
represented the full range of factors that influence PEHP policy choices and the degree of 
effectiveness of related policy efforts. In some cases, secondary data collection and analysis 
helped to identify interviewees and new variables to include for further analysis.  
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Moreover, I used interviews and secondary data to gain as complete a picture as 
possible about how PEHP policymaking fits within the larger political process at the state 
level.  This helped me to draw conclusions about whether the influences that contributed to 
the use of policy approaches have been idiosyncratic (e.g., based on particular design 
features, governance structures, or state-level issues) or whether there are generalizeable 
explanations about why policymakers have acted as they have (and the results of those 
actions).  These results are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Interviews and available and related secondary data (e.g., white papers, reports, etc.) 
also shed some light on a range of issues in each case state to describe the larger context or 
“windows of opportunity” that emerged among states to use PEHPs in different ways 
(Kingdon 1995).  This necessitated understanding the changing dynamics of states’ larger 
political or economic environments.  State-level contextual issues, including the political and 
market variables described in Chapter 2, were examined to understand the political impetus 
and trajectory of PEHP policy efforts and their sources of continuity and change.  
The strengths of this research design are its ability to provide in-depth information 
from a variety of perspectives.  Moreover, this approach also permitted a clear understanding 
of the experiences of two states using PEHPs to achieve similar goals but in different 
contexts.  An important natural limitation of the case-study approach is that the selected 
cases do not necessarily generalize to the broader universe of states and/or PEHPs.  This is a 
very important point considering that state markets and political environments, as well as 
PEHP governance and other features, vary from state to state.  Other limitations include the 
limited number of people who could be interviewed, the limited ability to empirically 
estimate the magnitude of effects of various design features and political influences, and 
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subjectivity inherent in interpreting complex and often contradictory information.  These 
issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 4: Massachusetts 
Introduction  
Scholars and analysts have written much about Massachusetts’ numerous health 
reform efforts over the last several decades, including efforts to expand access, contain costs, 
and improve health care quality.  However, much less attention has been focused on the 
state’s Group Insurance Commission (GIC) in purchasing health care benefits on behalf of 
the state’s largest employer: the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.  This chapter explores a 
new cost containment approach recently undertaken by the GIC called the Clinical 
Performance Improvement (CPI) initiative that is designed to mitigate rising costs within the 
GIC as well as to stimulate delivery system reforms to influence the state health care system 
as a whole.  The chapter examines the factors that shaped how and why this particular 
strategy was implemented, its potential impact on the broader state health care marketplace, 
and the specific factors that have contributed to the GIC’s influence (as well as the limits of 
its influence) as a major public purchaser.  
Specifically, this chapter finds that the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission 
(GIC) has been successful implementing a new network tiering initiative over the strong 
objections of key providers and related groups.  This initiative has induced private actors 
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(i.e., health plans and provider groups) to engage in business practices that they would not 
have otherwise engaged in.  To do so, the GIC has taken advantage of the state’s reputation 
for policy experimentation and innovation, the GIC’s favorable position as a major employer 
within the Massachusetts marketplace, the GIC’s relatively autonomous governance 
structure that has largely insulated the GIC from political influences from providers and 
other groups, the broad political consensus supporting efforts to promote cost containment 
and quality improvement, the GIC’s willingness to compromise with powerful delivery 
system players, and dynamic and politically savvy GIC leadership.   
The first section reviews the recent background of the state’s health care marketplace 
and policy arena.  Not only is Massachusetts reputed for its activist health policy history, 
strong and influential provider community, and dynamic health plans, the state is also well 
known for per capita health care costs that significantly exceed national averages.  The latter 
characteristic of the state’s health care system provides an important backdrop in 
understanding the cost containment efforts that the GIC has introduced in recent years. 
The second section briefly describes the basic history and structure of the GIC, 
including its basic administrative design and governance structure, health purchasing 
strategy and performance, and leadership.  The second section also provides a detailed 
description of the Clinical Performance Improvement (CPI) initiative.  It explores how and 
why the GIC chose this particular cost containment path as well as the experience of 
implementing the CPI in the face of opposition from providers and other groups. 
The third section explores the potential opportunities and limits of the GIC’s 
purchasing influence in Massachusetts.  Specifically, this section examines the relative 
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influence of the key variables described in Chapter 2 in providing the GIC with an 
opportunity as a major health care purchaser to overcome resistance from powerful provider 
groups and other stakeholders in Massachusetts.  This section also discusses the important 
constraints of the GIC’s influence over the state’s delivery system.  The conclusion section 
of this chapter briefly describes the key lessons learned from the Massachusetts “story” that 
contribute to a larger understanding of the role and limits of state PEHPs in enacting or 
pursuing health system reform through purchasing practices and market power. 
The Massachusetts Health Care Environment  
Policymakers in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have long been actively 
engaged in state health care reform efforts, earning the state a reputation as a leading health 
policy innovator (Paul-Shaheen 1998).  Most recently, in 2006, the state’s ambitious new 
“health reform law” to expand access to health insurance coverage to nearly all uninsured 
citizens has, according to one active participant in the Massachusetts health policy 
community, “seal[ed] the Commonwealth’s reputation as a breakthrough innovator” 
(McDonough 2006).  
In addition to its activist policy legacy, Massachusetts is also home to many 
nationally-acclaimed academic medical centers, biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies, health plans, and other health care organizations in the state (New England 
Health Institute 2007).  Changes in the state’s economic profile in the last two decades have 
magnified the health care industry’s important role in the economy and workforce of the 
state and the region even as other industries, such as financial services and technology, have 
declined as a proportion of total jobs.  As Nancy Turnbull (president of the Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Massachusetts Foundation)  noted, “The aggressiveness of the political process 
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around health issues and the importance of health care employers to the commonwealth are 
interwoven as important aspects of the DNA of the Commonwealth” (Turnbull interview 
2006). 
The Commonwealth’s reputation for leading policy innovation, scientific knowledge, 
and its major health care workforce, moreover, have not immunized the state from rising 
health care costs, which numerous analysts, panels, and white papers have in recent years 
characterized as a “a significant problem” in Massachusetts (Massachusetts Health Care 
Task Force 2002).  Stakeholders described how growing concerns about health care costs 
(both within the GIC and the state as a whole) have served as a political backdrop allowing 
the GIC to undertake efforts to use its contracting process with private health plans to 
experiment with cost containment solutions. These issues are discussed in more detail below. 
Group Insurance Commission 
The Group Insurance Commission (GIC) was established by the Legislature in 1955 
and implemented on January 1, 1956 to provide and administer health insurance and other 
benefits to the Commonwealth's employees and retirees, and their dependents and survivors.  
According to the general statutes outlining the legal definition of the GIC, “[The GIC] shall 
be established within the executive office of administration and finance, but not under its 
jurisdiction” (General Laws of Massachusetts).  The legislation established a framework 
whereby the governor appoints an eleven-member Commission to govern the GIC.  
Commission members encompass a range of interests and expertise including labor and 
retirees, the public interest, the administration, and health economics.  GIC Commissioners 
exercise authority to govern the GIC with the leadership of an executive director and staff, 
whom they are responsible for hiring.   
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Before the creation of the GIC, individual agencies and departments in state 
government issued separate funding requests to the legislature to receive state subsidized 
health insurance for employees and covered dependents.  However, as some agencies (such 
as the highway department) were able to leverage political clout to receive better funding 
than other agencies (such as social welfare workers), concern arose that funding and benefit 
inequities were inefficient and unfair (Johnson 2006).  Thus, the GIC was established to 
unify the disparate health insurance benefits offered to state employees.  In 1956, the 
legislature passed what is now Chapter 32A and 32B of the general statutes, which provided 
enabling legislation to create the GIC and authorized cities and towns to offer health benefits 
to their employees and retirees.  The legislation establishing the GIC outlined that the state 
would subsidize all premiums at 50% with GIC members responsible for the remaining 50%.  
In 1956, the agency issued a request for proposals for a basic indemnity plan.  The dominant 
insurer in the Commonwealth at the time, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts 
(BCBSM), won the first contract from the 40 proposals received from 18 companies to 
provide insurance to GIC members (Group Insurance Commission Annual Report 2005).  
In 1973, the Massachusetts legislature passed a law encouraging the spread of HMOs 
at about the same time that Congress passed the Health Maintenance Organization Act 
(Public Law 93-222) that supported the development of prepaid health plans (Brown 1983).  
According to Johnson, “Even at that point in time, Massachusetts considered itself a highly 
educated and innovative state, and the relatively new concept of clinic-based medicine 
caught on well, initially in and around the university system and then across the 
commonwealth.  [HMOs], which we then called ‘HCOs’ had a very natural home here from 
the beginning” (Johnson 2006).  In 1976, the GIC first offered its members a choice of health 
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plans in addition to the indemnity product administered by BCBSM.  Two HMO plans were 
offered in that first year:  Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Valley Health Plan.  
Given the availability of HMOs, a “classic adverse selection spiral” emerged as 
younger, healthier workers preferred HMOs over the state’s traditional indemnity option 
(Johnson 2006).  At the same time, growing cost trends became a concern to the legislature 
and the Commission.  Dolores Mitchell was hired as the new executive director of the GIC in 
1987 and was given a mandate to “cut costs wherever you can” (Carey 2006).  In the same 
year, the GIC received the authority from the legislature to “self insure”, and the GIC did so 
in 1988.  One of Mitchell’s first acts was to convince the Commission to replace 
longstanding indemnity insurer BCBSM with the John Hancock Company in 1989, which the 
GIC contracted with on an administrative services only (ASO) basis starting in 1989. 
Concerned that one of the drawbacks of self-insuring was that “[the ASO] may not 
manage the chicken coop as well as they should since they are not at risk, but we are”, the 
GIC became more assertive in seeking to manage its own cost trends (Slavin 2006).  
According to several observers who were active in Massachusetts health policy at the time, 
the hiring of Mitchell and the decision to self-insure and to grant John Hancock the ASO 
contract (from BCBSM) gave the GIC – and Mitchell in particular – a clear mandate to very 
vigorously manage costs of the growing program while preserving the value of benefits to the 
extent possible (Slavin 2006).  While the Commission itself was ultimately responsible for 
setting GIC policy, observers noted that Mitchell very quickly “was determined to be highly 
capable and thus the legislature and the commission entrusted her with the authority to run 
the show…legislators had other issues on their plate, like the [cost] trends in [Medicaid] to 
worry about” (Interview 2006).    
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Unlike other public employers, such as Massachusetts cities and towns that operate 
outside of the GIC, the GIC from the beginning has not been subject to collective bargaining.  
This has provided considerable flexibility for the GIC to negotiate with plans directly and 
assertively.   By contrast, “Some cities have 14 unions; if they want to raise one copay for 
one plan, they have to negotiate with all 14 unions” (Johnson 2006).  Beginning in 1974, 
however, the legislature required that at least two Commissioners must be representative of 
public employee unions.  Nonetheless, according to several interviewees, the lack of 
collective bargaining (in an otherwise union-friendly state) has increased the GIC’s ability to 
directly and assertively negotiate with health plans over prices, cost sharing, and other 
provisions.  
Another noteworthy feature of the original legislation enacting the GIC is that the 
legislature has been historically responsible for setting employer contribution levels while the 
GIC exercises responsibility and autonomy to establish other cost sharing and benefits (Carey 
2006).  According to Johnson, this divided responsibility has “politically, at least, created a 
perfect balance that has sustained legislative/GIC relations…Each side has an important role 
to play but the legislature is free to deal with other issues” (Johnson 2006).  Today, the GIC 
offers its 254,000 members an Indemnity plan (with UniCare, a subsidiary of Wellpoint, 
holding the ASO contract), preferred provider-type organizations (PPO), and multiple HMO 
plans.  These options are discussed in greater detail below.  The GIC has a full-time staff of 
43 individuals with total annual expenditures of $1.06 billion ($954 million of which is 
accounted for by medical expenditures (Group Insurance Commission Annual Report 2006). 
Exhibit 4.1 below displays recent per capita annual medical cost trends. 
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Exhibit 4.1: Group Insurance Commission Cost Per Capita: Total State and 
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Source: Author’s Analysis of “Pool 1 Age/Sex Composition Analysis, Fiscal Years 2000-2006. Group 
Insurance Commission 2006. 
 
Clinical Performance Improvement Initiative 
This section explores the origins of the GIC’s recently-implemented CPI effort, 
including the political and other reasons that have jointly shaped how and why the GIC has 
been able to implement this new initiative in the face of strong opposition from powerful 
health care stakeholders, namely provider groups.   
GIC and Cost Containment 
Like all major employers providing or subsidizing health benefits for employees, the 
GIC has considered and/or experimented with numerous efforts to contain premium growth 
in recent years.  Like most public employers, however, this has not, in general included 
shifting significant new costs to workers.  The GIC’s employer purchaser counterparts in the 
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private sector, both in Massachusetts and nationally, have embraced the thinning of benefits 
and more aggressive member cost sharing (Dowan 2005).  By contrast, public employers 
including the GIC continue to pay higher premiums for more comprehensive benefits 
(Maxwell 2004; Hurley et al. 2006). 
According to interviews with former and current GIC staff members and 
commissioners, several factors explain why the GIC has been reluctant to shift significant 
costs to workers.  First, the GIC Commission has traditionally been “labor oriented…in the 
sense that we are mindful at all times of the impacts that our decisions have on the public 
workforce” (Zeckhauser interview 2006).  Historically, since the GIC was formally 
established, the GIC has not faced direct collective bargaining pressure from public unions 
even though Massachusetts itself is home to many employee unions.  However, by statute, 
two public employee unions are represented on the Commission’s board, albeit in a minority 
position.  
However, according to interviews with current and past commissioners, very rarely 
do union representatives on the Commission split with GIC staff and other commissioners.  
In general, according to a representative of the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (which in turn is part of the AFL-CIO) that has previously served on 
the commission, “while there are only two unions reps on the commission, there is typically 
broad consensus among colleagues that concern about protecting rich and affordable benefits 
for public sector workers and retirees is of paramount concern” (Interview 2006).  Secondly, 
broadly shared goals among GIC commissioners to protect the value of health benefits and 
avoid cost shifting are also associated with the GIC’s larger public employee recruitment 
and retention strategy: “We have to do what we can to engage workers on the health care 
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[benefit] front because the Commonwealth doesn’t offer high wages that you can get in the 
private sector….it’s an important employee retention issue” (Mitchell interview 2006).  
Moreover, legislators and their families are themselves among the public employees 
eligible for GIC health insurance benefits.  This means, according to a former GIC Director 
of Policy and Research, that GIC staff and commissioners “do not want to do anything that 
would provoke the ire of policymakers in a way that would make [legislators] scrutinize the 
work of the GIC for fear of the loss of independence that GIC has enjoyed” (Slavin 
interview 2007).  Finally, not only would cost shifting not be politically palatable, the GIC 
staff and commission also expressed concerned that cost shifting could fundamentally alter 
members’ health care consumption patterns in ways that could ultimately be more costly 
later: “I don’t want to keep shifting more out of pocket spending to low and middle income 
people; they avoid getting useful care when you do that, according to the evidence, which 
could be more costly later down the road” (Mitchell interview 2006). 
These factors have together preempted major cost shifting to GIC members, which 
helps explain the search for other cost containment alternatives. With significant cost 
shifting and benefit cuts “off the table” (Mitchell interview 2006), the GIC has attempted 
other efforts, such as disease management, cuts in provider reimbursements, and other 
strategies to mitigate annual cost increases.  In a recent public forum in Waltham, 
Massachusetts at which health care cost mitigation options were discussed, Mitchell 
responded to a listing of several potential cost containment options, by suggesting that, 
“[The GIC has] been there, done that. Been there, done that” (Mitchell speech 2006).  In an 
interview following her speech, Mitchell suggested that these common cost containment 
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options efforts have been “necessary and important to [GIC], but have by no means been 
sufficient” to mitigate annual cost increases (Mitchell 2006).   
As a result, the major cost containment approach that GIC has selected has been to 
focus on the relationships between health care quality and cost effectiveness by placing new 
pressure on both consumers (demand) and providers (supply) side of medical marketplace. 
The Clinical Performance Improvement (CPI) initiative currently represents the GIC’s 
predominant cost containment approach. According to the GIC’s 2006 Annual Report:  
“The GIC does not wish to adopt some of the cost reduction measures used by other 
large employers, such as high-deductible plans, or to eliminate retiree health 
insurance coverage entirely.  Instead, three years ago the GIC launched an innovative 
program called the Clinical Performance Improvement (CPI) Initiative to address the 
wide disparity in the quality of care delivered by physicians and hospitals as well as 
the precipitous rise in health care costs (Group Insurance Commission Annual Report 
2006).” 
Current and former senior level staff members who served at GIC when CPI was 
formulated believe that the CPI will affect both GIC cost trends as well as cost trends and 
practice patterns in Massachusetts more generally.  However, given the failure of other cost 
containment initiatives, these claims should be viewed with caution.  According to Mitchell: 
“We decided to use the power of contracting to begin to think about tiering physicians to 
give [consumers] incentives to go to the more cost-effective and better-quality providers, 
which we thought would affect the cost trends not just in our group, but in the state as a 
whole” (Mitchell interview 2006).  From the outset, the GIC’s CPI efforts have been 
expected to have important market spillover effects allowing the state to pursue cost 
containment and other policy goals by taking advantage of the GIC’s contracting process 
with private health plans. 
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Philosophical and Programmatic Origins of the CPI 
Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as the era of tightly managed care came 
to an end nationwide and in Massachusetts, Mitchell and key GIC commissioners became 
increasingly influenced and intrigued by the approaches of large private purchasers and 
purchaser coalitions across the nation seeking to achieve cost savings by addressing the 
variation in provider practices, costs, and quality.  In addition to the direct benefits 
associated with seeking higher quality, the philosophy of many large purchasers is that 
quality promotion could ultimately result in lower long-run health care costs, although the 
evidence for this to date is premature at best (Galvin 1999).  Numerous purchasing 
coalitions, such as the Washington Business Group on Health, the Pacific Business Group on 
Health, and Gateway Purchasers for Health have attempted to encourage health plans to 
focus on improving health care quality through data sharing and reporting.  Mitchell was 
intrigued by the philosophical underpinnings of these approaches. 
Tiered provider networks involve grouping physicians and/or hospitals into separate 
tiers based on the cost or efficiency of care they deliver.  Consumers receive incentives 
through lower premiums or cost sharing arrangements to choose the lower-cost or higher 
performing providers.  The underlying strategy of tiered networks is to steer consumers to 
lower-cost or more efficient providers while also encouraging hospitals and physicians to 
improve their efficiency or accept discounted payment rates in exchange for preferred tier 
placement.  Thus, providers are expected to be motivated (or threatened) by consumer 
incentives that reward higher-performing providers with patient volume and public 
perceptions about variations in quality and efficiency at the provider level. 
69 
The concept of using existing contracts with private health plans to develop tiered 
networks made good sense for the GIC, according to Mitchell, since even in the era of 
tightly managed care, most Massachusetts health plans did not significantly restrict provider 
networks to specific hospitals or physician groups.  According to Insurance Commissioner 
Julie Bowler, for example, consumers and employer groups in the state have long demanded 
that prestigious teaching hospitals and community hospitals alike remain in-network 
regardless of their geographic proximity or variation in cost and quality (Bowler interview 
2006).  Thus, given the ambivalence about closed panels of providers and reluctance to cut 
benefits or shift costs to workers, Mitchell became very interested in developing tiered 
provider networks as a priority to attain quality promotion and cost savings.  
The GIC’s network tiering strategy, called the Clinical Performance Improvement 
Initiative (CPI), has several components aiming to achieve cost savings and quality 
enhancement.  First, by encouraging GIC members to shift their service use from lower 
performing providers to more cost-efficient, higher quality “preferred” providers, the GIC 
expects to realize the benefits of cost containment and quality improvement.  Moreover, by 
creating transparency and motivating all physicians to identify and implement more cost 
efficient and/or better quality practices patterns, the CPI is designed to promote ongoing 
performance improvement affecting both GIC and non-GIC patients.  Since health plans 
participating in the GIC collectively contract with every hospital in the state, GIC officials 
believed that the CPI would have a positive effect on the health care delivery system as a 
whole. 
To achieve these goals, the CPI has several components introduced in different 
stages.  These components included mandating that participating health plan require network 
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hospitals to participate in surveys characterizing the quality of care received in those 
hospitals (i.e., the Leapfrog Hospital Quality and Safety Survey).  They also included 
requiring health plans to submit aggregate claims data, and then requiring health plans to use 
these resulting consolidated data to establish network tiers based on cost and quality 
outcomes.  This strategy was seen by the GIC’s commissioners and staff as a viable option 
to maintain broad access to providers while steering patients to higher quality and/or more 
efficient providers. 
Tiering at the Hospital Level 
Led by strong advocacy by Mitchell and GIC staff, in 2000, the GIC Commission 
voted to seek a hospital network tiering structure to address high costs associated with 
Massachusetts hospitals.  The first step in establishing hospital tiers was to compel hospitals 
to participate in Leapfrog surveys to collect data on practices and systems within hospitals.  
Examples of Leapfrog measures included whether hospitals have a computerized system for 
ordering prescriptions (e-prescribing), whether there are specialists to manage intensive-care 
patients, and how often certain procedures are performed.  In its 2000 request for proposals 
(RFP) process to contract with health plans, the GIC required that health plans bidding for its 
business both report hospitals’ adherence to Leapfrog standards and also develop a ranking 
system to prioritize hospitals according to their costs (GIC RFP 2000).  According to David 
Smith, Senior Director of Clinical Data Policy and Research at the Massachusetts Hospital 
Association, “[Dolores Mitchell] bullied health plans into saying that if a hospital was going 
to be a part of their provider network, then the hospital had to respond to the Leapfrog 
survey.  The [GIC] used contracting with health plans as her primary instrument to force 
hospitals to do this” (Smith interview 2006).   
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The GIC’s strategy of requiring participating health plans to in turn require hospitals 
to respond to Leapfrog surveys was initially met with resistance from the hospital 
community.  In meetings with health plans and GIC officials, hospital leaders argued that 
while they support quality improvement initiatives and transparency at a general level, they 
did not believe that adherence to Leapfrog standards adequately captured actual measures of 
quality.  Specifically, hospital leaders balked that the GIC’s measures would serve as an 
inadequate basis on which to compare hospitals while adding unnecessary administrative 
burdens (Smith interview 2006).   
The GIC’s initial goal was for participating health plans to use Leapfrog surveys and 
other cost and quality data and information to assign each participating hospital to one of 
three standardized tiers, with $200, $400, and $600 co-pays respectively.  However, hospital 
leaders strongly rejected this approach.   
The state’s many academic medical centers were particularly concerned that teaching 
hospitals would be punished for the relatively high costs associated with serving safety-net 
populations.  According to John Erwin, who represents major teaching hospitals as 
Executive Director of the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals (and former Director of 
Government Relations at Tufts Health), “[The CPI] methodology doesn’t adjust cases for 
severity or account for fundamentally different cost structures of teaching hospitals 
compared to community hospitals, and as a result all of the teaching hospitals will almost 
always be assigned to the more costly, non-preferred tier” (Erwin interview 2006).  An 
additional concern was that hospitals did not understand how they would fare under the 
rating system until after the tiering was actually implemented and the tiering assignments 
were reported publicly to consumers, who in turn would use this information to make health 
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care choices.  According to Smith, hospitals received “no advanced notice on what we are 
being judged on” and thus could not take measures to improve their scores before the tiering 
structure was implemented, exposing consumers to different out-of-pocket costs based on 
their hospital selection (Smith interview 2006).  Because of this opposition, 56 of 80 
hospitals, including most of the major teaching hospitals, initially refused to provide the 
specific quality measures that the GIC had required participating health plans to collect.  
Moreover, some health plans reported Leapfrog survey measures from individual hospitals, 
while others reported only aggregate figures grouping all participating hospitals together.  
GIC officials were initially displeased with the perceived lack of cooperation on the part of 
hospitals, and in turn, the health plans. 
The initial controversy over and opposition to the hospital tiering effort motivated the 
GIC to scale back, but not abandon, its initiative (Kowalczyk 2000).  In response to these 
concerns and the initial lack of participation of hospitals, GIC officials facilitated a new set 
of negotiations with health plans and hospitals.  Plans expressed a strong desire to move 
toward the hospital tiering approach without requiring uniform implementation in the first 
year.  Thus, the GIC announced that because of ongoing methodological and related 
concerns on the part of hospitals, health plans could exercise some flexibility to introduce 
phased implementation of CPI that would allow health plans to modify their respective 
contracts with hospitals with the goal of adopting tiering over a period of 1-3 years 
(Kowalcyk 2004).  Exhibit 4.2 displays the tiering designations and methodologies that have 
resulted from the level of flexibility afforded to health plans to implement the hospital 
component of CPI in a way that made the most sense for individual plans and their 
respective contracts with hospitals.
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Exhibit 4.2: Clinical Performance Improvement Hospital Tiering 
Implementation by Health Plan (2007) 
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Some of the health plans, such as Tufts, used this flexibility to assemble expert 
panels with physicians, economists, and hospital leaders to determine the appropriate cost 
and quality measures and the appropriate implementation strategy (Kingsdale interview 
2006).  According to Jennifer St. Thomas, Tufts’ Account Manager responsible for all GIC 
business, “That flexibility to introduce these concepts into our own provider relations and 
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contracting strategies allowed us to go along with hospital tiering in ways that made sense 
for each plan instead of a one-size-fits-all approach that wouldn’t ultimately work” (St. 
Thomas interview 2007). 
Nonetheless, over time, the GIC’s hospital network tiering initiative resulted in 
health plans developing tiered hospital products that they would not have developed absent 
the GIC’s influence in this arena.  For example, Tufts Health Plan developed a three-tier 
preferred provider organization (PPO) option called “Navigator” that uses differential co-
payments to distinguish high, median, and low-cost institutions.  In the Navigator PPO, most 
acute care facilities in the state are grouped into inpatient co-payment levels based on their 
quality-cost scores in three categories of care: pediatric, obstetric, and adult medical/surgical 
care.  The Navigator tiering structure also includes a three-tier plan design for obstetrics and 
adult medical/surgical care.  Inpatient pediatric services are grouped into two tiers with 
varying co-payment amounts.   
The methodology underlying the Navigator tier structure includes a number of 
qualitative and quantitative measures on quality and cost efficiency that form Tufts’ 
“Quality-Cost Value Index”.  The quality score is based on three kinds of quality measures.  
These include Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
core measures for Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI), congestive heart failure (CHF), and 
pneumonia.  Leapfrog Group measures are used for computerized physician order entry and 
intensive care staffing, as well as internal inpatient mortality and complication rates.  Those 
measures are aggregated to an overall quality score.  Relative cost measures are also 
included based on data extracted from hospital bills (St. Thomas interview 2007).   
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Tufts’ Navigator efficiency measures examine how different a hospital is from the 
average on an adjusted cost per case basis.  Several factors are considered, including the 
contracted rates that a hospital has negotiated with Tufts and average length of stay.  
According to Dr. John Freedman, Tufts’ Medical Director of Clinical Quality and 
Informatics, “If two hospitals have comparable per diems negotiated with us, but one gets 
the patient out in 25% or 50% shorter length of stay, that is a more clinically efficient 
hospital…a better-performing hospital is treating the patient with fewer complications and/or 
less administrative delays” (Larose 2004).  Hospitals with comparable charge structures, but 
different utilization of ICU days for similar conditions will, according to Freedman, generate 
different efficiency measures (Larose 2004).  To help provide a fair comparison across the 
network, these scores are adjusted for the relative severity of patients treated by each 
hospital and are re-evaluated on an annual basis.  Data for case mix and severity come from 
the Massachusetts All Payer Data Set, which contains detailed data on all hospital 
admissions in the state (St. Thomas interview 2007). 
Beyond Tufts, the only other GIC plan to actually introduce hospital tiering to date is 
Unicare (owned by Wellpoint), which serves as the third party medical benefits 
administrator of the GIC’s Commonwealth Indemnity Community Choice and 
Commonwealth Indemnity Plan Plus products.  GIC members that are enrolled in Unicare’s 
“Plus” plan are presented with a three-tier hospital structure.   
The GIC’s original goal of establishing a robust and standardized hospital tier 
structure implemented through all participating health plans has not fully materialized.  
Beyond Tufts and Unicare, the other health plans participating in the GIC have not yet 
implemented a hospital tiering structure with actual differential co-payments.  Moreover, the 
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hospital tiering structures of Tufts and Unicare are not uniform; they each are based on plan-
specific methods to develop hospital tiers and different co-pays associated with selecting 
hospitals in selected tiers.  However, Unicare has the largest GIC enrollment of any plan 
operating in the GIC; in 2006, over half (54%) of GIC members were enrolled in one of the 
GIC’s indemnity plan options.  After Unicare, Tufts is the largest health plan operating in 
the GIC.  Approximately 23% of GIC members were enrolled in Tufts’ plan in 2006.  
Together, Unicare and Tufts account for 77% of total GIC membership (GIC 2006).  Thus, 
the fact that only two plans operating within the GIC established hospital network tiering 
programs is countered by the fact that over three out of four GIC members are enrolled in a 
plan that includes network hospital tiering for hospitals. 
Moreover, by developing the CPI, the GIC was one of the chief organizers within the 
state’s employer community to compel hospitals to comply with the quality standards 
recommended by The Leapfrog Group and other national quality standards. As a result, 
according to the Massachusetts Hospital Association’s David Smith, “hospitals in 
Massachusetts have been viewed as early adopters compared to hospitals in other 
states…and [the GIC’s] emphasis on [gaining compliance with Leapfrog surveys and 
standards] definitely caught people’s attention in the state and also put the GIC in the 
spotlight as the driving force behind this” (Smith interview 2006). 
Dr. Jeff Levin-Scherz is Chief Medical Officer of Partners Community Healthcare, 
Inc., the largest integrated provider organization in Massachusetts, which includes Brigham 
and Women’s Hospital, Massachusetts General Hospital, and other prominent providers.  
According to Dr. Levin-Scherz, “As a result of what the GIC has done around Leapfrog 
standards and hospital tiering, Massachusetts looks very good in terms of complying with 
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Leapfrog and other quality-related issues compared to the rest of the country.  That is largely 
because [the GIC]] has been very ‘determined’, shall we say, in these efforts over the last 
several years” (Levin-Scherz interview 2006). 
Tiering at the Individual Physician Level 
Starting in 2004, the GIC expanded the CPI to expand network tiering to individual 
physicians.  The physician tiering effort is similar to and emanated from the GIC’s earlier 
effort to rank hospitals and offer incentives for consumers to select preferred institutions.  
Like the GIC’s hospital tiering effort, the GIC’s primary tool to implement CPI is its 
contracting process with participating health plans.  Unlike the earlier hospital tiering effort, 
however, the GIC has played a more active role in facilitating the development of individual 
physician tiering structures, mainly by consolidating and then funding the analysis of claims 
data across plans to be used as the basis for provider profiling and ultimately, tiered 
networks.  In 2004, the GIC required participating health plans to submit three cumulative 
years of aggregate medical, mental health, and pharmacy claims data to a third party 
actuarial vendor hired by GIC, Mercer Human Resource Consulting.   
Importantly, health plans were required to submit all of their claims data, not solely 
their claims information from their GIC book of business.  This has resulted in a very large 
database of claims from which to support individual physician profiling, with significantly 
more data than any one GIC health plan could have based any individual plan-specific 
initiative.  Under direction from the GIC, Mercer, using the Episode Treatment Grouper 
(ETG) methodology and quality measures from Resolution Health, Inc. (RHI) and other 
measures, integrates all claims data from participating plans into a single massive database, 
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runs the ETG analysis on the resulting data file, transfers files to RHI for application of its 
quality measures model, and then returns the large dataset with the results of both these 
analyses to the health plans contracting with the GIC. 
The primary cost effectiveness measures used by the physician tiering component of 
CPI, ETGs, compare the relative resources expended by physicians to treat similar 
procedures (e.g., treating a broken leg).  In addition to ETGs, the GIC database is also 
modified by data and other measures from Resolution Health, Inc. (RHI), the Health Plan 
Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality, and specialty society best practices to incorporate numerous quality measures to 
ETG efficiency measures (Draper, Liebhaber, and Ginsburg 2007).  The GIC’s intention is 
for participating health plans to use the resulting database as the basis for establishing 
individual physician tier assignments. 
Participating health plans include Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Tufts Health Plan, 
Fallon Community Health Plan, Neighborhood Health Plan, Health New England and 
UniCare.  Like the earlier hospital tiering effort, tiering physicians at the individual level has 
generated controversy from the standpoint of physicians and physician advocates.  The 
Massachusetts Medical Society and other provider groups have voiced serious concern about 
CPI, ranging from challenging the basic philosophical premise of the initiative to expressing 
significant concerns with aspects of implementation and methodologies underlying the 
initiative.  According to Partners’ Levin-Scherz, “physicians are angry and are absolutely 
right to be angry” for a number of key reasons (Levin-Scherz interview 2006).  
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The first source of opposition on the part of physicians and physician advocates is the 
traditional concern among provider groups about transparency regarding cost and quality 
data.  According to Society President Dr. Kenneth Peele, “Today's attempts to impose 
transparency on our health care system, through public reporting, pay for performance, and 
performance measurement, are being done ‘too fast, too soon, with inaccurate information, 
and with untested tools” (Massachusetts Medical Society 2006).  According to Peele, related 
concerns about transparency also reflect concerns about threats to professional autonomy 
among providers.  
Second, physician groups have expressed serious practical concerns about the 
methodologies used to assign physicians to preferred and non-preferred tiers.  The 
Massachusetts Medical Society, for example, commissioned researchers to challenge the 
methodological basis of ETGs for rating physicians at the individual level.  This report, for 
example, highlights the lack of a uniform tier assignment protocol and very small absolute 
differences in performance differences as one of several methodological concerns about the 
CPI’s tiering methodology (Greene, Beckman, and Thomas 2006).  The Medical Society has 
broadly publicized the results of this study to cast doubt on the CPI. 
Third, physician groups cited the administrative and operational burdens that the CPI 
has created for medical practices.  For example, according to an interview with Elaine 
Kirschenbaum of the Massachusetts Medical Society, rating physicians at the individual, 
rather than at the group level, makes it difficult for physician practice staffs to know which 
co-pays to charge patients depending on which doctors they see, particularly if they see more 
than one physician in a particular group (Kirschenbaum interview 2006).  Another physician 
leader agreed, saying individual physician tiering is “big trouble operationally for practices, 
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creating a need to charge $30 for one provider in a group and $10 for another doctor in the 
same group if they ended up in different tiers” (Levin-Scherz interview 2006). 
Third, like the earlier hospital tiering effort, the manner of the CPI’s implementation 
did not allow physicians to understand how they would fare under the rating system until the 
tiering was actually implemented and in some cases, until consumers were forced to make 
decisions based on the rating system.  According to Kirshenbaum, physicians received no 
advanced notice about what the results of this tiering would look like and could not therefore 
change anything about their practice patterns before [CPI] was implemented” (Kirshenbaum 
interview 2006).  Another physician advocate added that, “[The CPI] doesn't appear to be 
fair, it's not transparent, and if there's misinformation, physicians don't have a chance to 
correct it before it's put in print or publicly released” (Lee interview 2006). 
Like provider groups, health plans also had problems with the original vision for the 
physician network tiering effort, or more precisely, the rapid pace that the GIC envisioned 
implementing CPI at the individual physician level.  In negotiations with participating health 
plans, health plan leaders argued that while they would participate in the conditions of the 
RFP, they sought the flexibility to use the consolidated cost efficiency and quality database 
to make their own plan-specific tiering decisions.  Health plan leaders argued that since each 
health plan had developed different contracting strategies and approaches with provider 
groups, each health plan should have the flexibility to work within those provider contracts 
and relationships to establish tiering as a goal over time. 
Like the earlier hospital tiering component of the larger CPI, the GIC’s goal 
regarding the physician tiering effort was to establish a standardized tiering methodology 
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that all participating health plans would use to place all individual physicians into 
standardized tier structures.  As a result of pushback from health plans and provider groups 
and the ensuing negotiation process with the GIC, however, the GIC did not abandon its 
plans, but afforded health plans a degree of flexibility to phase in implementation of the 
tiering structure over time and to do so in a manner that is consistent with health plans’ 
provider relationships and contracts to the extent possible.  As Erwin noted, by allowing 
flexibility, the GIC acknowledged that “the secret recipe of Tufts is different than secret 
recipe of Unicare, and so forth” (Erwin interview 2006). According to Suzanne Bailey, 
Manager of Financial Analysis and Company Licensing in the Department of Insurance 
(who sits on the Group Insurance Commission as an appointed representative of the 
Department of Insurance), this flexibility was an important concession for health plans since 
their corporate structures and strategies and relationships with provider groups are different: 
“If you’ve seen one health plan in Massachusetts, you’ve seen one health plan” (Bailey 
interview 2006). 
As a result of this flexibility, health plans’ tiering practices vary from plan to plan, 
with some tiering at the group level only, others tiering only specialists at the individual 
level, and still others tiering primary-care physicians as well.  In 2006, the first year in which 
physician network tiers were implemented, three of the six plans tiered physicians at the 
group level, one plan tiered physicians based on hospital affiliation (Tufts), one plan 
(Unicare) tiered physicians at an individual practitioner level as was originally envisioned by 
the GIC, and one plan (Neighborhood Health Plan “Community Care”) did not tier at all.  
Several changes to scoring and tiering methodologies were implemented for the 2007 plan 
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year (e.g., weighting recent data more heavily in the three-year efficiency measure and 
removing certain specialties from tiering).   
Unicare, which is administrator for the Commonwealth Indemnity Community 
Choice and Commonwealth Indemnity Plan Plus products, is the only participating health 
plan that opted to implement CPI exactly as the GIC had originally required, with 
individual-level physician tiering.  The Tufts Health Plan chose to gradually extend its 
Navigator hospital tiering product, but does not directly rate physicians at the individual 
level.  Instead, physicians in nine surgical specialties are ranked according to the rating of 
the hospital with which they are affiliated.  Co-payments for office visits with physicians in 
preferred tiers are $15, and others are $25.  Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, which does not tier 
hospitals, has a tiered physician product, called “Independence” that ranks physicians in five 
specialties: Allergy, Opthalmology, ENT, General Surgery, and Neurology.  HPHC’s 
differential copayments are $15 and $25 for the respective tiers. Exhibit 4.2A and 4.2B 
below display specific features of health plans’ physician tiering methodologies. 
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Exhibit 4.3.A: Clinical Performance Improvement Physician Tiering 
Implementation by Health Plan (2007) 
Health Plan Physician Tiers 
PCP Tiers? By 
Individual or 
Group? 
Specialist Tiers Specialty Groups 
Health New 
England Yes 
Yes, by site level 












Health Care  Yes N/A 
Yes, by individual for 
5 specialties and by 
group for 4 
Individual Level:
Allergy, Opthalmology, 






Tufts Health Plan Yes N/A 
Yes, by individual for 
five specialties and by 












Yes Yes, by individual Yes, by individual 
All PCP’s and specialists 




mental health are not 
tiered) 
Community 
Choice (Unicare) Yes Yes, by individual Yes, by individual 
All PCP’s and specialists 




mental health are not 
tiered) 
Commonwealth 
Indemnity Basic I 
(Unicare) 
Yes Yes, by individual Yes, by individual 
All PCP’s and specialists 









Yes Yes, by individual Yes, by individual 
All PCP’s and specialists 



















Yes, by group 
(physicians within 
Tier 2-“Value” 
group rated at 
individual level) 
Yes, by group 
(physicians within 
Tier 2-“Value”-group 
rated at individual 
level for three 
specialties 
GI, Cardiology, and 
Endocrinology (N/A for 
Tier 1- “Value Plus” 
physicians) 
Neighborhood 
Health Care Plan Yes Yes, by group 





Source: Data from Group Insurance Commission and Massachusetts Medical Society (as of April 2007) 
Exhibit 4.3.B: Clinical Performance Improvement Physician Tiering 
Implementation by Health Plan (2007) 









Tier 3: $25 
Tier 2: $15 
Tier 1: $10 
Specialist:
Tier 2: $25 
Tier 1: $15 
All Non-Tiered 
Specialists Co-
Pay is $15 
• IMs and FPs will be tiered using 
Efficiency (ETGs) and Quality 
Measures (HEDIS). 
• Specialists will be tiered using 
quality measures from Resolution 
Health and HNE 
Harvard Pilgrim 
Health Care  
Tier 2: $25 
Tier 1: $15 
PCPs: $15 
Specialties not 
Tiered is $25 
• Quality measures are used as the first 
threshold followed by efficiency 
measures (ETGs) 
Tufts Health Plan Tier 2: $25 Tier 1: $15 
PCPs: $15 
Specialties no t 
Tiered is $25 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 
Quality measures (including use of 
patient satisfaction, use of e-




Tier 2: $20 
Tier 1: $10 
All PCPs and 
Specialists are 
tiered 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 




Tier 2: $20 
Tier 1: $10 
All PCPs and 
Specialists are 
tiered 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 





Tier 2: $20 
Tier 1: $10 
All PCPs and 
Specialists are 
tiered 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 





Tier 2: $20 
Tier 1: $10 
All PCPs and 
Specialists are 
tiered 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 















Value Plus $15 
PCP Wellness:
Value $20 ($10 for 
Pediatrics) 
Value Plus: $15 
($5 for pediatrics) 
Value: $25 
Value Plus: $20 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 
Quality metrics (including 
Resolution Health) 
Neighborhood 
Health Care Plan 
Tier 2: $20 
Tier 1: $10 
Non-tiered 
specialist copay 
based on PCP 
tier 
• Efficiency measures (ETGs) and 
Quality metrics (including 
Resolution Health) 
Source: Data from Group Insurance Commission and Massachusetts Medical Society (as of April 2007) 
By allowing each plan to tailor individual physician tiering to be as compatible as 
possible with each plans’ own contracting relationships and corporate strategies, the GIC 
also effectively preempted any potential litigation from provider groups related to the 
potential anti-trust aspects of the initiative (Slavin interview 2006).  Health plans did not 
have to worry about violating any state or federal antitrust laws in combining their claims 
information because they did not collaboratively spearhead the project on their own but 
simply did so in response to their largest customer (the GIC). However, as a large employer 
contracting with numerous health plans, the GIC can and did include purchaser requirements 
in its health plan contracts that plans should use the consolidated claims database that 
includes cost efficiency (ETG) and quality (RHI) measures.   
However, more than one health plan executive noted (off the record) that insisting 
that all health plans ultimately provide a standardized tiered product based on the same data 
and methodology could provoke legal action on the part of hospitals and physicians against 
the GIC for shaping the market in unfavorable ways in collaboration with health plans.  As 
one interviewee noted (on the condition of anonymity), “It’s not clear whether Dolores 
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would actually lose such a case, but the fact is that she is pushing the plans as far as she can 
without getting to the point where litigation from providers is even a real possibility” 
(Interview 2006). 
The GIC and Purchasing Influence 
This section explores and summarizes what can be learned from the GIC’s efforts in 
introducing CPI, specifically the GIC’s impetus to structure a new networking tiering system 
with an eye toward mitigating cost increases for the GIC and the state as a whole. 
The jury is still out on the effectiveness of the CPI in achieving its goals to promote 
the efficient and high quality delivery of care within the domain of the GIC, much less on 
the larger delivery system in Massachusetts.  As has been the experience of similar 
initiatives in the private sector, delivery-system reforms of this type are politically and 
technically difficult and will take years to fully structure, implement, and take full effect 
before conclusive evaluations are possible.  Private employers experimenting with similar 
network tiering efforts in recent years have reported major administrative difficulties and 
hurdles (Mays, Claxton, and Strunk 2003).  Similarly, these efforts have also been 
technically challenging, necessitating sizable investments to develop the data capacity 
necessary to collect and analyze clinical information at the individual provider level 
(McKethan, Gitterman, Feezor, and Enthoven 2006).  Moreover, such efforts have also faced 
numerous political obstacles, including resistant provider groups wary of methodologies 
used to rate providers based on efficiency. 
Despite the dearth of empirical evidence attesting to the impact of the CPI on long 
term premiums and quality, it is still worthwhile to consider how the GIC chose this 
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particular cost containment path and what the implementation of CPI reveals about the 
political and market influence of the GIC as a major public purchaser.  I find that the 
interaction of several factors together explain the how and why the GIC has been able to 
exert influence to implement the CPI in ways that are designed to benefit the GIC and the 
broader state health care market.   The next section addresses these key factors or issues that 
have influenced PEHP policymaking by exploring in detail the relative contributions of the 
key variables outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
Partisan Political Landscape 
Democrats have historically dominated both the House and the Senate in the 
Massachusetts legislature (or “General Court”).  However, since 1991 until 2007, 
Massachusetts has had a Republican governor.  Thus, it would be tempting to explore how 
the split partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats in the legislature and the 
Governor’s office may have been important characteristic of the GIC’s policymaking 
environment.  After all, both the governor and legislature have key roles in GIC 
policymaking, the governor appointing GIC commissioners, and the legislature responsible 
for setting employer premium contributions and passing a state budget that finances the GIC.   
However, as many interviewees pointed out, while the governor has the statutory 
authority to wield influence over the GIC through appointments to the commission, 
governors have historically not been heavily involved in the details of GIC policymaking 
besides making commission appointments.  Moreover, commission appointments are open-
ended such that governors do not have to formally appoint commissioners on a regular basis 
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when terms expire.  Rather, many commissioners have served for many consecutive years, 
even outlasting governors themselves.  Exceptions exist as, for example, the Commissioner 
of Insurance represents a statutorily automatic GIC appointment, and thus turnover in that 
office necessitates turnover in the Department’s representation on the commission.   
In sum, historically it has been the Democratically-controlled legislature, not the 
governor, which has wielded relatively more influence over GIC-related issues.  While 
Massachusetts has been a “split” state with Republicans (until recently) controlling the 
governor’s office and Democrats dominating the legislature, the purview of GIC 
policymaking largely has rested within the Democratically-controlled legislature. 
Providers, including prestigious academic medical centers and community hospitals 
and physicians, have been opposed to the GIC’s CPI initiative on many grounds.  Thus, given 
that the legislature historically exerts more influence (relative to the governor) over GIC 
policymaking, it makes sense that provider groups would seek to wield influence within the 
domain of the legislature to block or change GIC efforts that threaten provider income, 
professional autonomy, or reputation.  However, three factors have effectively blocked the 
legislative influence of providers opposed to the CPI. 
First, there is a “universal appeal” within the legislature related to GIC efforts to 
address cost containment and quality improvement.  One interviewee with close ties to the 
legislature noted, “You’re able to tamp down criticism you might get if you were just shifting 
cost from state to enrollee or to providers because [the CPI] seeks to address cost and quality 
and create real value in the health system” (Interview 2006).  Another interviewee agreed, 
noting: “It rings hollow with these guys [in the legislature] if you’re a hospital and you’re 
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paying your CEO $900,000 a year and you’re complaining that this initiative to cut costs is 
going to really hurt you from a financial standpoint” (Interview 2006).  Regardless of party 
affiliation, there is a degree of general support for the underlying goals of CPI even if 
provider groups oppose its implementation. 
Second, Democrats that control the legislature may be less susceptible to the 
influence of provider interests than a Republican-controlled legislature would be.  Several 
interviewees noted that Democrats controlling the legislature in general seek to be supportive 
of the state’s health care system and its reputation for innovation and “breakthrough 
medicine”.  However, provider interests are more historically aligned with Republicans.  
According to one: “[The Massachusetts Medical Society], which has been very vocal against 
this initiative, is not a particularly strong supporter of Democratic legislators in general” 
(Interview 2006).  According to a different interviewee, this applies to hospitals as well as to 
physicians: “Hospitals are not heavy financial contributors to Democrats anyway, so it’s 
easier for Democrats to snub their nose at hospitals complaining about [the CPI]” (Interview 
2006).  
Third, for the last twenty years, the legislature itself has largely focused its 
policymaking efforts and time on other issues (e.g., Medicaid), leaving the commission and 
staff to govern the GIC (Carey interview 2006).  According to an interviewee that is 
representative of several others, “The legislature, relative to the governor, typically exerts 
control over issues related to the GIC within the political scene in Massachusetts…but in 
reality [legislators] are very comfortable with Dolores and therefore it’s the GIC itself that 
pretty much makes decisions without a lot of hand holding from Beacon Hill” (Interview 
2006). 
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In sum, the state’s historically split partisan control over the legislature and 
governor’s office belies the reality that it is the legislature, not the governor’s office, that is 
more active in GIC policymaking.  However, as noted, the legislature itself defers a great 
deal to GIC commissioners and its staff.  The “partisan” dimension to the GIC’s influence in 
implementing the CPI is that it is politically easier for Democratic legislators to ignore or 
overlook the concerns expressed by provider groups about the likely impacts of the CPI.  
Interviewees noted that providers may be able to “flex their political muscles” if the 
legislature was controlled by Republicans.  That said, given the broad (Republican and 
Democratic) interest in innovative health policy solutions that can achieve cost containment 
and quality improvement in the state, it does not appear that, on balance, the particular 
political configuration of the legislature or governor’s office has been a big factor affecting 
the GIC’s efforts to implement the CPI.  Below, I describe these issues in greater detail when 
I explore the relative influence of the GIC’s governance structure providing additional 
political insulation for the GIC to implement CPI absent a substantial degree of direct 
oversight from the legislature.   
The GIC’s Position Within the Larger State Health Care Marketplace 
In this sub-section, I describe three aspects of the GIC’s position within the broader 
Massachusetts health care market that have jointly influenced the development of the GIC’s 
CPI initiative and its impact on the state’s delivery system (i.e., health plans, hospitals, and 
physicians and their respective associations).  These aspects include the GIC’s market 




The GIC purchases health insurance on behalf of the state’s largest employer.  With 
over 254,000 covered lives, stakeholder interviews from broad perspectives explained that 
the GIC has considerable market power in Massachusetts.  For most health plans in the state 
that contract with the GIC, the GIC represents their largest single customer.  The sheer size 
of the GIC membership gives the GIC considerable influence in negotiations with 
participating health plans.  Charlie Slavin, who was formerly Director of Policy and 
Research at the GIC who is now Director of Network Management at Unicare, “When 
you’re the 800 pound gorilla, you get what you want without much negotiation” (Slavin 
interview 2006).  According to the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals’ Erwin, 
“Dolores [implemented CPI] knowing that her key pressure point for health plans was her 
massive purchasing power….with that many covered lives, you can often get what you 
want” (Erwin interview 2006). 
While GIC did not invent the idea of physician or hospital tiering and was not the 
first to introduce the concept nationally, the GIC’s activity in this area was the primary 
impetus for several participating health plans to establish tiered network products.  The 
relative importance of the GIC membership to participating health plans has shaped the 
willingness of participating health plans to accede the GIC’s goals and contracting strategies.  
According to Jon Kingsdale, Executive Director of the Commonwealth Health Insurance 
Connector Authority and formerly a senior executive at Tufts, the fact that Tufts has 
historically been the most dependent on GIC for its HMO business explains why Tufts was 
one of first HMOs to introduce a tiered health insurance plan that corresponded closely to 
the GIC’s stated goal for CPI (Kingsdale interview 2006).  With over 32,000 of its 287,000 
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(11%)  HMO members belonging to GIC, Tufts was eager to be responsive to the desires of 
its largest single customer.   
Importantly, by pursuing its policy agenda via contracts with health plans, the GIC 
has effectively given health plans the negotiating advantage they need to, in turn, contract 
with providers in ways that health plans would not otherwise.  Indeed, the market power of 
the GIC was not lost on provider groups, with whom there are no direct contracts, and Tufts 
and other health plans were empowered to use this knowledge to shape provider contracts in 
ways that would not have been possible or feasible absent the GIC’s market power.  
According to Kingsdale,  
“[Mitchell’s] determination to do this provided a lot of leverage for [Tufts] with 
providers. We used her as the bogeyman in our provider relations even as sometimes 
she used us as the whipping boy. The bottom line is that she was pushing us to do 
things with providers that we couldn’t get from them on our own.  We caught a lot of 
grief for doing this from physicians and hospitals, as well as the Massachusetts health 
plan family. It damaged our relationships with hospitals, but that was, for Tufts, the 
price we had to pay for staying in the GIC pool. Tufts is number three in the market 
and cannot afford not to be in the GIC.  I readily admitted that we only reason we did 
[participate in CPI] is that we had this crazy lady [Dolores Mitchell] driving the bus” 
(Kingsdale interview 2006). 
A current Tufts executive, Brian Pagliaro, Senior Vice President of Sales and Client 
Services (who effectively “owns” Tufts’ relationship with GIC) agreed: 
“While [Tufts] may have philosophically promoted the principle of transparency and 
so forth, we would have walked a very fine line of pissing off some very powerful 
and influential hospitals by pushing forward on the development of Navigator 
without a major external influence forcing us go in this direction. Without GIC, we 
wouldn’t have gone in this direction, at least not as quickly as we did…there’s no 
question about that” (Pagliaro interview 2006). 
After implementing Navigator in 2005, the GIC was Tuft’s lone customer of the Navigator 
product for over a year.  However, at the beginning of 2006, four large private employer 
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accounts, including defense contractor General Dynamics, purchased the Tufts’ Navigator 
hospital tiering product.  Other major accounts are anticipated for 2007 and 2008 as more 
employers get accustomed to this type of product and as consumers become increasingly 
engaged in making cost/quality/preference trade-offs. 
According to Jay Curley, Senior Vice President of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Massachusetts (which does not participate in GIC):  
“From a contracting perspective it can be difficult for health plans if a major third 
party is driving you to achieve certain contracts with providers, but on the other hand 
[such pressure] might make it more palatable to make those changes by blaming the 
third party. There is no question that the GIC’s market influence has empowered 
health plans in their negotiations with providers” (Curley interview 2006). 
A second aspect of the market power associated with the GIC’s initiative is related its 
ability to consolidate claims from numerous health plans for all their respective books of 
business.  Smaller health plans establishing network tiering is problematic given the lack of 
comprehensive data on provider practices.  Leapfrog CEO Francois de Brantes has said of 
the GIC’s initiative, “What's unique about [the CPI] is the scope; because of its scope, in one 
state and in one area, I think we're going to finally be able to measure whether it makes a 
difference.  The CPI will be able accomplish what individual plans can’t on their own, even 
if they have attracted big individual memberships” (de Brantes 2006). 
Partners Community HealthCare, Inc., for which Dr. Thomas Lee is CEO, is part of a 
Boston-based integrated health system founded by Brigham and Women's Hospital and 
Massachusetts General Hospital.  According to Dr. Lee, “[Dolores Mitchell] is big enough to 
single-handedly drive this market by, for example, forcing everybody that contract with her 
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to submit all data – not just GIC data – but all data – which is much bigger than just the GIC 
data” (Lee interview 2006). 
The fact that the GIC made some concessions on the implementation of CPI does not 
necessarily suggest its underlying weakness in achieving its goal of introducing a 
controversial new initiative in the face of powerful payer and provider interests.  While the 
GIC has not achieved everything it set out to achieve, health plans and providers were 
ultimately forced to move in directions that they would not have moved in otherwise. 
As Mitchell remarked about her perspective on allowing health plans some measure 
of flexibility to implement CPI, “We said you can innovate to some degree within the 
principles that I outline but you must give me something that moves in the direction I want 
to go in” (Mitchell interview 2006). And they did. 
Bargaining Power 
Massachusetts’ competitive marketplace is another source of the GIC’s influence.  
Because there are numerous hospitals and competing health plans in Massachusetts, the GIC 
is able to wield the threat of exclusion from GIC participation if payers and/or providers do 
not ultimately agree to participate with particular contract provisions or requirements.  Thus, 
the GIC’s bargaining power (as opposed to its market power) is shaped largely by its ability 
to contract with (or to decide not to contract with) willing health plans.  Bargaining power in 
this context is a function of the Massachusetts market itself.  As the Massachusetts Hospital 
Association’s David Smith noted about Dolores Mitchell,  
“Her tool has been her request for proposals from health plans that want to offer their 
products to GIC members. Since she doesn’t have to welcome them all into the GIC, 
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she has been able to say that if you’re going to have a piece of my population, you 
have to offer products that address my issues” (Smith interview 2006).  
The ability to include some health plans and to exclude others represents an 
important component of the GIC’s influence.  By contrast, if the nature of the Massachusetts 
market did not allow for the opportunity to exclude certain health plans from participation, 
either for political or market reasons, the GIC’s bargaining power would be limited because 
there would be few if any plans it could exclude without facing political backlash or 
compromising access to care on the part of GIC members.  While it would likely be 
unpopular from the standpoint of GIC members and constituent employers to actually 
exclude popular academic medical centers or health plans from its membership, the 
Massachusetts market does nonetheless allow the threat of exclusion to be taken seriously.   
Mitchell’s tenure at GIC and her “tough” negotiating tactics have earned the GIC a 
reputation as being an assertive purchaser whose threats should be taken seriously.  
According to Slavin, formerly the GIC’s Director of Policy and Research: 
“In the early to mid-1990s, Bay State Health contracted with GIC and at one point, 
they came in with a one-year 22 percent rate increase proposal. In negotiations, 
Dolores asserted that she was going to negotiate that really big rate increase 
downward and wanted to know from Bay State what was driving such an astounding 
rate increase.  Their CEO said ‘Our proposal is not up for negotiation, and the way 
we run the plan is none of your business.’ Mitchell kindly but abruptly ended the 
meeting. This was the GIC’s single largest plan and it was fairly popular with 
members. But she went back to the Commission and strongly recommended not 
accepting their contract and ending the relationship with Bay State. There was a 
vigorous discussion on the Commission with some commissioners saying there would 
be hell to pay from members. But the commission was ultimately persuaded by 
Dolores and we first froze Bay State’s enrollment in GIC for a year, and then later 
dropped them altogether. Bay State people went to the legislature and complained 
and there were a few inquiries. Later there was an internal battle on the Bay State 
board of directors. Within six months Bay State went out of business. This reinforced 
to the health plan community that Dolores was a serious person and learned to take 
her suggestions…or threats….very seriously” (Slavin interview 2006). 
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Other interviewees agreed that the ability to threaten health plan exclusion (and 
Mitchell’s reputation her willingness to execute on those threats) has contributed 
significantly to the influence of the GIC in its negotiation efforts. This is the combined 
function of the GIC’s market power as a major employer and its bargaining power associated 
with the characteristics of the state’s health care market.   
 “Weak” Employer Community 
A third component of market influences on the GIC is related to its position of 
leadership within the Commonwealth’s community of large employers.  The GIC represents 
the largest employer in the state of Massachusetts.  This provides the GIC with an important 
platform from which to assert and mobilize employer leadership in state health policy and 
related discussions.  According to Richard Lord, President of Associated Industries of 
Massachusetts, “No other employer in Massachusetts has the kind of heft in terms of 
employer leadership potential as Dolores” (Lord interview 2006).  Moreover, numerous 
interviewees described how the state’s changing economic landscape has created a vacuum 
in employer leadership focused on health care reform issues.  Numerous mergers, 
acquisitions, and the increasing nationalization of employers have, in the last two decades, 
transformed the state business community, once dominated by large technology and 
financial services firms and their headquarters. 
For example, in the last twenty years, the state lost the major corporate headquarters 
of once-prominent financial institutions, such as Shawmut Bank, BayBank, Bank of New 
England, and Bank of Boston.  In 2004, Bank of America, based in Charlotte, North 
Carolina, acquired FleetBoston Financial.  Recent mergers and acquisitions have not been 
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limited to financial services sector.  In 2005, for example, Proctor & Gamble, based in 
Cincinnati, Ohio acquired Gillette.  According to Smith, “In the last twenty years, and even 
in the last few years, business leaders that had previously contributed significantly to the 
business leadership’s interest in health care issues fell apart as the economics of the state 
changed” (Smith interview 2006).  According to Lord, “There used to be a coalition of very 
effective businesses that really showed some muscle and took a stand and drove reform here, 
but it has been pretty quiet except for the GIC, they’re the real driving force in terms of the 
employer community” (Lord interview 2006). 
Today, the state’s largest employers are in the health care industry, predominantly 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  Others, according to the New England Health 
Institute’s Wendy Everett, are smaller manufacturing firms or satellites and local production 
facilities for national or international organizations, so as a consequence their leaders aren’t 
all that visible in this environment” (Everett interview 2006).  As one interviewee noted 
(anonymously),  
“These newer firms care about health care at the state level, but the big shifts in the 
business landscape has meant that in the net, we have lost a lot of employer 
leadership in the health care community; that core of health care leadership from the 
business community that was previously active in the ‘70s and ‘80s has disappeared 
and hasn’t re-emerged in any real strong sense since then” (Interview 2006). 
As a result, the GIC has played an increasingly important role representing the 
business community in health care policy and related discussions.  According to Curley,  
“The GIC in Massachusetts is the organization being looked at by purchasers in the 
business community as the entity that really has the ability to influence in the health 
arena. There are not a lot of companies with the resources or time doing any serious 
thinking around impacting health care as GIC does. The remaining Massachusetts 
employers with major headquarters here just don’t have expertise in human resources 
and don’t want to dedicate capital to consulting services” (Curley interview 2006). 
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Michael Bailit, former Massachusetts Medicaid Director and president of Bailit 
Health Purchasing (a national consulting firm based in Boston), added, “Massachusetts is 
unusual in that the leading health care purchaser voice is the GIC.  This is rarely seen in 
other states but it is due both to the fact that the GIC is particularly innovative and assertive 
and because there is a real vacuum of employer leadership in this state” (Bailit 2006).   
As Trude and colleagues have noted, the trend (in Massachusetts and elsewhere) 
toward nationalization of employers can result in a centralization of health care benefit 
decisions and a lack of involvement with or concern for local or state market issues (Trude 
2002).  State public employee health plans by definition are connected to their states and 
communities. Local government employers and state government employers in state capitals 
in particular have a larger stake in the activities of local and state markets (Watts et al. 
2003).   Thus, the GIC’s position within the employer community in Massachusetts 
has contributed to its position of employer leadership in negotiations with other actors in the 
state’s health care delivery system.   
This employer leadership, in turn, has placed the GIC in a position of strength in 
negotiations with health plans.  According to Lord,  
“Many companies out there are watching GIC’s negotiations with the plans very 
carefully [as they relate to CPI]. The HMOs know that Dolores [Mitchell] doesn’t just 
represent state employees, she represents the state’s employer community. If the GIC 
is pushing for something, you can bet that Dolores has already carefully vetted the 
idea with much of the employer leadership in the state. The [health] plans know this. 
Massachusetts companies have been hard hit by premium increases since the end of 
the managed care era, and I think they will start to sign up for CPI because they are 
looking for any way to direct consumers to hospitals and doctors that provide the best 
medical care at the lowest prices.  Most companies are really going to wait a couple 
years to watch the GIC’s tiering effort play out, but a lot of them will ultimately 
follow the GIC’s lead and embrace this themselves” (Lord interview 2006). 
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Influence/Role of Interest Groups, Unions and other Stakeholders 
Participating health plans and other stakeholders were quick to cite the GIC’s 
influence in stimulating the movement toward tiered network products among participating 
health plans.  However, many also noted at the same time that the final results that have 
emerged through the negotiation process between GIC, health plans, and provider groups has 
not been precisely what GIC originally sought or envisioned.  The GIC clearly has thus far 
been unable to compel payers and providers to adopt the CPI exactly as it had been 
originally envisioned.  Both the hospital and physician tiering efforts stimulated loud 
protests from providers and health plans wary of standardization and rapid implementation 
of an initiative that would assert that some providers are able to achieve better levels of cost 
and quality than others.  Thus, payers and providers were able to extract important 
concessions that gave them some degree of flexibility in the implementation of CPI.   
As discussed previously, some health plans have not even introduced differential co-
pays at all.  This suggests a limitation of the GIC’s ultimate market influence to “reform” the 
delivery system in particular ways.  While it has been influential in setting the agenda and 
making known its strong preferences for what the CPI should look like, plans and hospitals 
have implemented CPI in ways that are consistent with their own corporate goals and values 
and provider network strategies.   
For example, Kingsdale, responsible for creation of Tufts’ tiered network product 
(“Navigator”), explained:  
“Despite the powerful position that Dolores [Mitchell] has had to introduce the CPI, 
Tufts was still able to customize Navigator to fit Tufts instead of some one-size-fits-
all approach.  For example, in the second year, we decided to tier primary care 
physicians (PCPs). We ended up ranking or ‘gold starring’ on cost and quality but not 
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differentiating co-payments.  We investigated this but the backlash against us would 
have been terrible among our providers and members. PCPs are in short supply 
anyway. This approach doesn’t ultimately satisfy [Mitchell], who wants physicians 
individually tiered, period. But there are just a whole lot of reasons why that doesn’t 
make sense for us.  In some ways we are caught between a rock and a hard place but 
Tufts is going to be moving in that direction out of necessity” (Kingsdale interview 
2006). 
In fact, of the GIC’s participating health plans, only Unicare has thus far introduced 
network tiering at the individual physician level precisely as GIC originally envisioned.  
UniCare is the only plan to do exactly what GIC wanted because it has nothing to gain and 
everything to lose from deviating from GIC’s vision for CPI.  This is because the GIC 
represents Unicare’s only business in the Commonwealth. According to Commissioner 
Bowler, “GIC is not simply Unicare’s largest customer, it is Unicare’s only customer, so 
they’ll do whatever their sole customer wants them to do since they face no repercussions on 
other lines of business” (Bowler interview 2006). 
All other participating health plans are in varying stages of introducing tiering or 
concepts related to tiering.  That different plans have different tiering methods means that 
different doctors are potentially rated or evaluated differently, which is a fundamental 
problem that several stakeholders identified. 
The GIC has been successful in promoting the underlying concepts of the CPI even 
though not every health plan has yet fully implemented the initiative.  However, the origins 
of the CPI were borne out of an inherent limitation of the GIC’s (and other employers’) 
influence in negotiations with health plans and provider groups.  Specifically, the GIC and 
other employer groups in Massachusetts have been unable or have been unwilling to actually 
restrict providers from their networks.According Commissioner Bowler, health plans in 
Massachusetts “have historically been reluctant to restrict their networks to particular 
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physician groups or hospitals because they understand the market and know that customers 
will vote with their feet if they can’t get what they want” (Bowler interview 2006).  Even in 
the managed care era that culminated in the 1990s, several interviewees noted that managed 
care had a big impact in Massachusetts, but it was always “managed care light” since 
managed care never featured closed panels of providers.  As one interviewee noted, “There 
has been a lot of emphasis on utilization review, prior authorization, et cetera et cetera, but 
not restricted networks as they might have been in California or other places” (Interview 
2006). 
The Department of Insurance’s Pinion noted that, “There are 8 teaching hospitals in a 
7 mile radius in the Boston metro area.  From a health plan’s standpoint, if you don’t have 
each of them in your network, your product gets defined as inadequate and substandard and 
you have difficulty selling that product. Tight networks are a challenge if not an 
impossibility in this state” (Pinion interview 2006).  Thus, while the GIC’s CPI effort has 
provoked the ire of health care providers, the GIC and other employers have not seriously 
considered network exclusion fearing the potential backlash from GIC members that desire 
broad access to health care providers of their choice.  This suggests an inherent limitation of 
the GIC in the face of provider popularity and strength. 
Governance Structure of the GIC 
While much of the GIC’s influence is related to the personality of its current 
executive director, it is also derived, as one legislative insider put it, from the “government 
structure in which it is been placed” (Hager interview 2006).  According to the general 
statutes outlining the legal definition of the GIC, “[The GIC] shall be established within the 
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executive office of administration and finance, but not under its jurisdiction” (General Laws 
of Massachusetts).  Thus, while the GIC formally sits within the Department of 
Administration and Finance, the GIC exercises quasi-independence from the department. 
According to Mitchell, “The GIC is ‘within but not under’ the jurisdiction of the Department 
of Administration of Administration and Finance.  I always like to tell the incoming 
Commissioner [of Administration and Finance] that ‘You can’t fire me! Only my 
Commission can do that!” (Mitchell interview 2006). 
The quasi-independent commission is governed by eleven commissioners with 
overlapping three-year terms.  The Commissioner of Administration and Finance and the 
Commissioner of Insurance (or their respective designees) serve on the Commission.  In 
addition to these automatic statutory appointments, the Governor makes several additional 
appointments.  This includes at least one retired state employee, at least one health 
economist (currently Harvard’s David Cutler), at least three full-time state employees, two 
of whom are union members and one of whom is a member of the Massachusetts State 
Employees Association (General Laws of Massachusetts).  
The Commission is fully responsible for appointing its Executive Director and setting 
and executing on its agenda.  The general statutes establishing the GIC grant the 
commissioners broad discretion to make policy decisions that affect health care and other 
benefits:  
“The Commission shall negotiate with and purchase, on such terms as it deems to be 
in the best interest of the commonwealth and its employees from one or more 
insurance companies….group general or blanket insurance providing hospital, 
surgical, medical, dental and other health insurance benefits covering persons in the 
service of the commonwealth and their dependents” (General Laws of 
Massachusetts). 
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The governor, through Commission appointments, has the actual authority to 
formally control the agenda of the GIC.  The reality, though, is that governors from both 
parties have historically deferred to the Commission.  According to the Commonwealth 
Connector Authority’s Carey, formerly with the GIC, “New governors come in, and they 
have so much other shit on their plate, if [the GIC is] not broke, they’re not going to go out 
looking for trouble. That’s how they’ve viewed Dolores and the GIC” (Carey interview 
2006). 
While the governor makes appointments to the Commission and therefore could 
exercise some authority over the GIC, the legislature has no formal control over the selection 
of the executive director or in setting the agenda of the Commission.  The GIC regularly 
submits its annual budget request to the governor’s office and legislature, and each year it is 
approved with little modification, regardless of party affiliation of the governor (Mitchell 
calls herself a “liberal Democrat”).  As elected officials responsible for the Commonwealth’s 
budget, members of the legislature and the Governor could wield more direct influence over 
the GIC’s budget through the state budget and appropriations process.  However, according 
to the health policy aide of the Massachusetts Speaker of the House,  
“Policymakers know that tinkering with the GIC’s budget or proposing big cuts or 
changes would result in political backlash from the public employees and their 
constituents. It is easier to kick around an entitlement program for poor people 
(MassHealth, the State’s Medicaid program) than to mess with public employees. 
Plus, everybody throughout the legislative process knows that Dolores is straight on 
these issues. She’s a cost cutter, so there’s no reason to go toe to toe with her when 
there are bigger fish to fry in other areas of state government” (Hager interview 
2006). 
The Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation’s Turnbull agreed: “Health care has long 
been identified as a budget buster for the state. Dolores has been a very active and strong 
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willed politically astute director who wants to drive reform. Nobody on Beacon Hill really 
wants to disturb that…in fact they want to encourage it” (Turnbull interview 2006).  The 
relative independence from legislative influence also means that state’s powerful payer and 
provider interest groups are effectively constrained from exercising direct legislative 
influence or using personal connections with legislators to directly affect the work of the 
GIC or, for example, block the CPI. According to Hager, “Most [legislators] know enough to 
not be combative with [Mitchell], so they would say to powerful provider groups and others 
that the Commission is an autonomous structure governed by a separate Commission and 
cannot be influenced through the legislative process, period” (Hager interview 2006). 
Furthermore, the relative insulation from direct political pressure from the legislative 
arena is derived in part from the specific goals of the CPI and similar initiatives.  Legislators 
are reluctant to be responsive to any provider or health plan “concerns” if the underlying 
issue is compatible with larger goals, such as cost containment or quality promotion.  Thus, 
the GIC’s relative autonomy may be confined to particular policy areas.  Carey describes the 
potential boundaries of the political insulation exercised by the GIC:  
“Dolores has couched the CPI in terms of cost containment and [quality 
improvement]…therefore she has been able to tamp down any serious criticism you 
might get from the hospitals and docs because the legislature has historically been 
interested in cost containment and maintaining the Commonwealth’s reputation for 
innovative quality health care. If she came forward with a proposal to just shift costs 
from the state to state employees, then the legislature would get involved because that 
would generate lots of constituent concerns. But couching her initiative in terms of 
cost and quality, she has been able to mitigate potential criticism. The docs and 
hospitals really have no avenue to vent on this one other than the occasional op-ed in 
the Globe” (Carey interview 2006). 
Thus, as long as the GIC undertakes a effort construed as being designed to contain 
costs or enhance health care quality in ways that do not disturb the health care benefits of 
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state workers, the GIC exercises relative autonomy.  Unicare’s Slavin recalled an example 
from his days as GIC’s Director of Policy and Research that illustrates how the 
Commission’s political independence and authority is shaped in part by the constraints that 
health plans and other interest face attempting to invoke the legislative or political process to 
control GIC policymaking. According to Slavin: 
“Harvard [Pilgrim Health Care] thought of themselves as the best health plan in 
world. In 1994, Harvard came to the GIC with what was seen by [Mitchell] as an 
unacceptable rate proposal. [GIC staff] went before the Commission with our analysis 
about how out of line Harvard’s rate proposal was.  Harvard refused to negotiate. 
They basically presented their rate proposal on a ‘take it leave it basis.’ Therefore 
[Mitchell] recommended to the Commission that we freeze Harvard’s enrollment in 
the GIC – we wouldn’t dump people off their health plan but also wouldn’t allow 
Harvard to enroll more of our members until the next contracting period when 
Harvard could re-submit a bid.  The Commission accepted Mitchell’s 
recommendation, and [Harvard] almost shit a brick. They were totally stunned.  On 
the night after the meeting, Harvard’s senior people started calling [GIC] 
commissioners at their homes and at their places of business, they even called 
legislators to encourage them to make the Commission reverse its decision.  But it 
didn’t matter. It was too late and there was nothing that legislators could or would do 
because no legislator was going to be seen as carrying the water for a health plan that 
cost too much against the GIC” (Slavin interview 2006). 
According to the Department of Insurance’s Pinion, there was no formal political or 
administrative channel for Harvard or other health care stakeholders to plead its case: “The 
Commission receives the GIC staff’s recommendations on the day before a meeting, there is 
a sometimes healthy and legitimate debate, and then the Commission votes, almost always 
unanimously in favor of what Dolores recommended. That’s it” (Pinion interview 2006). 
All interviewees insisted that the Commission is strong and “real”, as former 
commissioner Richard Zeckhauser put it, and that it engages in “authentic” debate and 
discussion that contributes to GIC policy decisions (Zeckhauser interview 2006).  According 
to Charles Baker, who served as a Commissioner from 1992-1999,  
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“Most board don’t work very well. This board actually functioned quite effectively 
representing both constituents and the public at large…..Why? Because it was of the 
government, but not wholly within the government and GIC has been fortunate to 
have first-rate staff and executive leadership” (Group Insurance Commission Annual 
Report 2005). 
However, others also emphasized Mitchell’s personal influence in setting an agenda 
that is palatable to the Commission, giving them an authentic voice, and then leading them 
to adopt her positions on critical matters, such as contracting issues. 
This influence and autonomy have, according to the Connector Authority’s 
Kingsdale, contributed to Mitchell’s ability to propose and implement the CPI: “Her position 
gives her enough independence and latitude to be able to make what other people might term 
as outrageous or difficult decisions” (Kingsdale interview 2006).  According to one 
interviewee with close contacts in the legislature,  
“I suspect there are a lot of other states that would have been susceptible to political 
backlash and pressure from providers to trim the sails. Dolores is well established and 
vocal on Beacon Hill and known to have strong will and determination and a lot of 
political connections in Massachusetts. But maybe as important to all of that, she also 
is significantly politically insulated, and everybody knows it” (Interview 2006). 
The result of the political insulation enjoyed by the GIC is that there is very little direct 
influence exerted on behalf of the legislature on GIC policymaking.  According to Mitchell:   
“In my nearly twenty years of service, only once or twice has a legislator applied 
political pressure to me to give a contract to a certain vendor or change a contract, 
and in those cases I listen carefully, but then ignore it unless the suggestion can stand 
on its own merit. There are no real consequences for me if I don’t simply exercise my 
own discretion about what I think is best, subject to the will of my boss, the 
Commission” (Mitchell interview 2006). 
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Policy Leadership and Entrepreneurship  
Virtually all interviewees attributed the importance of the GIC’s influence in state 
health policy discussions generally, and the implementation of the CPI specifically, as a 
direct reflection on the political influence and personal savvy of its Executive Director, 
Dolores Mitchell.   Given her “reputation as a cost-cutting enthusiast,” according to Carey, 
“Most everybody has absolute respect for Dolores, but also some fear” (Carey interview 
2006). Mitchell’s influence and reputation is not associated with her partisan allegiances. As 
executive director, Mitchell has worked under seven different governors (3 Democrats and 4 
Republicans) over a period of nearly 20 years. 
After each gubernatorial election, Mitchell somewhat famously submits a formal 
letter of resignation to each incoming governor, only to have her letter ignored. The 
governor does not appoint the executive director (the Commission does), but Mitchell’s 
letter is intended to symbolize her “respect for the new governor and the fact that I don’t 
want this job unless I have strong support from the new governor” (Mitchell interview 
2006).  According to the MHA’s David Smith, “Both Democratic and Republican 
administrations in Massachusetts have embraced her, going back to the Dukakis 
administration….she is now serving under the fourth consecutive Republican governor. 
They just let her do her thing” (Smith interview 2006). 
Numerous interviewees depicted Mitchell as a fierce negotiator who enjoys and is 
particularly skillful in the process and art of negotiation.  Commissioner Bowler explained, 
“Most employers in Massachusetts take rate renewal and say ‘thank you very much’ to 
whatever the health plans propose. Mitchell uses rate renewal proposals as merely a starting 
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place” (Bowler interview 2006). As one (anonymous) health plan interviewee noted, who 
has been on the receiving end of Mitchell’s aggressive negotiation efforts,  
“Dolores has outlived most health plan CEOs. When it comes to negotiating rates or 
other issues that involve costs to the GIC or the taxpayers, she doesn’t spare her 
friends.  In negotiations with health plans, even those senior executives that she 
knows personally, she kicks the shit out of all of them equally” (Interview 2006). 
 
Former GIC staff members noted that staff members have recommended a “satisficer” 
approach in negotiations with health plans; however, Mitchell’s approach is to treat small 
and large health plans alike:  
“Negotiating aggressively to take the costs of an enormously popular health plan 
down by 1% gets you a lot more savings than if you take a smaller, less popular plan 
down by 20%. It’s a basic ‘satisficing’ negotiation strategy. I remember her response 
to this staff recommendation. She said, ‘Every one of these plans is going to sacrifice. 
We’re going to negotiate with every one of them equally aggressively. While some of 
them may be smaller than others, proportionally they may all be rolling in dough’” 
(Carey interview 2006). 
 
Another health plan executive interviewed (anonymously) concurred, noting, “Her 
approach is ‘nothing is good enough.’ Wrestle them to the ground. Push them into the floor 
until their nose bleeds. Then politely, and with a big smile, ask them to leave.  She can be 
very funny and gentle and at the exact same time, very devastating” (Interview 2006). 
While health plan executives and other interviewees were quick to point out Mitchell’s 
fierce negotiating approach and tough personality, they each also conveyed a great deal of 
personal respect and heartfelt understanding of her efforts. According to Slavin, “she is not 
particularly ‘showy’, her pomp and circumstance is not about ‘her’, she just wants to get the 
job done, and everybody knows that” (Slavin interview 2006). 
Current and past GIC commissioners cited Mitchell’s longstanding desire to provide 
a generous health care benefit at the lowest possible cost as the source of her political 
support among both Republicans and Democrats.  Hager, chief policy aide for the 
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Massachusetts Speaker of the House Speaker, concisely summed up the basis of Mitchell’s 
political support on Beacon Hill as attributable largely to respect and support for her efforts 
and methods on a bi-partisan basis:  
“Her seriousness and legacy about containing costs and driving every penny out of 
the negotiation process is the basis of her support at the Legislature for the CPI. It 
doesn’t matter what party you’re in or if you have a powerful hospital in your district.  
This is an expensive state for health care, and any backchannel efforts of the powerful 
provider groups or insurance lobbies fall on deaf ears because of a strong respect for 
Mitchell’s commitment to cost containment and the kinds of think she is doing with 
the CPI” (Hager interview 2006). 
 
Mitchell has put her negotiating tenacity and reputation for cost containment to work 
in proposing and implementing the CPI.  Marisa Fusco, Tufts’ Director of Client Services, 
noted, “Dolores Mitchell has done a good job spearheading this….she has pushed and 
pushed and pushed to get [CPI] done, even when she hits an obstacle like a technical 
problem or a particularly frustrated provider group” (Fusco interview 2006). 
According to Barbara Rabson, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Health 
Quality Partners:  
“[Mitchell] is absolutely devoted and dedicated and passionate about this initiative 
and she has a lot of political capital built up over 20 years in which she has proven 
herself a serious policy leader who wants to drive the delivery system to provide 
higher quality, lower cost care.  [Mitchell] has single handedly pushed the CPI on the 
power of her own personality and reputation” (Rabson interview 2006). 
 
Virtually all interviewees highlighted Mitchell’s personal role in implementing CPI 
in the face of strong resistance from powerful hospitals and provider groups as a function of 
her reputation and leadership with the Legislature.  Bailit summed up the general consensus 
among interviewees about how Mitchell’s leadership has been instrumental in implementing 
GIC:  
“The ability to navigate around the powerful groups like the teaching hospitals and 
Partners and other physician-oriented groups is almost all due to Dolores Mitchell’s 
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‘one person show’ and correspondingly, her strong support from her commission and 




This chapter set out to analyze the GIC’s experience launching a new initiative 
designed to mitigate rising costs within the GIC as well as to stimulate delivery system 
reforms that would influence the state health care system as a whole.  Accordingly, it 
examined both the factors that shaped how this particular strategy was implemented and also 
the factors that have contributed to the GIC’s influence (as well as the limits of its influence) 
as a major public purchaser.   
The GIC’s Clinical Performance Improvement initiative is based on leveraging the 
Commonwealth’s contracts with private health plans participating in the GIC to establish a 
“high performance” network tiering structure.  In launching the CPI, the GIC has realized 
that contracts can be valuable instruments in the hands of sophisticated purchasers. 
Specifically, contracts with private health plans can use participation requirements to impose 
unequivocal standards, set detailed performance goals, demand more and better data, 
promote and reward quality improvement, generally convey to health plan participants a 
heightened sense of accountability, and in effect, change the business practices of 
contractors (i.e., health plans) and those with whom they contract (i.e., providers). 
When implemented, the CPI initiative was highly unpopular with health plans.  
Interviews with health plans revealed that they may have considered the concept of network 
tiering absent the GIC’s requirements that health plans move in this general direction, but 
none of them had active plans to actually implement network tiering due to the technical and 
administrative hurdles of doing so as well as the concerns about the potential backlash from 
provider groups.    
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Despite their protests, health plans have by and large grudgingly acceded to the 
GIC’s wishes at a basic conceptual level if not in a specific programmatic level.  All 
participating plans are participating in the GIC’s required data submission component of the 
CPI even if they have collectively extracted concessions from the GIC to phase in network 
tiering implementation in a manner that is consistent with each health plans’ provider 
relations and contracts and corporate goals.  Moreover, the GIC’s contracts with several 
participating health plans have, in turn, forced health plans to re-structure their own 
contracts with provider groups.  This has proven to be highly unpopular with health care 
providers.  This unpopularity has manifested itself in different ways, including public 
complaints about the initiative and its design elements.  However, even provider groups that 
have enjoyed the perception if not the reality of being highly politically popular (to the 
extent that they have been successful in avoiding restrictive provider networks even at the 
height of the managed care era) have been unable to exert political or other influence to 
effectively block the CPI.   
So what accounts for the GIC’s success in overcoming resistance from key 
stakeholders in the Massachusetts health care system, including health plans and provider 
groups? The analysis contained in this chapter argues that several issues help explain the 
GIC’s impetus to introduce the CPI and its basic success in doing so. There is a broad 
political consensus within the legislature, governor’s office, and commission itself that 
maintaining the quality of health care benefits for public workers and their families is of 
paramount concern, notwithstanding the erosion and thinning of health care benefits that has 
characterized the employer-based health system in the private sector.  With cost shifting 
effectively “off the table”, the GIC has had to search for alternative ways to contain costs.  
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The CPI purports to contain costs and improve health care quality.  The legislature 
has long been dominated by Democrats, who interviewees said were not as responsive to 
provider interest concerns and complaints as Republicans typically are.  Moreover, the 
legislature has historically deferred much of GIC policymaking to the GIC itself.  The GIC’s 
relatively autonomous governance structure has effectively eliminated a possible mechanism 
through which providers and other groups may be able to leverage political influence 
through legislative channels to block or modify the CPI.   
This chapter finds that characteristics of the state health care market play a very  
important role in explaining the GIC’s relative influence as a major purchaser.  First, the 
GIC enjoys significant market power because it purchases over $1 billion of health care 
benefits every year.  One interviewee said that “the GIC is the biggest employer-based 
purchaser in all of New England” (Carey interview 2006). Second, the GIC enjoys 
bargaining power, which is a testament to the relatively vibrant health care marketplace of 
Massachusetts, with its many teaching and community hospitals, physician groups, and 
many competing health plans.  Notwithstanding its reluctance to do so, the GIC is in a 
position to exert bargaining power because it can realistically threaten not to contract with 
certain health plans or provider groups if these groups do not accede to contract terms that 
the GIC finds acceptable.  Finally, the changes in the economic landscape of Massachusetts 
specifically, as well as the “nationalization” of employers on a broader level, mean that the 
GIC is positioned within a larger vacuum of employer leadership in the state. Given that 
other private and public employers in Massachusetts look to the initiatives of the GIC as a 
potential testing ground for new ideas, health plans and provider groups are forced to 
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address the concerns of the GIC as the GIC functions as a de facto leader among employers 
in the Commonwealth. 
As mentioned above, the GIC’s historical system of governance has created a 
powerful position in the GIC’s executive director. With the governor and legislature content 
to allow the GIC to exercise relative independence in its policymaking activities, the 
Commission has attracted talented staff and commissioners who exercise their duties with 
the broader market of Massachusetts in mind.  Finally, a very important ingredient in the 
success of the GIC has been the effectiveness, political acumen, and leadership of its 
executive director for the last twenty years, Dolores Mitchell. Not only does the GIC’s 
governance structure grant Mitchell considerable latitude to experiment with new and 
innovative initiatives, she has also earned an impressive level of personal trust given her 
stewardship of the GIC and reputation for being a fair, if forceful, cost cutter.  It is unlikely 
that an executive director lacking Mitchell’s skill and political influence would have been 
successful navigating the technical, administrative, and political challenges that Mitchell has 
addressed since the CPI was implemented four years ago.  Leadership matters. 
The key factors that help to explain the GIC’s success in implementing the CPI over 
resistance from key provider and health plan interests in Massachusetts also suggest some of 
the limitations of PEHPs’ “purchasing power” to induce private actors to behave in ways 
that they would not have otherwise. First, the political dynamics present in Massachusetts 
(with Democrats dominating the legislature) helped to reduce providers’ ability to exert 
influence to block or modify the CPI.  This suggests the possibility that in states with 
political dynamics that are more hospitable to the plight of provider groups, PEHPs may be 
constrained in important ways from engaging in innovative purchasing initiatives that are 
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perceived to harm health care providers.  This could be the case, for example, in states with 
hospitals that face serious financial challenges being affected by PEHP “reforms” that are 
perceived to exacerbate those challenges.   
More importantly, however, much of the GIC’s influence is associated with its 
governance structure, which provides as much political autonomy as could reasonably be 
expected for a political entity like the GIC.  The GIC’s governance structure has somewhat 
insulated its decisionmaking from political pressure from providers and other groups since 
the legislature does not actively assert control over the GIC’s specific initiatives or 
purchasing requirements. In states with different forms of PEHP governance, however, 
PEHPs may be more relatively limited in their ability to exert considerable influence 
introducing initiatives similar to the CPI that seek statewide delivery system reforms that are 
controversial.  This is because provider groups in such states could leverage political 
processes through the legislature, for example, to effectively block or modify such initiatives 
deemed hostile to provider interests.  Nonetheless, even independent governance structures 
can be captured by providers and other interests.  Thus the specific degree of political 
independence that PEHP commissioners or board members enjoy vis-à-vis the legislature 
may not entirely explain the effectiveness of governance structures.   More research is 
needed to better understand the role of governance systems. 
Moreover, that the Massachusetts “story” is to a large degree a function of its 
dynamic health care market suggests that in states with less health plan or provider 
competition, PEHPs may be disinclined or unable to enact purchasing requirements that 
explicitly affect the broader state health care system.  For example, in largely rural states 
with limited provider and health plan competition, PEHPs may not be in a position to exert 
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bargaining power and induce private actors to engage in the same types of behaviors that the 
GIC has been able to influence.  Further, in states with other large private employers and 
other purchasers that demonstrate strong interest in the broader state health care market, 
PEHPs may not be able to exert the “solo leadership” as the GIC and may instead need to 
couch its efforts in a more collaborative coalition-based manner.  This may ultimately reduce 
the ability of PEHPs to exert its preferred types of market influence as PEHPs would need to 
coordinate with other large purchasers instead of engaging in these efforts alone. 
Finally, as noted above, a large measure of the GIC’s success in implementing the 
CPI has been associated with the charisma and skill of its executive director.  Leadership 
matters.  This suggests the possibility  that in states whose PEHPs are not led by dynamic or 
especially talented or politically connected leaders, PEHPs may be effectively constrained in 
important ways from leveraging the many characteristics that together contribute to the 
relative “purchasing influence” of the PEHP.  
It is too soon to tell what real impacts, if any, the CPI initiative will have on cost 
containment and quality both within the GIC and statewide.  However, the GIC has in fact 
implemented the CPI in a way that is likely to gradually change the behaviors of private 
actors, possibly including consumers, within the state’s delivery system.  At the very least, 
health plans have had to collect new data that illustrates the relative efficiency and quality of 
health care providers in the state.  At the other extreme, however, some plan options have 
actually implemented the CPI specifically as the GIC proposed, via hospital co-pay 
differentials for different tiers and via physician tiering at the individual level for a number 
of key specialties.  It is possible that this initiative may change practice patterns and may 
induce other employers to purchase or experiment with tiered network or “high 
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performance” products.  A highly optimistic view would even suggest that this initiative 
could lead health care consumers (both GIC and non-GIC consumers) to play a more direct 
role in making health care choices that balance costs with quality. 
It should be pointed out, however, that the CPI has been introduced in a fairly limited 
way to date.  The “purchasing influence” of the GIC has not been unlimited by any measure. 
Its intended goal has been met with substantial backlash from the provider community and 
for that reason, from health plans.  Providers and health plans convinced the GIC to back 
down from its original ambitious goal to introduce a standardized tiering structure across all 
participating health plans.   
The activities of the GIC are somewhat impressive (even if the actual results of the 
initiative are unknown) and they do suggest an important policy role for states as major 
health care purchasers.  However, even under the most optimistic scenario, the policy 
research community should resist any urge to couch PEHP purchasing influence as capable 
of fundamentally re-shape the state’ health care market without much more research.  To the 
contrary, this case has demonstrated that while public purchasers are important and do have 
mechanisms to exert influence in the market, they are also constrained and limited in many 
important ways.  In sum, based on the Massachusetts experience to date, PEHPs play an 
important role in the broader health care market and policy environment but are shaped by 
and subject to political, market, and other influences and constraints. 
 
Chapter 5: North Carolina 
Introduction  
Scholars and policy analysts focusing on state health care policy do not typically 
consider North Carolina as a particularly ambitious reform-oriented or innovative state.  
Partly as a result, practically no policy and research attention has been focused on the North 
Carolina State Health Plan (SHP) and its role in purchasing or subsidizing health care 
benefits on behalf of the state’s leading employer, the state of North Carolina.  This chapter 
addresses this gap by focusing on the efforts of policymakers and SHP officials in recent 
years to use the SHP as a vehicle to help contribute to broader delivery system reform, 
seeking to confer cost containment benefits on the SHP itself as well as the health care 
system as a whole.   
Fitting within the larger scope of this dissertation, this chapter’s primary analytical 
and policy focus is on how policymakers have used the SHP in a larger effort to pursue 
policy objectives that affect more than the SHP’s traditional constituencies.  As noted in a 
previous chapter, this dissertation is not a formal evaluation regarding the extent to which 
states have actually achieved cost containment or other goals.  Rather, it is largely a political 
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and policy analysis seeking to understand the factors influencing SHPs to select their chosen 
strategies and the factors shaping their experiences with those strategies. 
Specifically, the key questions addressed by this chapter include how and why the 
SHP first decided to offer its members multiple private health plan options in the late 1980s 
and throughout the 1990s.  It explores the experience of this policy and also briefly discusses 
how and why the SHP’s experience with private health plans changed considerably by the 
early 2000s.  Given that policy and political officials in North Carolina had high hopes for 
the ability of the SHP’s experience with health plan “choice” to usher in a new era of 
delivery system reform in the state, while also yielding cost containment benefits for the 
SHP itself, this chapter also explores aspects of the “role” of the SHP (and the limits of its 
role) in the state’s larger health care policy arena. 
This chapter finds that the state’s use of the SHP to help encourage HMO 
competition in the state was successful in the sense that HMOs such as Kaiser did locate or 
expand HMO operations in North Carolina in part due to their ability to market to and within 
the state’s large SHP group.  The state engaged in several activities in structuring an 
environment of multiple health plan choice that were perceived to favor the state’s 
indemnity plan over HMO options.  However, it is unlikely that HMOs entered North 
Carolina exclusively because of the offer to use the SHP as a base of enrollment.  It is also 
unlikely that HMOs failed in the state solely because of perceived unfavorable market 
conditions within the SHP.  While state policymakers sought to use the SHP to help move 
the market toward alternative delivery systems, the SHP’s operating environment came to 
mimic the broader market instead.   
120 
The next section briefly describes the history and structure of the SHP, including its 
basic administrative design and governance structure.  The third section describes the rise 
and fall of one of the SHP’s high profile cost containment efforts in recent years by 
analyzing the relative influence of each of this dissertation’s key variables of interest.  The 
chapter concludes by describing the lessons learned from the North Carolina case that 
contribute to a broader understanding of the key factors influencing PEHP policymaking and 
the roles they play as major purchasers in state health care environments.  As with the 
previous chapter on Massachusetts, more detailed conclusions are presented in the final 




North Carolina State Employee Health Plan 
The North Carolina State Health Plan (SHP) provides health care benefits to over 
615,000 state employees, retirees, and their dependents.  Specifically, those eligible for 
coverage under the SHP include teachers, state employees and state retirees, current and 
former lawmakers, University of North Carolina System and state community college system 
employees, state hospital staff, and eligible dependents who choose to participate.  The SHP 
is financed through general state revenues and premium contributions from participating 
public employers and dependents.  The SHP is governed by a nine-member board of trustees.  
Three members of the board are appointed by the governor, three are appointed by the 
president pro tempore of the senate, and three are appointed by the state House.  As discussed 
in greater detail below, while the governor makes statutory appointments to the board, the 
legislature over time has asserted much more direct control over SHP operations. 
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The SHP was established in 1968 under the administration of Governor Bob Scott, 
who sought to move the authority to contract for health insurance for employees from 
individual government departments and agencies to a consolidated office.  Between the time 
that the SHP was formally established in 1968 until the early 1980s, state employees, 
retirees, and dependents were offered traditional indemnity insurance through the SHP’s 
contract with a single risk-bearing insurance carrier.  In response to the federal Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974, many private employers started replacing 
their fully-insured products with “self-funded” insurance administered by third-party 
administrators (TPA) to avoid benefit mandates, liability, and premium taxes (Enthoven 
2002).  During this time, state legislative and agency dissatisfaction with BCBS's handling of 
the SHP and its cost “overruns” compelled the state in 1982 to become one of the first state 
PEHPs in the country to “self-insure” (Feezor interview 2005).   
By self-insuring, state officials desired to no longer subsidize the outsourcing of risk 
via fully insured products and instead elected to pay a TPA to administer benefits and pay 
claims.  Thus, starting in 1982, all SHP members were enrolled in a self-insured traditional 
fee-for-service plan, the state Comprehensive Major Medical Plan (CMMP).  Texas-based 
Electronic Data Systems (EDS), which for part of the 1970s had handled claims 
administration in North Carolina’s Medicaid program, was chosen as the SHP’s first TPA.c
c However, former state officials in retrospect argued that “asking” EDS to submit a bid for the newly self 
insured program (in response to previous dissatisfaction with BCBS) was a poor choice given that EDS did not 
previously have a TPA service line and thus had little experience in this arena.  Hence, EDS’s “poor service and 
too many cost overruns” compelled the SHP to seek new TPA bids in 1987.   
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In 1987, BCBS submitted a winning proposal to the state that effectively wrested the SHP’s 
TPA contract away from EDS.  
The transition from full insurance to self-insurance with an outsourced TPA contract 
was not the only change that took place during this period in the life of the SHP.  As is 
described in more detail in the next section, beginning in the early to mid 1980s, the state 
undertook a new approach of offering its members the option of selecting from numerous 
private HMOs.  The general approach had two related goals.  The first goal was to use the 
SHP’s base of enrollment as a recruitment tool to encourage private HMOs to establish 
operations in the state in an effort to “reform” the state’s delivery system.  The second and 
related goal was to use HMO competition within the SHP to help mitigate annual cost 
increases incurred by taxpayers and public employers (Byrd, 2006). 
From 1986 until 2001, SHP members had the option of choosing from as many as 
twelve private HMO options in addition to the state’s traditional CMMP.  By the early 
2000s, however, all HMOs exited the SHP after incurring significant financial losses.  The 
next section describes this experience in detail, including the key factors that compelled the 
state to undertake this approach and the factors that explain why and how it unraveled by the 
early 2000s.  
The SHP’s Experience With Private Health Plan “Choice” 
Beginning in the mid-1970s, North Carolina state government officials became 
increasingly skeptical that the state’s indemnity-dominated health care marketplace was 
adequately equipped to mitigate rising health care costs (Byrd interview 2006).  Employers 
and taxpayers were “starting to feel the crunch” of rapidly escalating health care costs 
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(Rodman interview 2006).  The growing concern in North Carolina was part of a broader 
national uneasiness about health care inflation.  Both the Nixon Administration and liberal 
policymakers, including Senator Edward Kennedy, described cost containment as a “crisis” 
issue that demanded attention (Starr 1982). 
Policymakers in North Carolina sought to be responsive to growing concern among 
the business community and the public at large (Hunt interview 2005).  Specifically, state 
policymakers began to consider whether the HMO model gaining popularity in other parts of 
the country (and explicitly encouraged by the Nixon Administration) could serve as a viable 
cost-containment model that would encourage a more efficient allocation of health care 
resources in the state.  Previously, several high-profile and successful prepaid group practice 
(PGPs) efforts around the country (including Kaiser Permanente [Kaiser] based in Oakland, 
California) compelled Congress to pass the HMO Act in 1973.  This law greatly expanded 
the small but growing movement toward alternative delivery systems by statutorily defining 
HMOs, providing some capital financing to support the start-ups of non-profit HMOs, and 
importantly, requiring all employers of 25 or more employees to offer at least one PGP and 
one Independent Practice Association (IPA)-based HMO as health insurance options (where 
they were available).  This federal action was a big boost to the development of HMOs 
throughout the country and provided an important backdrop for state-level reform efforts in 
North Carolinas in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Starr 1982). 
The increasing growth and potential of HMOs that was generating much policy and 
political attention nationally also had the same effect in North Carolina.  In 1979, the 
General Assembly established the Commission on Prepaid Health Plans to study alternatives 
for organizing and financing health care (North Carolina Commission 1979).  The 
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commission examined several models of prepaid health care delivery and concluded that 
delivery system reforms could introduce health plan competition to control costs.  Based on 
the Commission’s recommendations, the General Assembly enacted several legislative 
reforms designed to establish a supportive environment for alternative delivery systems in 
North Carolina, including provisions to allow HMOs to acquire facilities and contract with 
medical groups and traditional insurers (North Carolina Commission 1979).  This legislative 
activity catalyzed the entry and development of HMOs in North Carolina, which in turn 
eventually allowed the SHP to offer multiple HMO options to its members.  
In 1982, Governor James Hunt established the Foundation for Prepaid Health Plans 
designed specifically to attract new HMOs to North Carolina.  The Foundation’s initial 
recruitment efforts were focused on encouraging Kaiser to launch a regional expansion in the 
state since Kaiser was one of the nation’s largest and fastest-growing HMOs and because of 
its reputation as a leading model of PGP (Gitterman et al. 2003).  The Foundation, with the 
active support of Governor Hunt, recruited Kaiser to North Carolina just as the state 
typically recruits large employers (Hunt 2006; Wade 2006).  The Foundation met several 
times with Kaiser officials and provided information about the state’s demographics, 
business community, and health care trends, specifically in the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill 
Triangle and Charlotte metropolitan areas. 
State officials, including the Governor, encouraged Kaiser to enter the North 
Carolina market by, among other things, suggesting that the HMO could submit a bid to 
enter the SHP and use it as an initial base of enrollment.  As Kaiser had previously 
developed and leveraged influential local organizational support (e.g., public employee 
groups and labor unions) in its other expansion region, the state’s courtship of Kaiser and its 
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willingness to offer the SHP as an initial base of Kaiser’s enrollment was one of several 
factors that ultimately influenced the HMO’s decision to expand to North Carolina 
(Gitterman et al. 2003).   
Moreover, the state’s recruitment of Kaiser coincided with Kaiser’s interest in 
expanding into new markets.  At the same time that elected officials and policy reformers in 
North Carolina were trying to make the state a hospitable environment for alternative health 
care delivery systems, Kaiser was seeking to expand regionally.  Specifically, Kaiser sought 
to branch out from its West Coast presence in order to compete more effectively for national 
corporate accounts.  To Kaiser, the southeastern United States offered a great deal of market 
potential and thus it eventually expanded to Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina and Atlanta, 
Georgia.   
Kaiser formally established North Carolina operations in 1984 as the first and only 
true prepaid group practice in North Carolina.  In 1985, the General Assembly formally 
authorized the SHP to allow the entry of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) into the 
SHP.   
HMO Choice in the SHP (1986-2001) 
After establishing operations in North Carolina in 1984, Kaiser entered a successful 
bid to join the SHP in 1985.  SHP members residing in the Raleigh-Durham area could 
select Kaiser as their health plan beginning in the 1986 contract year.  In addition, in 1985 
the SHP also approved BCBS and Prudential to provide HMO products in the SHP after 
these carriers, with Kaiser, were successful in the SHP’s first competitive bidding process.  
In contrast to Kaiser’s group practice HMO model in which members were treated 
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exclusively by Kaiser physicians (through the Carolina Permanente Medical Group), BCBS 
and Prudential and other entrants in North Carolina were network-model HMOs that 
contracted with IPAs and/or community primary care physicians not exclusively serving 
Kaiser patients.  Prudential, which based its “mixed-model” HMOd on the Nalle Clinic in 
Charlotte, offered its “PruCare” product while BCBS offered its “Personal Care Plan” 
(PCP).  The emergence and activity of these three HMOs – Kaiser, Prudential, and BCBS – 
were the first HMO players in the SHP in what became a flurry of HMO activity in the later 
part of the decade (in both the SHP and the state as a whole).   
Kaiser, Prudential, and BCBS built a modest base of enrollment within the SHP but 
did not remain the only HMOs operating in the SHP for long.  Carolina Physicians Health 
Plan (CPHP), a physician-owned and -directed HMO was created in response to Triangle-
area physicians “feeling coerced to participate in [North Carolina’s] growing HMO 
movement” (Bilbro 2003).  CPHP attracted over 6,000 SHP members by 1993.e In addition, 
Maxicare, Physicians Health Plan of North Carolina, and Partners National Health Plan of 
North Carolina entered the SHP in the early 1990s.  Despite the new HMO options available 
to SHP members, however, Kaiser continued to have the highest enrollment of any HMO 
option in the SHP.  Its 26,928 SHP members accounted for about 6% of total SHP 
membership in 1993.f Kaiser’s SHP business constituted about 23% of its total statewide 
enrollment in 1993 (NCSHP 1993–1998).  
 
d A mixed-model HMO contracts both with medical groups and IPAs. 
e In 1994, Healthsource entered the SHP after acquiring Carolina Physicians' Health Plan. 
f Importantly, Kaiser was only available to SHP members in the Triangle and Charlotte markets – not statewide. 
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Despite the flurry of new HMO options available in the SHP, the state’s self-insured 
CMMP continued to dominate, with nearly 84% of members opting to remain in the CMMP 
in 1994.  Nearly 20% of SHP members were enrolled in one of seven HMO plans in 1994, 
up from 14% in 1993.  HMO activity in the SHP reached its apogee in 1997, when twelve 
HMOs provided health plan alternatives to the CMMP.  Nearly 27% of SHP members chose 
HMOs that year (NCSHP 1983-1988). 
In the case of Kaiser, by 1996 the HMO began to lose SHP market share and 
members due in part to the intensifying competition of newer lower-priced entrants (e.g., 
Wellpath) in the state and within the SHP (Lore 2007; Soper 2007).  By 1996, Kaiser served 
slightly more than 20,000 SHP members, accounting for 16% of Kaiser’s total enrollment 
(down from about 23% in 1993).  By 1998, Kaiser served only 18,157 SHP members (15% 
of Kaiser’s total enrollment). Finally, in December 1999, Kaiser closed down and sold its 
North Carolina operations, leaving only 4,399 members who had opted to remain in the plan 
until their contracts expired (NCDOI 2000). 
Exhibit 5.1: Distribution of SHP Enrollment by Health Plan Choices (1997) 
Health Plan Enrollment % of Total 
Comprehensive Major Medical Plan 
(CMMP) 389,860 73.1% 
Personal Care Plan (BCBS) 47,425 8.9% 
Wellpath Community Health Plans 23,432 4.4% 
Healthsource North Carolina 19,622 3.7% 
Kaiser Permanente 18,401 3.4% 
UnitedHealthCare 11,223 2.1% 
PruCare  10,604 2.0% 
Partners National Health Plan 4,406 0.8% 
Maxicare Health Plan  2,623 0.5% 
Qualchoice Health Plan 2,546 0.5% 
Doctors Health Plan 2,016 0.4% 
Cigna Healthcare 1,178 0.2% 
Optimum Health Plan 225 0.0% 
Total 533,561 100% 
Source: Author’s calculation based on State Health Plan Enrollment Figures, 1997. 
128 
The SHP’s experiment with private health plan options ended with all remaining 
HMOs exiting the SHP by 2001.  For the next five years, all SHP members would be 
enrolled in the CMMP.   However, in February 2006, SHP officials announced that 
beginning in October of the same year, SHP members would be able to once again select an 
alternative plan option to the CMMP.  Unlike the previous experience in the 1990s in which 
the SHP contracted with private health plans (which were at risk), however, the preferred 
provider organization (PPO) options are state-based self-insured plans administered by 
BCBS.g
Specifically, SHP members selecting a PPO option can select from among three 
varying PPO options with different co-pays, coinsurance, deductibles, and premium 
contributions to be attractive to populations with different risk and health profiles.  Since 
SHP members were able to select a new PPO option in October 2006, about 260,000 
existing SHP members (42%) have chosen to stay in the traditional CMMP while 360,000 
opted (58%) to move into a PPO plan (Soper interview 2007).h
g The SHP discussed the new PPO network contract with several companies (including BCBS, United, Aetna, 
Cigna) to make their PPO networks and administrative services available for the new PPO plans.  Given its 
large statewide network, BCBS won the PPO contract.  Thus, BCBS retains the ASO contract for the CMMP as 
well as the separate contract serving the SHP’s PPOs.  
 
h According to SHP officials, the availability of the segmented PPO products has induced approximately 30,000 
individuals that had been eligible for SHP benefits but previously chose not to participate to enroll in a PPO 
(primarily dependents).  Thus, adding new 30,000 members means that approximately 60% of total SHP 
members are enrolled in a PPO option and 40% remain in the CMMP. The inclusion of presumably younger, 
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The SHP projected that the new PPO options would save the state $30 million in the 
first year (Soper intervi ew2007).  The primary basis of these savings is the lower provider 
reimbursements made available through the BCBS’s “Blue Options” network.  That is, given 
that PPOs offer wide-access provider networks and little utilization management (relative to 
traditional HMOs), “immediate” savings projections are based largely on simply lowering 
reimbursements to participating providers through the BCBS PPO network.  
Despite the apparent popularity of the new PPO options (relative to the CMMP), the 
current strategy is markedly different from the previous experimentation with broad health 
plan choice.  Encouraging private HMO options to enter North Carolina and the SHP had 
been designed to stimulate competition between the traditional indemnity-based marketplace 
and the new, more integrated delivery systems available through HMOs.  In contrast, the 
current environment of SHP plan options is designed to make new benefits and cost sharing 
options available to different segments of the SHP population and to leverage provider 
reimbursement as the primary cost containment mechanism.  While the state may realize 
short-term savings associated with lower provider reimbursement contracts, the PPO option 
is unlikely to stimulate significant long-term economizing as wide-access PPO options are 
subject to the same cost drivers as traditional indemnity insurance. 
Factors Influencing the SHP’s HMO Cost Containment Strategy and Its 
Experience 
This section explores and summarizes what can be learned about the SHP’s 
experience with private health plans, specifically the rise and fall of private health plan 
 
healthier dependents is likely to improve the problem of adverse selection that has concerned SHP officials and 
policymakers (and earlier, HMO executives participating in the SHP).  
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options in the 1980s and 1990s that ended by 2001.  The goal of this section is to better 
understand the key drivers of PEHP policymaking in North Carolina and what, if anything, 
the implementation of the effort reveals about the political and market influence of the SHP 
as a major public purchaser.   
HMOs that participated in the SHP sought to use it as a base of enrollment that 
would assist them in developing other business in North Carolina.  In the case of Kaiser and 
other new HMOs in the state, marketing products to a large employer group like the SHP 
were expected to reduce the initial costs associated with acquiring new membership and help 
amortize the fixed costs of expanded operations to the Triangle and Charlotte metropolitan 
areas.  Secondly, participation in the SHP was also expected to demonstrate the low-cost 
HMO model “alive and working” to other employers in North Carolina considering adding 
HMO options for their employees (Elting interview 2005).  For incumbent carriers already 
doing business in North Carolina, such as BCBS, providing HMO options in the SHP was 
also seen as a strategy to avoid losing significant market share to new HMO entrants while 
also growing their own HMO products to serve employer groups’ interest in experimenting 
with managed care options. 
State’s Political Party Configuration 
For the most part, North Carolina has had a Democratic governor and a Democratic 
legislature in the last three decades.  Republicans controlled the governor’s mansion when 
Republican Governor Jim Holshouser was in office from 1973-1977 and Republican 
Governor Jim Martin served from 1985-1993.  Republicans briefly held the North Carolina 
House between 1985-1988.  Otherwise, Democrats have dominated state party politics 
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(Luebke 1998).  Regardless of party affiliation, however, North Carolina governors have 
historically not played a major role in SHP policymaking (Long interview 2006). Aside from 
making three statutory appointments to the board of trustees, the governor “has largely taken 
a back seat on matters of [SHP] oversight and policymaking “(Interview 2005).  Thus, 
despite Governor Hunt’s active involvement recruiting Kaiser and other HMOs to the state 
using the SHP as a base of enrollment, the partisan affiliation of the state’s governor has not 
played an important role in PEHP policymaking (Kaplan interview 2007). 
Moreover, no interviewee directly attributed political competition between 
Republicans and Democrats in the legislature or the particular political configuration of the 
legislature at any given time as having played an important role in the effort to promote 
HMOs within the SHP or in HMOs’ inability to achieve and retain profitability in the SHP.  
 More generally, in North Carolina, SHP politics does not generate particular 
recurrent or ongoing partisan cleavages. As one key market observer noted, “Looking back 
over the years, I don't really recall any clear partisan issues, at least capital D or R type 
disputes with the [SHP].  Politics has long played a big role in the [State Health] Plan for 
sure, but competition between political parties isn’t really what’s it’s all been about” 
(Mahoney interview 2007).  Another interviewee agreed, noting, “I honestly cannot recall 
any explicit partisan battles over the State Health Plan or any related issues” (Kaplan 
interview 2007). 
Several interviewees articulated a “Medicaid crowd-out” thesis in which the lack of 
political partisanship regarding the SHP has been due in part to relatively more legislative 
interest in and concern about the state Medicaid program.  One such interviewee noted that, 
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“The much bigger elephant in the room, Medicaid, has served to preempt a lot of high 
profile attention on most aspects of the SHP” (Interview 2007). 
Indeed, compared to the SHP, the Medicaid program is more symbolically important 
as a program that generates the partisan political conflict endemic to social welfare 
programs.  Throughout the 1990s, Republican state legislators by and large sought to limit 
budget growth in the Medicaid program by resisting Democratic efforts to liberalize 
eligibility criteria for the program, by seeking to limit benefit expansions, and by focusing 
intently on perceived savings associated with “fraud and abuse” in the Medicaid program 
(Cansler interview 2006).  By contrast, Democrats have sought to take advantage of federal 
matching funds available to expand Medicaid eligibility and covered benefits to additional 
populations.  These respective positions, which have stimulated recurrent partisan debate 
and competition within the legislative arena, particularly within the budget process, have 
allowed policymakers in both parties to garner political benefits, with Republicans claiming 
that they are promoting cost controls and with Democrats seeking to use public programs to 
cover uninsured low income individuals.  (Fuquay interview 2006). 
Moreover, the focus on Medicaid makes sense given that compared to the SHP, 
Medicaid itself is more important in total covered lives and in dollar terms.  Medicaid 
provides comprehensive health care benefits to about 1.5 million state residents (Kaiser 
Family Foundation 2006).  Financed in part by general state revenues, the Medicaid program 
has consumed an increasingly large slice of state health care spending as well as total general 
fund spending in North Carolina.  Moreover, the program has been growing rapidly from a 
cost perspective.  From 1986 to 1997, expenditures for North Carolina's Medicaid program 
grew at an average rate of 18% per year before decelerating to single digit annual growth for 
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much of the later part of the decade (North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance 2000).  
In 2000, (the state share of) Medicaid spending accounted for 65% of North Carolina's total 
health care expenditures, compared to just 12.2% for the SHP (Milbank State Expenditure 
Report 2003).  Thus, partisan competition over aspects of the Medicaid program has been an 
important aspect of state policymaking in the last decade, while high-profile legislative 
attention on the SHP has been comparatively limited. 
A final reason that Medicaid politics has generated relatively greater partisan 
competition within the state legislative arena, compared to the SHP, relates to the particular 
constituencies served by the respective programs.  Medicaid is a “poor person’s program” 
providing health care benefits to low-income and otherwise uninsured individuals that are 
perceived to have limited electoral or political power (Brown and Sparer 2003).  This frees 
policymakers, primarily Republicans, to promote cost containment without fully enduring 
political backlash from Medicaid recipients themselves.i
By contrast, the SHP’s primary constituency is state employees and retirees.  The 
state views health care benefits as important components of total compensation to recruit and 
retain public workers.  With some exceptions, there has been broad political consensus to 
avoid cutting benefits or limiting eligibility to this politically important and well-organized 
group (Cope interview 2007).  Hence, despite annual cost increases, the actuarial value of 
 
i That said, owing to its size and importance to the larger health care policy arena, Medicaid has developed 
constituencies that have protected it from deep cuts during state budget crises.  For example, physicians and 
hospitals, particularly those in underserved communities, have a vested interest in ensuring the resiliency of the 
program as Medicaid reimbursement represents an important source of provider revenue.  
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benefits offered to SHP members exceeds the average private employer-based health plans 
(McKethan et al. 2006).  Consistent with national trends, even as private employers have 
“thinned” benefits and shifted new costs to workers, the value of the SHP’s benefits have 
remained relatively stable.  As one interviewee noted, “It’s much easier to at least talk about 
finding ways to trim Medicaid than it is to go up against what is considered a fairly strong 
and vocal public employee constituency. Nobody really wants to mess with that unless we 
have to” (Interview 2006). 
The “Medicaid crowd-out” thesis was well-articulated by a longtime health care 
lobbyist in North Carolina: “Most legislators have bigger fish to fry in trying to wrestle 
Medicaid cost growth to the ground rather than worrying about state employee benefits” 
(Kaplan interview 2007).  As a result, partisan cleavages in SHP policymaking have not 
characterized SHP policymaking nearly to the extent as in the Medicaid program and other 
areas of health care policy.  In summary, it is not that politics per se did not play a key role 
in the development and experience of the SHP’s effort to promote HMO competition.  
Rather, contrary to theoretical expectations, the politics of SHP policymaking has not been 
explicitly a partisan issue with Republicans seeking particular policy goals and political 
advantages and Democrats others.  Nonetheless, politics has emerged in other ways as the 
more detailed discussion below on the SHP’s governance structure describes.  
The State’s Changing Health Care Marketplace 
During the state’s period of experimentation with private HMO options, SHP 
members could choose to remain in the state’s own fee-for-service plan (CMMP) or select 
one of several participating HMOs.  Despite the significant number of HMO choices offered 
135 
in the SHP by the mid-1990s, most members chose to remain in the CMMP.  Several 
overlapping market-related factors help explain both the resilience of the CMMP in an 
environment of multiple HMO options as well as the demise of HMO choice in the SHP. 
First, despite new HMO activity in the state generally and in the SHP in particular, 
North Carolinians had very little experience with managed care, particularly “true” prepaid 
group practice options such as Kaiser.  Even at the height of the “managed care era” that 
swept the country, North Carolinians were enrolled in HMOs at rates well below national 
averages.  Market observers and regulators described how, in general, most North 
Carolinians were unaware of the concept of managed care and had very virtually no 
experience with HMOs when they became available.  According to Paul Sebo, the SHP 
Program Manager who led the first HMO enrollment meetings with state employees and 
retirees to explain the new HMO options in the SHP, a frequent source of confusion among 
state employees involved:  
“…getting people to stop saying ‘HBO’ because during that same time, cablevision 
was becoming very popular and attendees thought they were attending the enrollment 
meeting to talk about ‘HBO’ instead of ‘HMOs’…That’s how ‘back-woodsy’ North 
Carolina was in terms of managed care” (Sebo interview 2005). 
Despite great interest among the state’s political and policy community in ushering in 
a new era of managed care in the state, this effort relied upon an assumption that consumers 
would eventually select for managed care options when confronted with a choice.  For the 
most part, the market was never fully conducive to the more restrictive forms of managed 
care.  A relatively inexperienced consumer population (regarding managed care) took cues 
from both national discussions about the problems of managed care as well as an aggressive 
effort by the provider community to “brand” HMOs as “low quality” or “inadequate” health 
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care, as described in greater detail below.  For most SHP members, then, the relative comfort 
of staying with the CMMP (particularly active employees and retirees that paid no premiums 
and had no cost advantage to choose lower-cost health plan options) factored into their 
choice to remain in the CMMP despite the myriad choices available. 
Second, while the SHP population is widely distributed across the state, not all HMO 
plans were available statewide.  For example, Kaiser’s markets were in the Raleigh-Durham 
metropolitan area and later the Charlotte metropolitan region. While multiple HMO options 
were available in the state’s metropolitan areas, such options were not available to a 
significant proportion of the SHP population, especially in rural areas. SHP purchaser 
requirements obligated participating HMOs to make their plans available to their full 
provider networks in the state.  This (understandable) requirement prevented HMOs from 
“cherry-picking” from their most profitable markets and excluding regions where provider 
contracting or networks were more difficult or expensive.  However, most HMOs in the SHP 
did not have a statewide provider network and thus generally did not have to serve non-
metropolitan markets.  This put as many as twelve HMOs in a position of engaging in 
intense competition for relatively fixed enrollment within confined geographic areas within 
the state and limited the ability of HMOs collectively to attract market share even remotely 
comparing with the statewide CMMP.   
Third, many North Carolina HMOs themselves faced market-related operational and 
business challenges that were not directly related to their SHP membership, including 
insufficient capital, marketing problems, lots of smaller employers in a very tough and costly 
market, resistance from the medical community (discussed below), poor internal business 
decisions, and high fixed costs associated with the geographically-dispersed North Carolina 
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market (Bilbro 2003; Greene 2003).  It was also the case that there were few other large 
employers that offered a choice of multiple HMO options, which under different 
circumstances could have translated into more enrollment for HMOs and reduced the 
importance of HMOs gaining adequate market share in the SHP. 
Fourth, the rise and fall of HMO choice in the SHP mirrored the much broader 
managed care “backlash” in the nation in which growing national disillusionment with 
various forms of highly managed care led to greater regulatory scrutiny of HMOs.j This 
discontentment led employers and consumers to demand that HMOs increase the number of 
providers in their networks, expand the geographic coverage of networks, loosen restrictions 
on in-network referrals to specialists, reduce other utilization management controls, and give 
employees the option of going out of network for care at affordable out-of-pocket costs.  In 
response, the HMO marketplace rapidly moved away from a closed HMO model toward 
less-restrictive forms of HMOs, PPOs, point-of-service (POS) products, and other direct 
access HMO products that offered enrollees broader provider networks and fewer service 
restrictions.  Several HMOs in the SHP, including Kaiser, attempted unsuccessfully to stem 
enrollment losses by transforming traditional HMO products into less restrictive PPO-like 
products for SHP members (Wolf 2000; Fisher 2002). As one former HMO executive put it, 
“by then, it was too little, too late” (Lore interview 2005). 
 
j Ironically, when Americans were surveyed about the satisfaction of their health plans, a majority suggested 
that they were generally satisfied with their care; however, a plurality nonetheless responded that managed care 
resulted in lower quality health care and that managed care organizations should be subjected to greater 
regulation.  
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Further, federal payment pressures loomed large in the general financial performance 
of HMOs in the 1990s, including those participating in the SHP.  Before 1997, government 
reimbursement rates generally gave health care providers enough margin and flexibility to 
respond to the pricing pressures attributed to managed care.  However, in 1997 Congress 
passed the Balanced Budget Act (BBA), which effectively cut government reimbursements 
to hospitals and physicians.   
Squeezed by pressures from the BBA, many providers “pushed back” on HMOs in 
the late 1990s, becoming less willing to concede to significant provider discounts 
(Cunningham 2001).  As HMOs were squeezed on non-SHP business, they became less able 
to withstand the losses from their SHP participation.  Thus, larger non-SHP market 
considerations exacerbated pressures that HMOs were facing operating in the SHP.  
Moreover, HMOs faced intensified competition from new entrants struggling to 
quickly gain market share in North Carolina.  In particular, the more mature “incumbent” 
HMOs (including Kaiser) were discriminated against because of pricing strategies adopted 
by new market entrants.  Newer carriers such as Wellpath gained market share within the 
SHP by initially offering their HMO options at prices significantly lower than those of 
earlier entrants. According to Commissioner Long, “many HMOs were stretched, from a 
financial standpoint, as a result of the heightened level of competition following the rapid 
expansion in the number of HMOs during the 1990’s, and this only magnified the effect of 
financial losses that may have come as a result of contracting with the SHP” (Long 2006). 
By the middle of the 1990s, as losses mounted and HMO enrollments started to 
decline, the state’s managed care marketplace experienced rapid organizational change.  In 
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fact, the state’s HMO environment between 1997 and 2002 has been characterized as a 
period of “shakedown and reorganization” as the number of full-service HMOs declined 
rapidly due to mergers and closings (Greene 2003).  For example, Kaiser Permanente sold its 
Triangle membership to Partners National Health Plans of North Carolina and its Charlotte 
membership to Principal Health Care of the Carolinas (now Coventry).  Greensboro-based 
Physicians Health Plan (distinct from “Carolina Physicians Plan”), which along with Kaiser 
had been one of the most popular HMO options in the SHP, was sold to United Health Care.  
BCBS later acquired Partners Health Care, and Carolina Physician Health Plan was bought 
by HealthSource, which in turn was later acquired by Cigna.  These mergers and acquisitions 
were related to the broader market evolution of HMOs at the broader state and national level 
and not entirely or mostly due to the SHP. 
The opportunity to use the SHP as a base of enrollment played an important role in 
encouraging Kaiser and perhaps other HMOs to enter North Carolina.  However, it became 
very clear by the middle part of the 1990s that SHP business alone was not sufficient on its 
own to help HMOs sustain their livelihoods in North Carolina.  The above market factors 
affecting the SHP business in particular, as well as the state’s and nation’s changing health 
care marketplace more generally, did not allow the SHP to serve as the safe base of 
enrollment that was intended.  Thus, instead of the SHP’s experiment with HMO options 
reforming the state’s market, the SHP largely came to mimic the market as the state’s larger 
experience with HMO options deteriorated nearly as quickly as it arose. 
SHP’s “Politicized” Governance Structure 
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The underlying politics and governance structure of the SHP created (real and 
perceived) challenges that limited HMOs’ ability to effectively use the SHP as a favorable 
base of enrollment.  All stakeholders interviewed acknowledged that the General Assembly 
exerts significant political and operational influence over the SHP, specifically the 
Committee on Employee Hospital and Medical Benefits.k The direct legislative role in 
determining specific rates, benefit designs, and generally shaping SHP policy is “as strong as 
any [state employee health plan] in the country” according to a former acting SHP 
administrator (Feezor interview 2005).  Under the SHP’s enacting law, all benefits are 
included directly in state statutes and can only be adjusted through legislative procedures.l
Given how cumbersome it can be to amend state statutes through the political process, this 
arrangement has been criticized for removing flexibility for the staff and trustees of the SHP 
to quickly respond to costs and other factors that arise (McKethan and Gitterman 2005).   
While the SHP is formally governed by a board of trustees, numerous interviewees 
explained that “[the board] has been more of an advisory board…the real power over most 
aspects of the [SHP] has historically resided directly in the legislature” (Interview 2006). 
According to the Commissioner of Insurance, the direct political role of the General 
Assembly in making health benefits and other decisions “adds complexity and politicizes 
issues faced by the SHP…This is not a judgmental statement but is a simple fact” (Long 
2006).  More generally, the SHP’s “politicized” governance structure places the General 
Assembly in a position of being directly involved in many of the details of SHP 
policymaking.  This means that provider and other interests have a direct avenue by which to 
 
k The Committee on Employee Hospital and Medical Benefits is established by statute (see GS 135-38).  
l North Carolina General Statutes Chapter 135 
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lobby for and against certain SHP policies, subjecting SHP policymaking to the political 
legislative process.   
Specifically, the politicization of the SHP contributed to policy choices being made 
that, from the standpoint of several market observers interviewed, effectively favored the 
state’s own traditional indemnity plan (the CMMP) over HMOs.  First, benefits offered by 
HMOs had to be at least comparable to those offered under the SHP’s indemnity plan.  To 
HMO executives, this provision limited HMOs’ ability to tailor their benefits designs even 
while the state sought to ensure that adverse selection did not occur.  However, more than 
one HMO executive and a regulator reported that the SHP purchasing requirements for 
HMOs ensured that HMO benefits were actually richer than the CMMP.  The concern within 
the HMO community was that this policy would raise the possibility that higher risk 
members may be attracted to the relatively generous package of benefits available in HMOs.  
 Requirements of richer benefits and the need to provide lower member costs to 
attract enrollment led to adverse selection in some HMOs (White interview 2003).  
According to White, who served as President of CIGNA’s North Carolina operations, 
relatively high-risk members were better off choosing HMOs, despite having to pay an extra 
monthly premium, since 100% of their medical bills were covered under HMOs.  The SHP’s 
risk adjustment mechanism, discussed below, was not capable of mitigating this burden.  As 
one market observer described, “So they were willing to bring HMOs in, but right from the 
beginning with the richer benefit requirements we could start to see that they brought HMOs 
in only under conditions that basically forced [HMOs] to subsidize the retirees and older 
state employees in the [CMMP] who generally avoided HMOs” (Mahoney interview 2007). 
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A related example concerned mental health and substance abuse benefits.  After 
aggressive lobbying in the legislature from the North Carolina Psychological Association 
(NCPA) and other mental health and substance abuse advocates, the SHP did not allow 
HMOs to place the same limits on mental health or substance abuse treatments that were in 
the CMMP (and relative to the benefits HMOs offered in their non-HMO business).  As a 
result, HMO mental health and substance abuse benefits were actually more generous than 
the CMMP’s benefit.  Thus, members expecting to have greater health care needs were more 
likely to select HMO coverage over the CMMP.  The SHP’s governance structure, in which 
the legislature played a direct and assertive role in myriad details of SHP policymaking, 
meant that these and other benefit design issues were subject to legislative politics with 
various interest groups gaining the opportunity to find a political supporter on the legislative 
oversight committee.  Even after hiring influential lobbyistsm, HMOs struggled to secure 
what HMO executive perceived would be “basic neutral” conditions operating within the 
SHP. 
Second, a longstanding implicit agreement has existed in which SHP members would 
always have employee-only health coverage through the SHP without paying a premium 
contribution.  However, the state makes no premium contributions toward dependent 
coverage, which means that those seeking dependent coverage are responsible for the full 
average cost of coverage.n Based on utilization/claims and on the availability of reserves, 
 
m For example, Kaiser hired Zeb Alley, a longtime lobbyist who is perennially at the top of the North Carolina 
Public Policy Institute’s ranking of most effective lobbyists in the state. 
n In other words, the state makes a 100% employer premium subsidy for active employees/retirees and 0% for 
dependents. However, as a SHP official remarked, “There is a belief by certain General Assembly members 
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the General Assembly sets premiums and cost sharing provisions by statute for the CMMP.  
When the SHP offered multiple health plan options to its members, it maintained its 
employer premium contribution strategy of fully subsidizing each “employee-only” 
premium with an amount equal to the full cost of the CMMP premium (with zero employer 
premium contributions for spouses and other dependents).  Thus, SHP members were not 
rewarded with savings by selecting health plans with lower total premiums than the CMMP 
premium.  In addition, they had to pay the price difference to enroll in plan options with 
higher total premiums than the CMMP.  This policy was likely not designed to specifically 
favor the CMMP.  However, it had the effect of doing so as it created virtually no reason for 
members (particularly lower-risk members) to select HMO options. 
The state’s employer-contribution strategy led to very expensive dependent coverage 
in the SHP compared with similar coverage outside the SHP.  This situation contributed to 
adverse selection since dependents would have a strong incentive to obtain coverage 
elsewhere and those who could not would likely include some members who were unable to 
do so because of their health status (Sebo interview 2005).  Importantly, however, this 
artifact of the SHP situation preceded (and has persisted after) the period of HMO options in 
the SHP and thus was not designed in response to HMO options.  However, it did contribute 
to a difficult market environment for HMOs offering their products to SHP members and 
had the effect of favoring the CMMP over participating HMO plans. 
 
that, well, the subsidy for the employees in North Carolina comes largely from the fact that their employee 
premium is paid at 100%. If you’re paying everybody’s employee premium, therein lies the subsidy” (Soper 
interview 2007). 
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Perhaps more importantly, only when the General Assembly acted to modify the 
premiums for the CMMP would the HMOs know how much premium revenue from the state 
could be expected.  However, the General Assembly did not raise the CMMP’s base 
premiums at all from 1991 to 1998.  This fueled the belief among HMO executives that 
higher risk members may have been exiting the CMMP and being attracted to HMOs, 
resulting in adverse selection on the part of HMOs.   
However, according to one interviewee: 
“The key issue was that it was politically difficult to significantly raise [legislative] 
appropriations to the SHP while there were still millions in reserves. So rather than 
small, incremental bumps over that period, [legislators] spent down the reserves and 
then had to very sharply increase appropriations [to the CMMP] in each of the next 
few years” (Mahoney interview 2006).  
As the interactions between the Fiscal Research Division and legislators are 
confidential, it is not known what, if any, actual consideration was given to the impact of 
frozen CMMP premiums on HMOs.  However, HMOs and other more neutral market 
observers speculated that legislators knew that freezing the CMMP base premiums would 
hurt the HMOs: “They knew what they were doing. It was in some ways similar to Medicaid 
HMOs: welcomed with open arms to lose all the money they wanted to” (Interview 2006). 
Regardless of why the CMMP premium remained flat during this period, the effect was to 
make premiums relatively and increasingly costly for SHP members enrolled in HMOs. 
Again, this generally goes against the standard model of HMOs being able to compete as 
among the lower-cost plan options.   
Third, despite the dominance of the CMMP, SHP officials and legislative leaders 
became concerned in the early 1990s that SHP members migrating to HMO options were 
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younger and healthier relative to those remaining in the CMMP.  The concern was that such 
a migration could leave the CMMP at risk for a higher proportion of high risk members.  
Legislators sought guidance from the General Assembly’s Fiscal Research Division to seek a 
way to ensure that the SHP was compensated for the relatively “good” risk that migrating 
away from the CMMP toward HMO options.   
Accordingly, the state levied a risk adjustment of $10 per member per month on all 
HMO enrollees aged one to 40.o The state’s one-way risk adjustment was based on age, 
ensuring that the younger employees choosing HMOs would end up subsidizing older 
workers remaining in the CMMP.  However, the risk adjuster was one-way, which meant 
that that HMOs were not compensated for any unfavorable risk that they might have 
attracted.  This was especially problematic given that HMOs offered rich (or richer) benefits 
relative to the CMMP and, unlike the CMMP, had no benefit maximums.  
HMO executives and government leaders interviewed cited the SHP’s particular 
method of risk adjustment as one of several sources of financial strain for HMOs in the mid-
late 1990s.  The HMO community generally did not object to a risk adjustment mechanism 
per se.  In fact, several interviewees welcomed an opportunity (which never came) to be 
compensated for “bad” risk they themselves attracted.  Rather, their contention was with the 
state’s particular one-way, age-based risk adjustment formulation, and the fact that the state 
did not modify this methodology after better experience data became available over time. 
 
o This $10 PMPM risk adjustment, which increased in value in later years, was applied to the CMMP’s reserve 
fund. 
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That the risk adjustment was one-way meant that HMOs that enrolled high-risk 
members received no adjustments themselves even while HMOs had to compensate the 
CMMP for younger members enrolling in HMOs.  The Commissioner of Insurance 
generally agreed that the risk adjustment mechanism should have been modified over time:  
“The impetus for imposing this [risk adjuster] in the early years of HMO offerings is 
understandable, [but it] likely caused more harm than good and probably should have 
been computed differently [such as age/sex], once comparative claims data became 
available, in order to be a more sensitive and accurate compensation for any adverse 
risk that occurred” (Long interview 2006).  
HMO executives protested the methodology underlying the state’s risk adjuster and 
suggested alternative methodologies.  Alternatives included models that would be two-way 
to compensate HMOs when they in turn attracted higher risk members as well adjustments 
computed not on the basis of age only, but also on the basis of sex and actual claims 
experience.  However, legislators, with support from the legislature’s Fiscal Research 
Division, resisted changing the risk adjustment methodology.  As one HMO executive 
concluded, “It was a political thing [to protect the CMMP] more than a medical thing” 
(Interview 2006).   
The age-only adjustment, on top of zero co-payments and benefit mandates, reduced 
HMOs’ ability to offer competitive bids to SHP participants.  HMOs eventually raised their 
prices to cover these extra costs.  This created a “perverse incentive” that further undercut 
HMOs’ strategy to offer lower-cost health plan options relative to the CMMP. Taken 
together, the above issues contributed to an unfavorable operating environment for HMOs.  
Over time, as one former HMO executive summarized, “by the late 1990s, the [risk 
adjustment], the CMMP premium contribution situation, and other factors meant the 
numbers just no longer added up [to remain in the SHP]…the hemorrhaging that we all 
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experienced in the [SHP] was certainly not helping us expand our business in the rest of the 
state” (Interview 2006). 
Legislators and SHP officials extending to the Governor’s office had recruited 
HMOs and welcomed HMO activity in the SHP.  However, once HMOs entered the state 
and the SHP, the perception developed among a broad range of stakeholders that the SHP 
operating environment strongly favored the state’s own traditional indemnity plan, the 
CMMP, over HMOs.  Importantly, this is not to suggest that the politics of the SHP 
necessarily entails sinister “smoke filled rooms” and questionable motives.  Rather, it means 
that the SHP’s governance structure did not create a strong degree of insulation from 
legislative politics, which effectively meant that many of the often competing pressures and 
challenges that legislators face made their way to PEHP policymaking.  A prominent 
example is the desire among legislators not to appear to favor HMOs to avoid provoking the 
ire of key provider groups that lobbied the General Assembly (discussed in greater detail 
below). 
Some of the policy choices that the SHP made certainly may not have been explicitly 
designed to favor the CMMP or to hurt HMOs.  For example, most employer groups 
providing multiple health plan options, not just the SHP, grappled with issues of risk 
adjustments and other issues during this time.  However, perception (even if not linked to 
reality) is important in structuring a vibrant marketplace of multiple health plan choice.  That 
HMO executives came to strongly perceive that the SHP’s politicized governance 
environment was unfavorable to HMOs in relation to the CMMP is an important limitation 
of the SHP even if the perception is largely unwarranted. 
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A key state senator with a long tenure on the Committee on Employee Hospital and 
Medical Benefits (which exercises control over many aspects of SHP policymaking) 
remarked: “Does the legislative committee control the state health plan?  Yes it does.  Does 
the committee make decisions [concerning the SHP] that are political, that are based on 
politics?  Yes it does” (Rand interview 2005).  In the experience of HMO “choice” in the 
SHP, these issues had important implications for the performance and governance of the 
SHP more broadly.   
Provider Interest Groups 
In North Carolina, as in other areas of the country in fee-for-service dominated-
marketsp, provider organizations, including physicians and hospitals, were quite hostile to 
restrictive forms of managed care.  For example, the North Carolina Medical Society was 
generally opposed to HMO expansion in the state and some specialist medical societies 
organized against HMOs.  Several other professional organizations, including the North 
Carolina Psychological Association (NCPA), objected to specific elements of the expansion 
of managed care in the state.  Specifically, NCPA was against HMOs’ utilization review of 
provider practices and favored requirements that the SHP cover their services without 
restrictions.  Similarly, the North Carolina Hospital Association and some of the larger 
hospital systems opposed HMO expansion as well, fearing administrative burdens associated 
with many of the techniques of managed care as well as the threats to their sources of 
revenue. 
 
p Which is to say, virtually everywhere 
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The General Assembly had been directly involved in opening the way for HMOs to 
enter North Carolina hoping that a “reformed” delivery system and cost containment would 
emerge.  However, many political observers argued that the organized resistance of the 
provider community to the spread of managed care, which increased along with the number 
of new HMO entrants into the state, resulted in legislators eventually playing a more neutral 
posture toward HMOs, including those within the SHP.   
Moreover, the state’s politicized governance structure, discussed above, meant that 
the strong anti-HMO sentiment among the organized provider community fueled the 
legislature’s ambivalence toward HMOs even after legislators had previously allowed the 
entry of HMOs into the SHP.  For example, a hospital executive that lobbied the legislature 
on behalf of other large hospitals, expressed the consensus of several provider-oriented 
stakeholders:  
“When the select committee made the decisions that it did, in the back of the mind of 
several of them was the very clear sense that hospitals and docs absolutely hated 
[HMO expansion], so [legislators] were careful not to be seen as explicitly favoring 
the HMOs …in fact they did some things that flat out hurt HMOs ostensibly to 
protect the fee-for-service environment in the SHP. Beyond that, though, there was 
this paranoia in the provider community that we were headed down a ‘dark road’ to 
heavy managed care in the state, and some of the members on the legislative 
committee overseeing the SHP didn’t want to be seen as directly championing that 
given fierce resistance from hospitals and docs” (Interview 2006). 
Another interviewee noted that the combination of providers’ concerns about managed 
care’s expansion and the legislature’s role in SHP policymaking influenced the policy 
decisions of the SHP: “It is certainly true that politicians wanted to protect the indemnity 
plan.  This was led by a fight of providers who didn’t want to come under the market 
pressures that HMOs were providing.  [The executive administrator] at the time didn’t have 
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the autonomy.  So these discussions took place quietly in the legislature” (Cope interview 
2007). 
In sum, the SHP’s relatively politicized governance structure, in which the legislature 
plays a direct and often assertive role in SHP policymaking, provided a venue for providers 
and other groups to influence the process of developing and maintaining an environment of 
multiple health plan choice in the SHP.   
Policy Entrepreneurship and Leadership 
Compared to the case of Massachusetts described in Chapter 4, the dozens of 
interviews conducted in North Carolina did not suggest the “obvious” influence of personal 
leadership or policy entrepreneurship in shaping the SHP’s experience with multiple health 
plan choice.  This is not to suggest that North Carolina is lacking in high quality leaders in 
the health policy or political arenas.  In general, North Carolina’s health care policy 
environment includes many prominent and influential leaders, policymakers, and public 
officials.  However, no single candidate stood out in interviews as having played a key 
singular role – formally or informally – in shaping the experience in the state.  
Governor Hunt was certainly involved in the origins of the health choice experiment 
in the SHP and in the state as a whole. His administration studied alternative delivery 
systems and recommended key regulatory and other changes that facilitated the expansion or 
growth of HMOs in the state. Governor Hunt was also directly involved in recruiting Kaiser 
to come to North Carolina.  One interviewee recalled the Governor inviting executives from 
Kaiser onto the Governor’s helicopter to highlight the state’s major metro areas just as the 
Governor did the same for other companies considering expanding operations to North 
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Carolina.  However, others suggested that Kaiser’s entry in the state was based on myriad 
factors, including but not limited to the ability to “open up” the SHP to provide multiple 
health plan options to members.  Governor Hunt was an important player in the experience 
of the SHP, but his leadership and his administration were generally more focused on 
education initiatives, such as the “Smart Start” program that has won national acclaim for 
the state. 
Several interviewees cited Sam Byrd, the now-retired Director of the General 
Assembly’s Fiscal Research Division, as having been an important player in the legislature.  
Byrd earned a reputation for effectively translating legislators concerns or ideas into policy. 
He was a key player that helped to develop the SHP’s risk adjustment methodology and to 
resist the alternative risk adjustment models proposed by Kaiser and other HMOs.  While a 
popular and important figure, none of the interviews suggested that Byrd single-handedly 
drove SHP policymaking.   
There are other important figures that could be mentioned, including Senator Tony 
Rand who has wielded considerable legislative influence over the SHP over the years.  
However, the data collected in dozens of interviews did not support the general thesis that 
particular leaders single-handedly “drove” the SHP policymaking process or were 
responsible for the success or failure of the SHP’s experience with health plan choice.     
Conclusions 
This chapter set out to analyze the SHP’s experience offering its members multiple 
HMO options.  Encouraging HMOs to enter the SHP was part of an initiative that state 
policymakers and public officials expected would yield cost containment benefits for the 
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SHP itself.  The initiative was also part of a broader strategy to help stimulate delivery 
system competition within the state as a whole.  Accordingly, the chapter examined the 
political and other factors that shaped how this particular strategy was implemented and the 
experience of the SHP with this initiative.     
In developing the SHP’s multiple health plan environment, state policymakers and public 
officials believed that the SHP’s very large population of covered lives would benefit HMOs 
by allowing them to gain traction in a state that had little previous experience with managed 
care.  Indeed, thanks in part to the ability to market and sell products within a very large 
SHP population, HMOs like Kaiser set up expansion regions in the state.  Other incumbent 
carriers within the state developed HMO products within the SHP to begin participating in 
the growing managed care movement that was developing nationally and, it appeared, in 
North Carolina.  In this sense, the state’s effort can be viewed as a success in that it did 
provide an initial base of enrollment for HMOs within the state.  However, the state’s 
broader market change proved to be short-lived as all HMOs eventually exited the SHP 
convinced that despite its relative size as a major employer group, the PEHP contract terms 
and (more importantly) the state’s market and political conditions were not conducive to 
broad HMO participation.  
What accounts for the SHP’s experience offering its members multiple HMO options 
starting in the late 1980s only to return to an indemnity-only health plan option by the late 
1990s?  The analysis contained in this chapter shows that the SHP’s experience offering its 
members HMO choice was highly unpopular with health care providers.  Provider 
discontentment was based on the lower reimbursements available from a public purchaser 
(the SHP) that has historically provided more generous provider compensation than other 
153 
public programs, such as Medicaid.  More broadly, however, providers’ frustrations about 
HMOs operating within the SHP were fueled in part by concerns that managed care may 
ultimately compete with the state’s indemnity-dominated health care marketplace.  Not only 
would a more managed care-friendly marketplace involve lower provider reimbursements 
(relative to fee-for-service reimbursement), but this possibility was also perceived to pose 
threats to physicians’ professional autonomy with “third party HMOs interfering with the 
practice of medicine” (Interview 2006).  
This case demonstrated that provider discontentment with HMOs operating in the 
SHP manifested itself in several ways, including public complaints about the initiative and 
the perceived low quality of care available from “doc in the box” HMOs.  Moreover, 
providers also expressed strong resistance to state HMO expansion to key legislative staff 
and members.  As the legislature played an important and direct role in SHP oversight and 
governance, provider wariness about the spread of managed care contributed to 
policymakers making decisions affecting the SHP’s multi-health plan choice environment 
that were perceived to favor the state’s incumbent indemnity product over new HMO 
options.   
Other aspects of the SHP’s “politicized” governance structure affect system 
performance as well.  For example, according to a 2003 state auditor’s report, the General 
Assembly’s fairly sporadic meeting schedule and the intense workload of legislators does 
not promote continuous oversight of the SHP and compromises flexibility in responding to 
cost and other factors (North Carolina Office of the State Auditor 2003).  Moreover, with 
two-year legislative terms and two-year budget cycles, even well intentioned, public-minded 
legislators may focus on short-term political considerations. 
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An important caveat, though, is that many large public and private purchasers during 
this time struggled to develop a market of multiple health plan competition that featured, for 
example, “fair” and adequate models of risk adjustment, premium contribution strategies, 
and benefit standardization in ways that could avoid adverse selection.  Indeed, concern 
about adverse selection was a very vivid and valid fear of legislators and key staff members 
within the General Assembly’s Fiscal Research Division, even beyond concerns from the 
provider community.  The opposition of providers groups to HMO expansion certainly made 
the experience of SHP competition more difficult for HMOs.  However, interpreting the 
experience of HMO choice in the SHP as merely the result of powerful provider and other 
interests “capturing” legislative oversight and control over the SHP is much too simple. 
Importantly, this chapter finds that characteristics of the state health care market play 
an important role in explaining the SHP’s experience with multiple health plan options.  The 
vanishing of HMO “choice” within the SHP also mirrored the larger retreat and evolution in 
managed care from the state and national marketplace.  Importantly, HMOs did not grow 
their products within North Carolina exclusively because of the ability to market to the SHP, 
although this did initially help them to establish a modest base of enrollment.  Moreover, 
HMO market penetration also did not decline in the state solely because of perceived or 
actual unfavorable market conditions within the SHP (although the difficulties that HMOs 
experienced in the SHP did not help).  In addition to issues of governance processes 
discussed above, the underlying story in North Carolina is that while state policymakers 
sought to use the SHP to help move the market toward alternative delivery systems, the 
SHP’s operating environment came to mimic the broader market instead.   
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The key factors that help to explain the SHP’s experience with multiple health plan 
options, including the influence of key provider groups in North Carolina and the larger 
market changes taking place at a state and national level, suggest some of the limitations of 
PEHPs’ “purchasing power” to induce private actors to behave in ways that they would not 
have otherwise.  State PEHPs with governance structures that are subject to direct political 
influences from providers and other groups through legislative or other channels may be 
constrained in important ways from structuring major reform efforts that are feasible and 
sustainable.  This could include relatively “autonomous” governance structures that are 
nonetheless “captured” by provider and other interests.   
Nonetheless, even the relative autonomy of governance structures and systems from 
outside political influences does not guarantee by any means that states can be successful 
leveraging the purchasing influence of PEHPs to achieve broader policy purposes.  As the 
North Carolina case points out, PEHPs are important purchasers, but they are also subject to 
important market related constraints described in this chapter.  Even the most ambitious 
large state purchaser with even the most autonomous governance structure cannot easily 
overcome the movement of a much larger and sophisticated health care marketplace.  To be 
effective as major purchasers in “moving the market”, PEHPs may have to define their goals 
more modestly and coordinate their efforts with other public and private employers and 
purchasers.  In sum, based on the North Carolina experience to date, PEHPs play an 
important role in the broader health care market and policy environment, but PEHPs 
themselves are subject to important political, market, and other influences that constrain 
their ability to serve as major or singular vehicles of reform. 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Overview 
This dissertation set out to understand whether PEHPs could and should be viewed as 
“opportunistic” public purchasers that can wield their purchasing influences and contracts 
with private health plans and relationships with providers to contribute to broad state policy 
goals.  The alternative view is that PEHPs should be viewed as perhaps important employer-
based purchasers, but purchasers that are not large enough, groups that are encumbered by 
political influences from strong provider and other interests, and groups that are dominated 
by rising costs associated with relatively generous benefits and other constraints.  The 
answer to this question, suggested by this dissertation, is that under certain conditions, 
PEHPs can indeed serve as important components of the larger health policy environment 
and can contribute meaningfully to health system change at the state level.  That said, 
evidence from case studies presented in this dissertation does suggest that any lofty claims 
about the “purchasing power” of PEHPs are perhaps unwarranted on a grand scale.  
Notwithstanding their position as large and relatively stable health care purchasers, PEHPs 
are subject to certain political, market, and organizational challenges that can constrain their 
efforts to pursue meaningful health policy or market change at the state level.  These 
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political and market forces create both opportunities and constraints to successful reform 
efforts.  
In preliminary exploratory work, some PEHP executives (e.g., Massachusetts) 
optimistically claimed that their initiatives have the potential to affect real change in the 
states’ health care delivery systems.  In other states (e.g., North Carolina), PEHP executives 
were less sanguine about even very large PEHP purchasers’ ability to use their market clout 
to stimulate significant delivery system reforms. 
In the case of Massachusetts, a new networking tiering initiative was implemented 
over the objections of private health plans and provider groups in a way that has in fact 
induced private actors within the state’s delivery system to change their business practices 
when they had no plans to do so otherwise.  These changes are likely to affect non-PEHP 
consumers as well as PEHP members alike to varying degrees.  Thus, the opportunistic view 
of the role of PEHPs in state health policy, suggested by Massachusetts exploratory 
interviews, is warranted within certain conditions discussed in Chapter 4.   
In the case of North Carolina, a multi-faceted effort to stimulate broad health system 
change in the state’s delivery system included a strategy to position the PEHP to be a 
hospitable base of enrollment for large HMOs.  This effort did in fact help to encourage 
early HMOs (e.g., Kaiser) to enter the state while other incumbent carriers likewise sought 
to use the PEHP as a base of enrollment to grow their new HMO products.  However, due to 
myriad market, political, and administrative challenges discussed in Chapter 5, the state’s 
market change proved to be short-lived as all HMOs eventually exited the SHP convinced 
that despite its relative size as a major employer group, the PEHP contract terms and (more 
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importantly) the state’s market and political conditions were not conducive to broad HMO 
participation.  
The initiatives profiled in Massachusetts and North Carolina are quite different from 
one another: one purported to change a product and networking strategy available to 
consumers while the other much more ambitiously set out to contribute to a new era of 
delivery system competition within the state as a whole. Despite these differences, much can 
be learned from the examination of PEHP policymaking in these two states, as suggested by 
this dissertation.  
Alternative Explanations  
The political science and policy literatures have identified a number of key factors 
that influence policy choices and outcomes within states and, consequently, cross-state 
policy variation.  These factors were examined in this analysis of PEHP policymaking 
activity in the two case states. 
Partisan Political Configuration 
In Chapter 2, I explored the political science literature’s development regarding the 
impact of states’ partisan political configurations on state public policy choices and 
outcomes.  Based on this literature, I hypothesized that states in which Democrats have more 
dominant and consistent control over state policymaking will be more likely to embrace an 
“opportunistic” view of PEHPs’ roles within state health policy and market environments.  
Accordingly, these states are more likely to assert the purchasing influence of PEHPs to seek 
reforms of the state health care environment compared to states in which Republicans have 
achieved more electoral success.  Moreover, I hypothesized that split legislatures (in which 
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partisan control of legislative and governor’s offices is divided) would be less likely to view 
state PEHPs as avenues to achieve broad statewide policy reforms. 
In both Massachusetts and North Carolina, states have at different times been 
controlled by both Democrats and Republicans.  However, the political scene in 
Massachusetts has much more consistently been characterized by a “split” government 
between the governor and legislature.  North Carolina, by contrast, has for the most part 
been dominated by Democrats in both the legislature and governor’s office.  However, I 
found in this research that the roles of governors in PEHP policymaking in both states have 
been limited.  Governors in both states make appointments to the governing bodies of the 
respective PEHPs (a commission in Massachusetts and a board of trustees in North 
Carolina).  However, their respective roles in ongoing PEHP policymaking are limited.  
Relative to governors, by contrast, legislatures play a much more assertive and active role in 
PEHP decision-making, particularly in North Carolina.   
Given the relatively limited role of governors in PEHP policymaking (including 
Republican governors in Massachusetts and Democratic governors in North Carolina), my 
hypothesis regarding the “split” partisan balance of power between governors and 
legislatures turns out to be largely irrelevant.  That said, it was Democratic Governor Jim 
Hunt in North Carolina who was actively involved in an effort to encourage the development 
of HMOs in the state by, in part, offering Kaiser and other HMOs the opportunity to use the 
SHP as a hospitable initial base of enrollment.  It is impossible to know whether a 
Republican governor, hypothetically elected instead of Governor Hunt, would have been as 
eager to stimulate broad delivery system reform using HMOs, and whether a Republican 
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governor or Republican-dominated legislature would have been ultimately supportive of 
using the SHP as an initial base of enrollment for HMOs.   
Within the legislative arena, Democrats have largely controlled legislatures in both 
states.  In Massachusetts, interviewees cited the ability for the Democratic legislatures to 
“snub their noses” at provider groups concerned about the CPI initiative’s perceived adverse 
impact on physicians and hospitals because of the historically closer ties between 
Republicans and provider groups.  However, it is not apparent that partisan identity per se 
played a major role in the development of PEHP efforts in either state.  More generally, it is 
not clear from this dissertation that partisan identity and partisan influence play a substantial 
role in states’ efforts to use PEHPs as instruments of health reform at the state level or had 
any meaningful impacts on the development of PEHP policymaking.  The dissertation’s 
research design focusing only on two states makes broad generalizations quite difficult in 
this regard. Further research is needed within a broader mix of states with different 
experiences with PEHP policymaking to fully examine the impact of partisan political 
configuration on PEHP policymaking and perceptions concerning the roles of PEHPs within 
the larger state health care policy and market environment. 
State Wealth 
The political science and policy literatures have also suggested that policy variation 
from state to state can be explained in part by examining the relative wealth of different 
states.  The conventional hypothesis with respect to state fiscal health is that the greater the 
amount of resources available to a state, the more likely it is that the state can afford to 
undertake more stringent regulation or adopt policy innovations (Williams and Matheny 
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1983; Lowry 1992).  Applied to PEHP policymaking, I hypothesized that a state’s economic 
development and state wealth would influence more wealthy states to view PEHPs as 
important components of state health policy.  These states are likely to more aggressively 
use the purchasing influence of PEHPs to seek delivery system and other reforms at the state 
level.  
In this dissertation, I used state wealth as one of several criteria to select the two case 
states, ensuring that there was variation in this variable in the two states selected.  Like 
political party configuration and systems, however, I argue that state wealth played a limited 
role in the different views of PEHPs roles, their uses as instruments of health policy reform, 
and the experiences of those efforts.  It turns out that PEHP executives in North Carolina – 
the lower-income state compared to Massachusetts – had developed a more modest view 
about the role of PEHPs within the broader state market environment in large measure for 
reasons unrelated to its degree of wealth. Namely, SHP leaders’ more limited views about 
the role of the SHP in the broader market was due to the state’s previous effort to promote 
delivery system competition in the state using, in part, the SHP.  Thus, the hypothesis that 
state wealth influences states’ policy PEHP policymaking activities does not appear to be 
borne out in these two states.  Both a relatively lower-income state (North Carolina) and a 
higher income-state (Massachusetts) sought to use the PEHP in an instrumental way (albeit 
differently from one another) to initiate health care reform in the state as a whole.  From a 
two-state comparison, it is difficult to fully ascertain the precise role of state wealth in 
influencing the views that state PEHP leaders hold about their roles in state policy and 
market environment or in their uses of PEHPs for broader purposes.  However, even within 
these two states, state wealth appears to be a minimal (direct) factor.   
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Rather than playing a direct role in PEHP policymaking, it is more likely that state 
wealth, combined with other factors such as states’ policy cultures or inclinations toward 
innovation, may have played an important historical role in the development of the 
configuration PEHP itself, including aspects of its governance structure.  Thus, governance 
structure and other PEHP political influences may be an important intervening variable that 
is itself explained by political culture, wealth, and other factors identified here.  Further 
research is needed to better understand the historical development of PEHPs and the role 
played by state wealth in PEHPs’ resulting political trajectories. 
Interest Groups 
Political scientists and other scholars have examined how the formulation and 
adoption of public policy is shaped by conflicts and competition between interest groups 
(Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  This is particularly true within the arena of health care 
policy in which provider interests and other groups are able to mobilize the appropriate 
levels of political influence to block systematic reforms.  
I argued in Chapter 2 that the activity and mobilization of provider interest groups 
would be likely to shape state PEHPs’ perceptions and expectations about the roles of their 
PEHPs within the larger state health care marketplace.  Specifically, I hypothesized that the 
activity and mobilization of provider interest groups is negatively correlated with the state 
officials’ willingness or assertiveness in developing purchasing or contracting approaches in 
ways that are perceived to directly affect providers’ income, professional autonomy, or 
reputation.  I further hypothesized that public policies that pose a threat to interests invested 
in maintaining the status quo (including physicians, hospitals, insurers, and others) are less 
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likely to emerge in states in which these interests strongly influence the political and policy 
environment.   
In both Massachusetts and North Carolina, provider interests (including medical 
societies, hospital associations, and other groups representing providers) are politically 
powerful players in the state health care policy environment in both states.  In 
Massachusetts, prestigious academic medical centers and community hospitals, as well as 
well-organized provider groups (i.e., via the Massachusetts Medical Society), are perceived 
to wield important influence within the legislative arena.  After all, even in the era of strong 
HMO popularity nationwide, Massachusetts HMOs have never fully embraced restrictive 
provider networks or closed panels of physicians because consumers and employers were 
loathe to be restricted to their broad choice of providers.  This is associated with 
considerable clout for providers.   
Moreover, within North Carolina’s predominantly indemnity-dominated 
marketplace, health care providers, too, play an important role in shaping health care policy.  
Providers groups were directly involved in actively resisting the tide of managed care in the 
state.  For example, some county medical societies actively established competing provider-
owned HMO plans to compete with carrier-owned HMOs (Bilbro 2003).  Provider groups 
also helped to “characterize”, as one interviewee put it, HMOs as “bad” or “low-quality 
medicine” (Interview 2007). 
Thus, provider groups exert much political influence in both North Carolina and 
Massachusetts.  However, in Massachusetts, provider groups have been ineffective in 
ultimately blocking implementation of the CPI even though it is perceived to be anathema to 
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provider interests for numerous reasons described in Chapter 4.  Provider groups and health 
plans together have sought and received important concessions regarding the technocratic 
details or timing of CPI implementation. While provider interests are said to exert important 
political influence within the legislative arena in Massachusetts in a general way, the 
particular governance structure of the GIC has effectively curtailed this political influence 
from being channeled to shape the development (or blocking implementation) of the CPI.   
By contrast, in North Carolina, the legislature plays a much more direct and active 
role in ongoing operations of the SHP.  The governor, legislators, and SHP officials were 
successful in inviting Kaiser and other HMOs to develop products in North Carolina by, in 
part, using the SHP as a base of enrollment.  However, once private “HMO choice” emerged 
within the SHP, provider interests were able to wield legislative influence to impact the 
development of specific design features that HMOs interpreted as legislators’ efforts to 
“protect” the SHP’s indemnity plan.  Several interviewees claimed that legislators were 
reluctant to create a “level playing field” for HMOs in the SHP for many reasons, including 
concerns that they would be seen as actively “favoring” HMOs in ways that would 
undermine the provider community’s preferred indemnity dominated marketplace.  In 
contrast to the GIC’s governance structure, which affords some measure of political 
insulation from legislative politics for the GIC Commission and staff, the SHP’s system of 
governance in North Carolina affords provider interests an opportunity to play a key role in 
shaping SHP policy development through legislative processes.   
However, it is important to note that political dynamics and systems of governance 
are not static.  Provider interests have not permanently “captured” SHP policymaking even if 
the SHP’s governance structure provides them with an important voice in the PEHP 
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policymaking environment.  For example, five years after the experiment with health plan 
choice ended within the SHP, the SHP established new PPO options that achieved cost 
containment premised solely on the ability of the SHP to cut reimbursement rates to doctors 
and hospitals.  This effort was strongly supported by the legislature as a mechanism to 
constrain rising costs within the SHP and strongly opposed by provider gropus.  As the 
SHP’s Soper explained, “Some health care providers in this state have even said that by 
doing this [cutting provider reimbursement via new PPO contracts], we have broken the 
‘social compact’ in this state” (Soper interview 2007).  Of course, that North Carolina has 
for the last five years only had a conventional indemnity health plan for SHP members 
suggests, among other things, the residual political power of provider groups that strongly 
favor the traditional CMMP with its relatively rich reimbursement arrangements.  On the 
other hand, that providers groups’ efforts to block the new PPO structure were ultimately 
frustrated suggests that, while politically influential, state policymakers and SHP officials 
must balance competing interests in making PEHP policy.  Provider interests are powerful 
but not immutable.   
The larger point is that the degree to which provider interests are directly involved 
and influential in PEHP policymaking appears to be dependent on the governance structures 
of SHPs themselves.  The particular role of governance structure and bureaucratic autonomy 
(and the interaction with provider legislative influence) is described in greater detail in the 
sub-section on governance structure below. 
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Political Culture  
Numerous studies about state politics and policy have incorporated the concept of 
political culture to help shed light on the variations in state political characteristics or policy 
approaches (Elazar, Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969; Sharkansky 1970).  In general, states’ 
political cultures reflect the level of general ambivalence about government and support for 
public action in the policy arena.  This dissertation used political culture as one of several 
criteria for selecting the two case states, using both Elazar’s (1966) famous typology and 
also Klingman and Lammers (1984) and Buchanan’s (1987) liberal-conservative scales.   
At the outset of this dissertation, I had mixed expectations about the impact of state 
political culture on states’ efforts to achieve health care reform through the purchasing 
auspices of state PEHPs.  On the one hand, I predicted that more conservative, 
traditionalistic states, whose policymakers are in general more likely than counterparts in 
more liberal, moralistic, and individualistic states to have a more limited view of 
government’s role, would be less likely to hold an opportunistic view about the role of 
PEHPs in state policymaking.  On the other hand, individualistic and moralistic states are 
probably more likely to embrace an “opportunistic” view of PEHPs and thus will be more 
likely to engage in innovative efforts wielding the purchasing clout of the state to help 
achieve broader policy goals.   
These theoretical expectations are compatible with the rather optimistic views of 
PEHP purchasing power that I identified in initial exploratory interviews in Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, and California.  These states’ political cultures contribute to each of their 
respective general reputations for policy innovation and experimentation.  Accordingly, in 
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Massachusetts, GIC officials and policymakers tend to hold a fairly ambitious view of the 
relative influence of the PEHP within the state health care marketplace and policy 
environment.  While not naive to the realities that such efforts can be and have been difficult 
for numerous reasons, GIC officials expressed confidence that the GIC is well positioned to 
exert purchasing influence that could impact the rest of the state beyond the GIC’s 
traditional constituencies.   By contrast, PEHP officials and stakeholders in North Carolina 
expressed a much less sanguine view of the SHP’s role in the larger state health care 
marketplace.  This could be associated with the underlying political culture of the more 
conservative, traditionalistic state.  However, it is more likely the case that this view has 
been shaped more directly by the state’s previous experience with implementing a structure 
of HMO options in the SHP designed to create a hospitable base of enrollment for HMOs 
within the state as a whole.  Thus, the “political culture” thesis appears to be a positive but 
fairly weak explanation for PEHP policymaking and in general the “role” of the PEHP in the 
state.  Additional research with more states with varying measures of political culture is 
necessary to fully investigate the relative influence of political culture in shaping PEHP 
policymaking.   
Another explanation of the role of political culture is that it, in combination with 
other state-level factors described in this dissertation (and others), may have played an 
important historical role in the development of the configuration PEHP itself, including 
aspects of its governance structure.  Thus, governance structure may be an important 
intervening variable that is itself explained by political culture, wealth, and other factors 
identified here.  Further research is needed to better understand the historical development of 
PEHPs and their resulting political trajectories. 
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State Policy Innovation  
Another important tradition in political science research has suggested that states are 
characterized by general orientations toward innovation, with some tending to be leaders and 
others laggards.   I hypothesized at the outset that state policymakers’ interpretations of the 
roles of PEHPs in the larger state health care marketplace and the innovative uses of PEHPs 
for larger policy purposes are associated with states’ general reputations for or inclinations 
toward innovation.  That is, states with a stronger tendency toward health and welfare policy 
innovation in general will be likely to view PEHPs as important instruments of state health 
care policy and would attempt to use PEHPs’ purchasing power more assertively.   
In selecting Massachusetts and North Carolina, I purposefully selected two states 
with decidedly different reputations for policy innovation.  Massachusetts is viewed by 
scholars and analysts as a particularly innovative policy state, taking the lead on health care 
policymaking and experimentation.  By contrast, North Carolina’s health care policy 
environment is not viewed as particularly innovative.   
I argue that states’ traditions and reputations for innovation have played an 
important, though not dominant, role in PEHP policymaking in Massachusetts and North 
Carolina.  In Massachusetts, GIC officials and policymakers embrace the Commonwealth’s 
reputation for policy innovation and experimentation.  The GIC certainly did not invent the 
concept of network tiering.  Nonetheless, the GIC is one of the first major public or private 
purchasers (and is certainly one of the largest) to experiment with such an innovation, 
particularly given that the GIC has effectively combined the claims data of otherwise 
competitive health plans that participate in the GIC.  Massachusetts stakeholders’ view of 
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the PEHP and its role in the larger state health care marketplace and policy environment is 
somewhat shaped by a desire to be, as one interviewee put it, “constantly on the cutting 
edge” (Slavin interview 2006).   
By contrast, in North Carolina, the state policy and political communities have 
embraced a more modest, conservative view of the role of government and correspondingly, 
views the SHP as an important entity serving public employees and retirees, but not 
necessarily as a key agent for health care reform.  Unlike Massachusetts, the state does not, 
by and large, have a reputation for or tradition of policy innovation in the heath policy arena.  
The fact that the state PEHP only recently moved away (once again) from a traditional 
indemnity plan to embrace the more popular PPO plans suggests that in contrast to 
Massachusetts, the SHP does not find itself on the “cutting edge”.  
That said, the major initiative discussed in Chapter 5 does suggest that state 
policymakers and public officials in North Carolina at one time viewed the SHP as part of a 
larger strategy to help stimulate broader health system change in the state.  The effort to 
promote HMOs in North Carolina suggests the desire to embrace what at the time was a 
fairly innovative approach to health care financing and delivery.  However, this initiative 
appeared to be mostly focused on the desire for viable strategies to contain costs than a 
concerted desire to develop a reputation for innovation or experimentation.  On balance, it 
appears that states’ reputations for policy innovation do play a role in shaping perceptions 
about the potential uses for PEHPs and other government resources to affect broader market 
change.  This generally fits the pattern that emerged from early exploratory research in 
which highly innovative states (i.e., California, Minnesota, and Massachusetts) stood out 
among the 12 states examined in implementing somewhat innovative strategies to control 
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costs in a way that could have important spillover effects on the broader state health care 
marketplace.  
However, it is not altogether clear, absent additional research in other states, whether 
the “innovation” thesis plays a central role in dividing innovative from non-innovative states 
in their view of PEHP’s “opportunistic” abilities to affect delivery system or other reforms at 
the state level.  As noted above, it is possible that states’ inclinations toward policy 
innovation, combined with state wealth, political culture, and other variables – may have 
played a key historical role in shaping the development of PEHPs themselves (including 
governance structures and traditions) in ways that are more directly important to variation in 
how states are viewed within the larger state health care marketplace and policy 
environment.  Further research is needed to understand the historical development of PEHPs 
and the key drivers of continuity and change. 
Governance Structure and Bureaucratic Autonomy 
Previous research on systems of governance and bureaucratic autonomy in areas of 
public policy has laid a foundation for understanding the degree of policymaking discretion 
afforded to PEHP leaders, focusing on both the preferences of the actors and the technical 
complexity inherent to the policy choice.  Even with a two-state case study approach, this 
dissertation demonstrates that state PEHP governance structures and systems can vary in 
important ways that can influence the degree to which PEHPs enjoy relative autonomy to 
exercise discretion in policymaking.  PEHPs in Massachusetts and North Carolina are 
governed by different structures that exercise different levels of authority or autonomy to 
make policy decisions.  On paper, the governance models in each state appear very similar.  
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Each state establishes, by statute, a role for the governor (and in North Carolina, the 
legislature as well) in making appointments to a commission (Massachusetts) or board of 
trustees (North Carolina).  The respective governance structures in each state are responsible 
for hiring an executive director (Massachusetts) or executive administrator (North Carolina).  
These entities meet regularly, deliberate, and vote on important policy matters affecting 
health care benefits and cost containment efforts and other policies. 
However, in practice, state legislators in North Carolina are more directly involved in 
day-to-day PEHP oversight and decision-making than are legislators in Massachusetts. 
Unlike in Massachusetts, health benefits and cost sharing provisions are set by statute and 
involve sometimes cumbersome legislative processes to modify.  Beyond that, at a strategic 
level, interviewees in North Carolina described how “nothing of any real significance really 
gets done unless [the Committee] is really involved in it” (Interview 2006).  
As a result of the relatively assertive legislative influence over the SHP in North 
Carolina, SHP policymaking is subject to a relatively greater level of political influence from 
provider and other groups that have a strong interest in PEHP policymaking.  The most clear 
example of this is related to the SHP’s experience offering multiple health plan options.  A 
key reason that legislators with oversight over the SHP acted to effectively “protect” the 
state’s own indemnity plan option (described in more detail in Chapter 5) was to be 
responsive to political pressure from providers and other groups that had a strong antipathy 
for the possibility that managed care could expand substantially within the state.  As 
legislators did not want to be seen as “promoting the HMOs” within the SHP or more 
broadly, legislators were cautious about broadly promoting HMOs as a “replacement” 
delivery system.  As a result, HMO executives suggested that the state “would not even set a 
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level playing field, much less a ‘hospitable’ operating environment for [HMOs]” (Interview 
2006).   
Of course, it is important not to put too much emphasis on what is ultimately a 
simple point.  After all, legislators, like people in general, are influenced by myriad factors 
in making decisions.  In addition to being responsive to pressure from provider groups 
fearing managed care, legislators also understandably sought to ensure that the CMMP did 
not become a magnet for adverse selection for reasons that had little to do with political 
pressure from provider interests.  Nonetheless, the North Carolina legislature’s relatively 
active role in SHP policymaking has provided an important avenue for providers and other 
interests to exert influence through the legislative process over SHP policy direction, 
strategy, and other issues.   
By contrast, in Massachusetts, the commissioners governing the GIC themselves 
enjoy much more authority and relative political insulation from direct legislative politics.  
This has given the GIC the flexibility to set policy and strategic direction for the CPI and 
other issues.  Importantly, it has also countered any direct desires of provider interests to 
effectively block the CPI.  As Slavin noted, “Dolores was able push this forward because the 
commissioners back her, and beyond that, nothing else really matters” (Slavin interview 
2006).   However, it is important to offer the caveat that the legislature could be more 
actively involved in GIC policymaking if key members decided to be more involved. After 
all, the legislature controls the state budget and the financing of the GIC and could use the 
budget process to question the validity of certain activities or suggest new strategies for the 
GIC. The governor, which controls appointments to the commission, could likewise be more 
directly involved in day-to-day GIC policymaking.  However, the current executive director 
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has earned a degree of respect from legislators who are impressed with her hard-charging 
cost-cutting persona and they are loath to interrupt her.  Thus, the governance “structure” per 
se may not provide the political protection and insulation that the GIC currently enjoys. 
Rather, the GIC’s tradition of governance is itself somewhat the function of the level of trust 
that the political actors place in the commissioners and in the executive director.   
This “chicken and egg” phenomenon goes even further, however.  Several 
interviewees noted that the GIC has been successful in keeping talented and professional 
commissioners and staff, including Dolores Mitchell, because of the perception that the GIC 
has the authority to exercise judgment and independence.  As the Commonwealth’s political 
process has historically granted a measure of political insulation and autonomy to the GIC, 
the GIC has been successful in attracting certain commissioners and staff, which in turn has 
served to reinforce the level of trust that the legislature and governor have placed in the GIC 
to act autonomously.  As one interviewee noted regarding the GIC’s relationship with the 
legislature: “We would never have had Dolores sticking around this long if just any elected 
nobody on Beacon Hill simply pushed her around and told her what to do” (Interview 2006). 
Nonetheless, the practical effect of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the GIC is 
that provider and other interest groups have been heretofore unable to leverage enough 
political influence within the legislative arena to effectively modify or block the CPI in a 
significant way.  The GIC has made important concessions in both the timing and flexibility 
of the CPI’s implementation that have afforded health plans and provider groups the ability 
to comply with “general principles” rather than standardized directives.  However, in 
general, the GIC has effectively mediated concerns from providers, health plans, and other 
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groups due to its relative autonomy from the legislative arena in setting and implementing 
policy.   
The differences in systems of governance in North Carolina and Massachusetts have 
a temporal component and yet are also rooted in the historical developments of PEHPs 
themselves.  The “temporal” nature of PEHPs’ relationships with legislative processes is 
related to the existence of particular people and particular circumstances, both of which can 
change over time.  For example, it is not clear what, if any, changes in the GIC’s relationship 
with the legislative process will result when Mitchell retires and a successor is chosen.  The 
legislature may be more directly involved in GIC policymaking until a similar “level of 
trust” is established with the new leader and his or her capacity to govern.  The temporal 
nature of the PEHP/political process can also be observed by examining the changing 
dynamics in leadership that have taken place in North Carolina since the experiment with 
HMO choice in the SHP ended in 2001.  In 2005, a new executive administrator, George 
Stokes, was appointed.  Stokes made several new senior-level hires within the SHP.  Early 
indications are that the legislature is pleased with Stokes and his team and “we have already 
visibly seen a change in the flexibility granted to Stokes [by legislators] that was not granted 
to his predecessor” (Cope interview 2007).  
The dynamic or “temporal” nature of PEHP governance structures and systems is 
consistent with the findings of Bawn (1995), Epstein and O’Halloran (1994), and others 
arguing that the benefits of granting discretion to PEHP governance structures is likely to 
increase as the objectives of policymakers and “agents” converge.  For example, if 
policymakers and PEHPs seek to achieve similar outcomes within a framework of personal 
trust, policymakers may grant PEHP boards and staffs greater political autonomy.  If 
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policymakers and PEHP boards and staffs seek to achieve different outcomes, however, 
policymakers may seek to grant PEHP boards and staffs more limited autonomy, and instead 
choose to direct in explicit ways the specific policy strategies, policy boundaries, and 
outcomes to be pursued. 
While the relationship between PEHPs and the state political process has a definite 
temporal component, it may be also rooted in the contrasting historical development of each 
state policy environment and each PEHP.  While both the GIC and the SHP were established 
in the 1950s, several key historical aspects of their development continue to characterize 
their respective relationships with their states’ political processes.  For example, in 
Massachusetts, the legislature “from the very beginning” retained the authority to set 
employer premium contributions and granted the GIC itself with the authority to make 
health benefit, cost sharing, and other decisions.  Thus, aspects of the political autonomy and 
governance systems of the GIC today may be traced back to the GIC’s origins and 
development.  In North Carolina, SHP health benefits and other specific policy areas have 
long been maintained by statute, which means by definition that the legislature has long been 
actively involved in SHP policymaking.   
Furthermore, as noted above, some of the variables discussed in this dissertation 
(e.g., political culture, innovation, state wealth, etc.) may have played important roles in the 
historical development of PEHPs and their systems of governance.  Regardless of their direct 
impacts on current  PEHP policymaking, the contributions of these (and other) variables may 
have been manifested in the manner in which PEHPs developed over time .  This dissertation 
did not include an exhaustive exploration of the historical evolution and political 
development of respective PEHPs, but further research (i.e., research treating governance 
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structures as dependent rather than independent variables) could elucidate the ultimate 
sources of variation in systems of governance that characterize modern PEHP policymaking.   
At the outset of this dissertation, I expected to find, quite generally, that states in 
which PEHP boards and staff members exercise relatively more political autonomy and 
authority in PEHP policymaking are more likely to wield PEHP purchasing power to pursue 
policy or market change that could threaten provider and other interests in various ways.  I 
argued that such approaches may not be as politically feasible in states for which PEHP 
boards are more closely associated with political control through the legislative process.  It 
would be tempting to claim that my theoretical expectations about systems of governance 
were correct, and by and large, they appear to be.  It is true that the GIC in Massachusetts 
fits the pattern of a state granting its PEHP much policy autonomy.  It is also true that the 
GIC has effectively used this autonomy to structure a system of tiered networking over the 
objections of politically powerful interest groups.  However, in North Carolina, the failure of 
“choice” in the SHP, I argue, is less a testament to the governance structure of the SHP as 
much as it is a testament to the market dynamics at play in the state at the time.   
I do argue and acknowledge that the North Carolina SHP’s system of governance 
allowed providers and other interests to help make the SHP a less hospitable environment 
than the HMOs had hoped for.  Moreover, I acknowledge that several policy decisions were 
probably made that, in retrospect, could or should have been made differently, such as the 
one-way risk adjustment mechanism that HMO executives spoke at length about (though it 
is certainly true that other large employers – not just PEHPs – struggled with issues of risk 
selection and adjustment).  However, as I will describe in more detail below, I do not believe 
the evidence supports a rather simple thesis that the state’s system of SHP governance 
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necessarily allowed providers to “capture” the process and thereby ruin the HMOs’ chances 
of successfully operating within the SHP (or much within the state more generally).   
Furthermore, it could be argued that the SHP experiment was actually successful in 
the sense that offering HMOs an opportunity to use the SHP as a base of enrollment did in 
fact stimulate frenzied HMO activity within the SHP even if operating within the SHP was 
not the “safe harbor” that HMOs had hoped for.  More broadly, however, as I will argue in 
the next section, fundamental market dynamics, both within the SHP and statewide, simply 
did not support (for long) broad scale delivery system reform in North Carolina.  HMOs did 
not fail in the state simply because of the SHP’s governance structure, although governance 
issues certainly played an important role in characterizing the state’s experience with health 
plan choice.  
State Health Care Marketplace 
In Chapter 2, I offered what are ultimately competing theories about how a state’s 
health care marketplace may impact how PEHPs are viewed and how or whether they are 
used to contribute to larger health policy goals beyond the traditional purview of public 
employees, retirees, and their families.   Generally, I argued that the policy options available 
to a given state will depend heavily on the nature and structure of the health care 
marketplace that exists within that state.  I expected to find that the political impetus for 
particular cost containment or other types of reforms using PEHPs will be closely associated 
with states’ market structures.  On one hand, policymakers in states with strong indemnity 
dominated marketplaces will be more likely than HMO-friendly states to use PEHPs 
instrumentally to stimulate broad health system change.  After all, states characterized by 
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relatively high-cost and inefficient delivery systems have the most to gain by using PEHPs 
as instruments of reform.  This theoretical explanation helps to understand the experience in 
North Carolina.  With its indemnity dominated marketplace, state policy officials sought to 
use its PEHP as part of a broader strategy to establish a strong presence of HMOs in the 
state.   
On the other hand, I also argued that the existing availability of broader health plan 
options and competition and also more provider groups and delivery systems would give 
other states more options to use HMO competition within PEHPs for broader policy 
purposes.  States with few HMOs or low HMO penetration obviously have fewer 
opportunities to leverage HMO plan competition in an attempt to contain costs.  This 
expectation explains the Massachusetts experience implementing the CPI.  The 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts is generally recognized as friendly territory for managed 
care.  Thus it is not surprising that private health plans have been a critical fixture in the 
GIC’s provider tiering strategy.   
Based on an examination of PEHP policymaking in Massachusetts and North 
Carolina, I argue that the market dynamics of states play a big role in shaping the types of 
reforms to which PEHPs can meaningfully contribute.  Specifically, the nature of the state 
marketplace can severely constrain the sets of choices available to states and the abilities that 
PEHPs have to contribute meaningfully to state health care system reform more broadly.  As 
Chapter 4 demonstrated, key characteristics of the Massachusetts market have effectively 
given the GIC considerable market power (given the size of the GIC’s population), 
bargaining power (since the state can realistically wield the threat of provider or health plan 
exclusion), and an important leadership position within the employer community in the state 
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(given the dearth of other major private or public employers active in health policy issues in 
the state).  These factors have provided considerable opportunities for the GIC to play a 
meaningful role in a state initiative to promote cost containment and quality promotion (even 
if the impacts of those initiatives are not yet known). Private stakeholders in the health care 
system in Massachusetts – including physician groups, health plans, and hospitals – are 
being forced to change their patterns of behavior in order to comply with contract terms 
from the GIC.  Existing market characteristics explain a great deal of the GIC’s market 
leverage.  
By contrast, it is not surprising that in an indemnity-dominated marketplace such as 
in North Carolina, state officials sought to usher in an era of delivery system reform given 
that fee-for-service payment systems are the most costly and least efficient in the available.   
As discussed above, the state’s initiative to encourage the spread of HMOs in North Carolina 
by, in part, offering the SHP as a base of enrollment was successful in some ways and less so 
in others.  However, the SHP would face considerable obstacles if it tried to implement the 
same network tiering structure that the GIC in Massachusetts has developed.  While the SHP 
does have market power (in that it purchases health benefits for over 600,000 covered lives 
in the state, the state’s Blue Cross Blue Shield-dominated marketplace means that there are 
many fewer health plan options available to structure a network tiering initiative.  There are 
also many fewer competing hospitals and provider groups relative to, for example, the 
Boston metro area.   
As a result, the state as a major employer has much less bargaining power.  If the 
SHP chose to launch a CPI-like initiative in North Carolina today, health plans could wield 
much more influence over the direction of the initiative (if they even supported it at all) 
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given the dearth of vigorous competition found in Massachusetts.  There, health plans went 
along with the initiative knowing that if they chose not to, the GIC (led by an assertive 
executive director) could effectively remove them as a plan option.  In North Carolina, while 
several major health plans operate within the state, only Blue Cross Blue Shield operates 
statewide.  Moreover, with some exceptions in the few densely populated metropolitan areas 
of the state, the provider community has limited competition.  The SHP has no choice but to 
contract with providers in certain areas where access to care would be compromised 
otherwise.   
More broadly, market dynamics play a major role in shaping the choices available to 
PEHPs and their larger roles as major purchasers in the state health care marketplace.   This 
is not to say that PEHPs cannot exert their influence as purchasers to pursue particular policy 
goals in states whose health care marketplaces do not resemble the key characteristics of the 
Massachusetts market.  It is to suggest, however, that the market plays a major role not only 
in the options available to states, but also in their experience implementing market strategies 
. As noted above, the experience with HMO “choice” in the SHP failed if one takes a “long 
view”, but largely because HMOs failed more broadly in the state. Even a large purchaser 
like the SHP could not have fundamentally altered the state’s market movement away from 
HMO options.  Instead of reforming the market, the SHP’s experience with HMO options 
came to mimic the market. 
Policy Entrepreneurship and Leadership  
The agenda setting literature within political science has examined the action of 
policy entrepreneurs in shaping policy at the state and national levels (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Kingdon 1995; Polsby 1984). Policy entrepreneurs seek to promote particular 
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policy innovations using numerous approaches and efforts to sell their ideas to policymakers 
and other decision makers. Policy entrepreneurs must be willing to invest political resources 
to attract sufficient support to win approval (Kingdon 1995). Beyond merely interested 
citizens that petition government in various ways, policy entrepreneurs are distinguished by 
their well-positioned decisions to take risks to skillfully change the terms of political or 
policy debates (Schon 1971). 
In Chapter 2, I outlined a very general hypothesis, derived from the literature on 
policy leadership and entrepreneurship, that particular leaders inside and outside of state 
government have exerted their influence in setting the course of policy direction of PEHPs to 
impact the broader health care marketplace.  Consistent with theoretical expectations, in 
Massachusetts, virtually all interviewees attributed the importance of the GIC’s influence in 
state health policy discussions generally, and the implementation of the CPI specifically, to 
the political influence and personal savvy of its executive director. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Mitchell has earned a reputation for her desire to maintain 
generous health care benefits at the lowest possible cost.  According to the chief policy aide 
for the Massachusetts Speaker of the House, Mitchell’s “seriousness and legacy about 
containing costs and driving every penny out of the negotiation process is the basis of her 
support at the Legislature for the CPI” (Hager interview 2006).  Thus, Mitchell’s leadership 
role and the trust that she has earned over many years in her position have generated 
personal support for her within the legislature.   
As described above in the section on governance structure, the high degree of trust in 
Mitchell has helped to reinforce the political autonomy that the GIC has enjoyed in recent 
years, including its effort to establish the CPI.   Moreover, it has also helped to preempt or 
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limit the effects of provider and other groups seeking to leverage political influence to block 
or seriously modify the implementation of CPI.  According to Hager, “…any backchannel 
efforts of the powerful provider groups or insurance lobbies fall on deaf ears because of a 
strong respect for Mitchell’s commitment to cost containment and the kinds of thing she is 
doing with the CPI” (Hager interview 2006).   
It is difficult to know whether the GIC would have been successful in launching the 
CPI if Mitchell were not in her current position.  It is also impossible to know whether 
additional or different personal leadership and policy entrepreneurship in North Carolina 
would have changed the experience of the SHP in developing a framework of multiple HMO 
plan choice (although it seems unlikely).  But consistent with previous studies on the 
importance of leadership, it is apparent that Dolores Mitchell’s leadership has been 
instrumental in effectively exerting the purchasing influence of the GIC, which in turn has 
led numerous delivery system stakeholders to engage in practices that they would not have 
engaged in otherwise.  Personal leadership is not the sole factor at work in Massachusetts, 
but its importance should not be overlooked.  PEHPs with dynamic leaders are probably 
more likely than others to be successful in using the PEHP to contribute to larger health 
policy goals at the state level.   
Limitations of PEHPs 
The above analysis also implies some potential weaknesses or limitations of state 
efforts to wield PEHP purchasing influence that can contribute to broad state health policy 
goals.  Thus far, the GIC has been largely successful implementing the CPI over the 
objections of key providers and related groups. Specifically, it has taken advantage of the 
state’s reputation for policy experimentation and innovation, the GIC’s favorable position 
within the Massachusetts marketplace, the GIC’s relatively autonomous governance 
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structure that has largely insulated the GIC from political influences from providers and 
other groups, the broad political consensus in favor of efforts supporting cost containment 
and quality promotion, and dynamic and politically savvy GIC leadership.  Each of the 
above factors, if lacking, would reduce by varying degrees the GIC’s ability to implement 
the CPI or similar initiatives designed “with the larger state market in mind” (Mitchell 
interview 2006).  Thus, states seeking to leverage the purchasing influence of their own 
PEHPs to pursue similar initiatives may not achieve similar levels of success if some or all 
of the above factors are not present.  Of course, additional research in more states is needed 
to make this point more confidently. 
In North Carolina, state policymakers and SHP officials sought to stimulate delivery 
system reforms in the state by, in part, offering HMOs hospitable SHP operating 
environment allowing HMOs to further develop and promote their products to other 
employer groups within the state.  This initiative was successful in that HMOs such as 
Kaiser did locate or expand HMO operations in North Carolina in part due to their ability to 
market to the state’s large SHP group.  At one time, in fact, the rapid entry and development 
of HMOs had provided SHP members with as many as 13 health plan options.  The state 
engaged in several activities in structuring an environment of multiple health plan choice 
that were perceived to favor the state’s indemnity plan over HMO options.  However, it is 
unlikely that HMOs entered North Carolina exclusively because of the offer to use the SHP 
as a base of enrollment (although it helped).  It is equally unlikely that HMOs failed in the 
state solely because of perceived unfavorable market conditions within the SHP (although 
they undermined the “hospitable” operating environment that HMOs had planned for).   
Rather, the story in North Carolina is that while state policymakers sought to use the SHP to 
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help move the market toward alternative delivery systems, the SHP’s operating environment 
came to mimic the market instead.  While the SHP did play a role in the development of 
HMOs in North Carolina, the experiment with health plan choice could not survive the much 
larger market movement away from restrictive HMOs toward the end of the 1990s.  
Policy Implications  
Weaving the lessons of Massachusetts and North Carolina together, it is clear that the 
“purchasing power” of PEHPs is not universal and immutable.  Rather, PEHPs represent one 
important actor in very large and sophisticated state health care systems.  In particular, this 
dissertation suggests that PEHP purchasing influence is largely contingent upon conditions 
of PEHP governance structure, state market conditions, and political and administrative 
leadership.   
Within the arena of governance structure, there are inherent tradeoffs associated with 
outsourcing political authority to unelected governance boards and commissions in an effort 
to provide political insulation in PEHP policymaking.  For one, a fundamental tradeoff 
between democracy and efficiency characterizes the choices that states must make when 
developing or modifying systems of governance within PEHP (or other) arenas.  In a 
democracy in which elected representatives are ultimately responsible for state spending and 
policy decision-making, how much authority is appropriate to confer on un-elected 
individuals with no direct accountability from the voting public? Indeed, these are tradeoffs 
that political scientists and others have described in other policy contexts.  Perhaps the most 
famous in recent memory is the decision of Congress to establish a Base Realignment and 
Closure Commission (BRAC) to make policy choices affecting the future of military 
infrastructure in order to create incentives for efficient policy choices to supercede local 
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political concerns about losses of military bases or investments.  Within the health policy 
arena, Congress has granted CMS broad authority, within limits, to make policy choices 
regarding Medicare and Medicaid, including payment policy and other technocratic but 
potentially controversial issues.  Similarly, states confront somewhat difficult choices about 
the appropriate level of bureaucratic autonomy regarding PEHP policymaking.  That said, it 
is clear that much of the success that the GIC has achieved in leveraging its contracts with 
private health plans to build “high performance” networks is based on the degree of 
flexibility and political insulation of its governing commission.  This suggests rather clearly 
that other states seeking to implement similar initiatives should anticipate how the politics of 
PEHP governance may characterize the experience of engaging in difficult negotiations with 
political powerful health plan and provider interests.  
This dissertation also described how the purchasing leverage of PEHPs is also highly 
contingent on the markets in which PEHPs operate.  I explored three elements of health care 
markets: the degree to which PEHPs enjoy market power, the degree to which PEHPs enjoy 
bargaining power, and the degree to which PEHPs exercise leadership among other large 
employers in the state.  In Massachusetts, the GIC took advantage of each of these factors in 
ways that are not possible in other states.  In North Carolina, the health care marketplace – 
including the configuration of employers, health plans, providers, and the perceptions and 
preferences of consumers – helped to characterize the PEHPs efforts to promote delivery 
system reform in the state.  These two cases illustrate the importance for state policymakers 
to anticipate the opportunities and limits PEHPs face in constructing policy efforts or 
purchasing strategies designed to promote cost containment, quality improvement, or 
transparency at the state level.  In general, states are major purchasers, but they are also price 
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and quality “takers” to some extent as well. While PEHP purchasing and contracting 
strategies may be able to influence the direction or basic contours of the medical 
marketplace to some extent, states operate in distinct market environments and thus should 
construct policy efforts accordingly.  This suggests that states seeking to adopt a purchasing 
initiative similar to the one that GIC has introduced should seek to import particular 
principles of reform rather than specific and detailed “recipes”.  While the experiences of 
other states can and should help to inform states’ policy efforts, policymakers should seek to 
import new models in ways that are sensitive to their own state market conditions.    
Within the arena of leadership, this dissertation concluded rather generally that 
“leadership matters”.  Of the three principal findings in this dissertation, the policy and 
political implications of leadership are the most difficult to operationalize and apply to other 
states or other contexts.  However, it is clear that dynamic leadership is needed to promote 
ambitious policy efforts in ways that anticipate and address strong political opposition and 
technical and other challenges.  As noted previously, there is also an interaction effect 
between systems of governance and PEHP leadership.  That is, governance structures that 
provide opportunities for genuine executive leadership and authority are more likely to be 
attractive to particular types of leaders that have the characteristics needed to effectively 
leverage PEHP purchasing influence at the state level.  This suggests another dimension of 
governance structure that policymakers should consider when making decisions about how 
best to structure bureaucratic autonomy.    
On balance, state policymakers have an opportunity to take advantage of an aspect of 
state government that has largely been overlooked in many states as a potential vehicle for 
state health care reform.  While much more research is needed to fully examine the 
187 
opportunities and limitations of PEHP purchasing power at the state level, this dissertation 
finds that states may be able to leverage their positions as major employers and purchasers 
of health care to contribute to broader state health policy goals.  Beyond simply enacting 
policy affecting primary PEHP constituents (i.e., state employees, retirees, and their 
families), the case states included in this dissertation sought to wield the purchasing 
influence of the respective PEHPs to produce policy spillover effects on the rest of the health 
care marketplace.  PEHP leaders have confronted numerous challenges along the way, but 
their experiences suggest a new way of thinking about the role of states as major health care 
purchasers within broader state health care systems. 
Opportunities for Further Research 
That policy scholars have largely ignored the roles that PEHPs, as major purchasers, 
can and do play in the state health care environment remains puzzling. The results of this 
dissertation suggest that additional research is needed to explore the roles that PEHP 
purchasers play as major purchasers in state health care policy environments.  In order to 
improve the external validity of this dissertation’s findings regarding the importance of 
systems of governance, market conditions, and leadership, additional research is needed in a 
broader number of states that have undertaken efforts to leverage PEHP purchasing 
influence to promote cost containment, quality improvement, and delivery system reform.   
Moreover, while this dissertation profiled two states’ efforts to use PEHPs to 
explicitly reform elements of the state delivery system through contracting and purchasing 
practices with health plans, there are several other ways that states have attempted to use 
PEHPs to achieve broader policy purposes. These other uses will be examined in further 
research to gain a broader understanding of the roles that PEHPs play in state health care 
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markets and policy systems.  In North Carolina, for example, the PEHP was used as the 
platform for SCHIP/NC Health Choice for children when the Balanced Budget Act created 
the program in 1997.  States had the option of structuring SCHIP as a Medicaid expansion 
program, creating/using a separate program, or using a combination approach.  Governor 
Hunt and the Democratic-led Senate sought a Medicaid expansion program to establish an 
“entitlement” to health benefits for covered populations and to take advantage of existing 
outreach and other infrastructure.  At the time, however, the House of Representatives was 
controlled by Republicans, whose leaders preferred using the SHP as the program platform 
for SCHIP children, giving enrollees a “private insurance look-alike” program and 
importantly, giving the state the ability to control spending when state revenues fell short of 
anticipated cost growth.  The Republican-led House had its way as due to political 
compromise, the new program was structured around the SHP. 
In Massachusetts, the GIC has historically not provided health care benefits to cities 
and towns.  The same legislation that created the GIC in 1955 also authorized cities and 
towns to purchase insurance on their own, subject to collective bargaining. Partly as a result 
of union involvement which limits program flexibility and partly given their relatively small 
size as employer-based plans, many cities and towns are struggling to finance rapidly 
escalating health care costs.  A recent report characterized the health care costs of cities and 
towns as “unsustainable” (Boston Municipal Research Bureau 2006).  As a result, the report 
calls on the legislature to enact a law that would authorize cities and towns to join the GIC. 
There are several other examples (e.g., in Kentucky and West Virginia) of state efforts to 
leverage the PEHP as a platform to expand access to public coverage, with varying degrees 
of success.  Much more research is needed to understand these and other uses of PEHPs as 
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vehicles to expand or consolidate access to health insurance coverage for public employees 
and non-public employees alike.   
A longer-term research agenda will include further analysis on the roles of PEHPs as 
major purchasers to leverage contracts with private health plans, providers, and other entities 
to pursue broader policy goals.  In addition, this research agenda will also consider other 
ways that states have leveraged or could leverage PEHPs to pursue other policy goals as 
well, such as expanding access to health care for other public constituents as in 
Massachusetts or more importantly, in making health care coverage available to those that 
currently do not have it.  
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Exploratory Interviews  
1. Paul Campbell, Illinois Group Insurance Program [2006] 
2. Bob DuBois, New York State Health Insurance Program [2006] 
3. Jarvio Grevious, California Public Employees Retirement System [2006] 
4. David Haugen, Minnesota State Employee Group Insurance Program [2006] 
5. Julie Kerlin, Georgia Division of Public Employee Health Benefits [2006] 
6. John Matthews, Florida Division of State Group Insurance [2006] 
7. Teresa Planch, Mississippi State and School Employees’ Health Insurance Program 
[2006] 
8. Dolores Mitchell, Massachusetts Group Insurance Program [2006] 
9. Dan Soper, North Carolina State Employee Health Plan [2006] 
10. Rob Tester, South Carolina Employee Insurance Program [2006] 
11. Thomas Vincz, New Jersey State Health Benefits Program [2006] 
12. MaryJane Wardlow, Texas Group Benefits Plan [2006] 
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1. Susanne Bailey, Department of Insurance (Designee for Department of Insurance on 
Group Insurance Commission) [2006] 
2. Michael Bailit, President, Bailit Health Purchasing [2006] 
3. Julie Bowler, Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance [2006] 
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[2006] 
6. Robert Carey, Massachusetts Connector Authority (formerly Director of Policy and 
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7. Jay Curley, Vice President for Public Affairs, Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
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9. Anne Doyle, Director of Public Policy, Government Affairs and Compliance, Tufts 
Health Plan [2006] 
10. Rob Egan, Senior Vice President, Marketing & Product Development, Tufts Health 
Plan [2006] 
11. John Erwin, Executive Director, Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals [2006] 
12. Wendy Everett, New England Health Institute [2006] 
13. Marisa Fusco, Director of Client Services, Tufts Health Plan [2006] 
14. Christie Hager, Health Policy Aide to Massachusetts House Speaker Salvatore F. 
DiMasi [2006] 
15. Robert Johnson, Deputy Director, Group Insurance Commission [2007] 
16. Jon Kingsdale, Massachusetts Connector Authority (Former Senior Vice President, 
Tufts Health Plan) [2006] 
17. Elaine Kirshenbaum, Vice President for Policy, Planning and Member Services, 
Massachusetts Medical Society [2006] 
18. Bruce Landon, Assistant Professor of Health Care Policy, Assistant Professor of 
Medicine, Harvard Medical School [2006] 
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19. Thomas Lee, Chief Executive Officer, Partners Community Health Care [2006] 
20. Arnold Milstein, Consultant, Mercer Human Resource Consulting [2006] 
21. Jeff Levin-Scherz, Medical Director, Partners Community Health Care [2006] 
22. Amy Lischko, Tufts University (former Commissioner of the Division of Health 
Care Finance and Policy within the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and 
Human Services) [2006, 2007] 
23. Dolores Mitchell, Executive Director, Group Insurance Commission [2006, 2007] 
24. John McDonough, Executive Director, Health Care for All (Formerly a state 
legislator) [2006] 
25. Brian Pagliaro, Vice President for Sales, Tufts Health Plan [2006] 
26. Barbara Rabson, Executive Director, Massachusetts Health Quality Partners [2006] 
27. Charlie Slavin, Vice President, Unicare (Director of Policy and Research, Group 
Insurance Commission) [2006, 2007] 
28. David Smith, Massachusetts Hospital Association [2006] 
29. Nancy Turnbull, President, Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation [2006] 
30. Richard Zeckhauser, Professor, Harvard University (Former commissioner, Group 
Insurance Commission) [2006] 
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North Carolina Interviews 
1. Bradley Adcock, Vice President of Government Affairs, Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
North Carolina [2005] 
2. William Atkinson, President and CEO, WakeMed Health and Hospitals [2005] 
3. Sam Byrd, Former Director, Fiscal Research Division, North Carolina General 
Assembly [2005] 
4. Lanier Cansler, President, Cansler & Fuquay Solutions, Inc. (Former Deputy 
Secretary [NC DHHS] and former state legislator) [2006] 
5. Leslie Bevacqua Coman, Director of Government Relations, Capstrat (Formerly 
Vice President of Governmental Affairs, North Carolina Citizens for Business and 
Industry) [2005] 
6. Dana Cope, President, The State Employees Association of North Carolina [2007] 
7. Geoff Elting, Former Executive Administrator, North Carolina State Employee 
Health Plan [2005] 
8. Allen Feezor, Chief Planning Officer, University Health Systems of Eastern North 
Carolina (Former Senior Deputy Commissioner of the SHP) [2005, 2006, 2007] 
9. Barbara Morales Burke, Deputy Commissioner of Insurance [2005, 2006, 2007] 
10. Marlowe Foster, Former President, North Carolina Association of Health Plans 
[2005] 
11. Gary Fuquay, Vice President, Cansler & Fuquay Solutions, Inc. (Former North 
Carolina Medicaid Director) [2006] 
12. Dan Gerlach, Senior Policy Advisor for Fiscal Affairs, Office of the Governor 
[2005] 
13. James Hunt, Former Governor of North Carolina [2005] 
14. Harry Kaplan, Senior Vice President, State Government Relations, McGuireWoods 
Consulting LLC [2006, 2007] 
15. James Long, Commissioner of Insurance [2005] 
16. Anna Lore, Government Affairs Representative, Duke University (Formerly CEO of 
Wellpath’s North Carolina operations) [2006, 2007] 
17. Paul Mahoney, Account Director, Capstrat (Formerly Executive Director of the 
North Carolina Association of Health Plans) [2005, 2006, 2007] 
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18. Kenneth Morris, Chief Financial Officer, Duke University Medical Center [2005] 
19. William Pully, President, North Carolina Hospital Association [2006] 
20. Tony Rand, State Senator, North Carolina General Assembly [2005] 
21. Jack Rodman, President and CEO, North Carolina Business Group on Health, Inc. 
[2006] 
22. Adam Searing, Project Director, NC Health Access Coalition [2006] 
23. Paul Sebo, Former Manager of Operations, North Carolina SHP [2005] 
24. Pam Silberman, President, North Carolina Institute of Medicine [2005] 
25. Daniel Soper, Chief Operating Officer of the North Carolina SHP (Formerly Chief 
Financial Officer of Kaiser’s North Carolina expansion region) [2006, 2007] 
26. David DeVries, former Executive Administrator, North Carolina State Health Plan 
[2005] 
27. Steve White, President of CIGNA’s North Carolina operations [2005] 
28. Chuck Willson, Clinical Professor of Pediatrics, ECU (Former President, North 
Carolina Medical Society) [2006] 
195 
REFERENCES 
Aberbach, J. 1990. Keeping a Watchful Eye. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Alt, J. and R. Lowry. 1994. “Divided Government, Fiscal Institutions, and Budget Deficits: 
Evidence from the States.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 88, No. 4. 
Banks, J. 1989. “Agency Budgets, cost Information, and Auditing.” American Journal of 
Political Science. 33:670-99. 
Barrilleaux, C. and M. Miller. 1988. “The Political Economy of State Medicaid Policy.” 
American Political Science Review 82:1089-1106. 
Barrilleaux, C., P. Brace, B. Dangremond. 1995. "The Sources of State Health Reform." 
Presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, 
September 2, 1994. 
Barone, M. and R. Cohen. 2006. The Almanac of American Politics. Washington, D.C.: The 
National Journal.  
Baumgartner, F. and B. Jones. 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F., and B. Leech. 1998. Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics 
and in Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Bawn, K. 1995. “Political Control versus Expertise: Congressional Choice About 
Administration Procedures.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 89, No. 1: 62-73. 
Beamer, G. 2004. “State Health Care Reform Politics and the Unfortunate End of the 1990s.” 
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. Vol. 29, No. 2:293-304. 
Begun, J. E. Crowe, R. Feldman. 1981. "Occupational Regulation in the States: A Causal 
Model." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law. 6(2):229-254. 
Bendor, J., S. Taylor, and R. Van Gaalen. 1987. “Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric 
Information.” American Journal of Political Science. 31:796-828. 
Berry, W. , E. Ringquist, R. Fording, and R. Hanson. 1998. "Measuring Citizen and 
Government Ideology in the American States, 1960-1993." American Journal of Politics.
42:327-348. 
Berry, R. and W. Berry. 1990. “State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event 
History Analysis.” American Political Science Review. 84:395-415.
196 
Berry, F. and W. Berry. 1992. “Tax Innovation in the States: Capitalizing on Political 
Opportunity.” American Journal of Political Science. 36:715-42. 
Berry, F., and W. Berry. 1999. “Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research.” In 
Theories of the Policy Process, ed. P. Sabatier. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
Beyle, T. (forthcoming). URL:  
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=187648. Accessed 10 March 2007. 
Bilbro R. 2003. “The Evolution of an HMO: Hands-on Experience for North Carolina 
Physicians.” North Carolina Medical Journal. (64):1. 
Boston Municipal Research Division. 2006. "Soaring Health Insurance Costs Threaten 
Boston's Competitive Edge." URL: http://www.bmrb.org/content/upload/health2006.pdf. 
Accessed 10 May 2007. 
Boyne, G. 1985, “Review Article: Theory, Methodology, and Results in Political Science: 
The Case of Output Studies.” British Journal of Political Science. 15:473-515. 
Brace, P. and A. Jewett. 1995. “The State of State Politics Research." Political Research 
Quarterly. 48:643-681. 
Brown, L. and M. Sparer. 2003. "Poor Program's Progress: The Unanticipated Politics of 
Medicaid Policy." Health Affairs. 22(1): 31-44. 
 
Lawrence D. Brown. 1983. Politics and Health Care Organization: HMOs As Federal 
Policy. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
Buchanan, R., 1987. Medicaid Cost Containment: Long-Term Care Reimbursement.
Cranberry, New Jersey: Associated University Presses. 
Cutler, L. 1989. “Now is the Time for All Good Men.” William and Mary Law Review. 30:
387-402. 
Darling, H. 1991. "Employers and Managed Care: What Are the Early Returns?” Health 
Affairs. 10(4): 147-160. 
Davidson, S. 1978. “Variations in State Medicaid Programs.” Journal of Health Politics, 
Policy, and Law. 3:63. 
Davis, K. “How Employers Can Help Create a High Performance Health System.” The 
Commonwealth Fund. May 21, 2007.  
Dawson, R. and J. Robinson. 1963. “Inter-party Competition, Economic Variables, and 
Welfare Policies in the American States.” Journal of Politics. 25:265-289. 
197 
Draper D., A. Liebhaber, and P. Ginsburg. May 2007. “High-Performance Health Plan 
Networks: Early Experiences.” Issue Brief. Center for Studying Health System Change. No. 
111. 
Dye, T. 1955. Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States.
Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally. 
Elazar, D. 1966. American Federalism: A View from the States. New York: Crowell. 
Enthoven A. 2002. “The Fortune 500 Model for Health Care: Is Now the Time to Change?” 
Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law. (27)1. 
Epstein, D., and S. O'Halloran. 1994. “Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency 
Discretion.” American Journal of Political Science. 38 (3): 697-722. 
Erikson, R., G. Wright, and J. McIver. 1989. “Political Parties, Public Opinion, and State 
Policy in the United States.” American Political Science Review. 83:729-50. 
Etheredge, L. S. Jones, and L. Lewin. 1996. “What is Driving Health System Change?” 
Health Affairs. 15(4), 93-104.  
Fenton, J. 1966. Midwest Politics. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Gabel, J. 1997. “TenWays HMOs Have Changed During The 1990s.” Health Affairs. 16(3): 
134-145. 
 
Gais, T. and J. Walker. 1991. "Pathways to Influence in American Politics." In Mobilizing 
Interests Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements. ed. J. Walker. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
 
Galvin, R. 1999. “An Employer’s View of the U.S. Health Care Market.” Health Affairs. 
18(6). 166–170. 
 
General Laws of Massachusetts. Chapter 32A, Section 3-4. 
 
Gitterman, D. 2000. “The President and the Power of the Purchaser: Consumer Protection 
and Managed Care in the United States.” California Management Review. 43(1), 103-120. 
Gitterman, D., M. Domino, B. Weiner, A. McKethan, A. Enthoven. 2003. “The Rise and Fall 
of a Kaiser Permanente Expansion Region. Milbank Quarterly. 81(4):567-601. 
Government Accounting Standards Board. June 2004. “Summary of Statement No. 45, 
Accounting and Financial Reporting by Employers for Postemployment Benefits Other than 
Pensions” URL: http://72.3.167.244/st/summary/gstsm45.html. Accessed 11 August 2006. 
Granovetter, M. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology.
78:1360-80. 
198 
Granovetter, M. 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness.” American Journal of Sociology. 91:481-510. 
Gray, V. 1973. “Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study." American Political Science 
Review. 67: 1174-1185. 
Gray, V. and D. Lowery. 1993. “Stability and Change in State Interest Systems: 1975 to 
1990.” State and Local Government Review. 25: 87-96. 
Gray, V., D. Lowery, and E. Godwin. 2004. “Democratic and Non-Democratic Influences in 
Health Policy: State Pharmacy Assistance Programs as Innovations.” Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL. 
Gray, V., D. Lowery, and E. Godwin. 2005. “The Political Management of Managed Care:  
Explaining Variations in State HMO Regulations.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April. 
Greene, R., H. Beckman, and J. Thomas. Nov.  2006. “Review of the Massachusetts Group 
Insurance Commission Physician Profiling and Network Tiering Plan.” The Massachusetts 
Medical Society. 
 
Grogan, C. 1994. “Political-Economic Factors Influencing State Medicaid Policy.” Political 
Research Quarterly. 47: 589–622.
Group Insurance Commission. 2006.  Enrollment in Health Plans Operating in the GIC. 
 
Group Insurance Commission Annual Report.  2006 
 
Group Insurance Commission Annual Report.  2005. 
 
Group Insurance Commission Annual Report. 2004 
Heclo, H. 1978. “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment.” In The New American 
Political System, ed. A. King. Washington: American Enterprise Institute. 
Holahan, J., S. Zuckerman, A. Evans, and S. Rangarajan. 1998. “Medicaid Managed Care in 
Thirteen States." Health Affairs. 17(3): 43-63. 
 
Holahan, J. and L. Blumberg. 2006. “Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look At The 
Issues.” Health Affairs. 25(6):432-443. 
Holbrook, T. and E. Van Dunk. 1993, “Electoral Competition in the American States,” 
American Political Science Review. 87:955-962. 
Holtz-Eakin, D. 24 March 2004. "Estimating the Cost of the Medicare Modernization Act.” 
Testimony before the House Committee on Ways and Means. URL: 
http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5252&sequence=0. Accessed 12 April 2006. 
 
199 
Howard. C. 1999. The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the 
United States. Princeton University Press. 
 
Hurley, R., L. Felland, A. Gerland, and J. Pickreign. 2006. “Public Employees' Health 
Benefits Survive Major Threats, So Far.” Health Affairs. 25(3):195-203. 
 
Hurley, R. and S. Somers. 2003. “Medicaid and Managed Care: A Lasting Relationship?” 
Health Affairs. 22(1): 77-88. 
Jennings, E. 1979. “Competition, Constituencies, and Welfare Policies.” American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 73. 
Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust. 2003. “Survey of 
State Employee Health Plans: 2002.” URL: 
http://www.kff.org.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/insurance/ 6100-index.cfm. (accessed 22 August 
2006). 
Johnson, H. and D. Broder. 1997. The System: The American Way of Politics at the Breaking 
Point. Back Bay Books: Washington, D.C. 
 
Kaiser Family Foundation. 2005. “State Health Facts.” URL: 
http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/cgi-
bin/healthfacts.cgi?action=compare&category=Managed+Care+%26+Health+Insurance&sub
category=HMOs&topic=HMO+Penetration+Rate. Accessed 10 March 2007. 
 
Key, V., 1949. Southern Politics in State and Nation. New York: Random House. 
Kirst, M., G. Meister, and S. Rowley. 1984. “Policy Issue Networks: The Influences on State 
Policymaking.” Policy Studies Journal. 13:247-63. 
Kingdon, J. 1995. Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: Harper Collins. 
Klingman, D, and R. Lammers. 1984. “The General Policy Liberalism Factor in American 
State Politics.” American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 27: 598-610. 
Kowalczyk, L. 11 March 2004. “Massachusetts Adopts Healthcare Rating System.” The 
Boston Globe. Pg. E2. 
 
Kowalczyk, L. 18 October 2000. “State Pushes a new Set of Standards for Hospitals." The 
Boston Globe. Pg. A1. 
 
Larose, S. 2004. “Tufts Tiers Massachusetts Hospitals Using Quality and Efficiency Scores." 
Managed Care Outlook. Vol. 17, No. 9. 
Lewis-Beck, M. June 1977. “The Relative Importance of Socio-Economic and Political 
Variables for Public Policy.” American Political Science Review. Vol. 71:559-566. 
Lichiello, P. and C. Madden. 1996. “Context and Catalysts for Change in Health Care 
Markets.” Health Affairs. 15:(2). 
200 
Lieberman, R. and G. Shaw. 2000. “Looking Inward, Looking Outward: The Politics of State 
Welfare Innovation Under Devolution.” Political Research Quarterly.53:215-240 
Lipson, D. and J. De Sa. 1996. “Impact of Purchasing Strategies on Local Health care 
Systems.” Health Affairs. 15(2): 62-76. 
 
Lockard, D. 1959. New England State Politics. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. 
 
Long, S. and M. Marquis. 1999. “Comparing Employee Health Benefits in the Public and 
Private Sectors.” 1997. Health Affairs. (6): 183-193. 
 
Luebke, P. 1988. Tar Heel Politics 2000. Chapel Hill. University of North Carolina Press. 
Macey, J. 1992. “Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative 
Agencies.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 8: 93-110. 
Maciejewski, M., B. Dowd, and  R. Feldman. 1997. “How Do States Purchase Health 
Insurance for Their Own Employees?" Managed Care Quarterly 5(3): 11-19. 
 
Marmor, T. 1983. "Political Analysis and American Medical Care. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Massachusetts Medical Society. “Saying Most Transparency Programs Fail on Accuracy, 
Relevance, and Fairness, Medical Society President Urges Insurers to Slow Down in Race to 
Transparency." November 3, 2006. Press Release. Massachusetts Medical Society.  
"The Massachusetts Health Care Task Force." 2002. Final report to the Task Force jointly 
created by Governor Paul Cellucci, Lieutenant Governor Jane Swift, Speaker Thomas 
Finneran, and Senate President Thomas Birmingham. URL: 
http://www.mass.gov/healthcare/pages/pdf/dr_final.pdf. Accessed 10 February 2007. 
 
Maxwell, J., P. Temin. 2004. “Private Health Purchasing Practices in the Public Sector: A 
Comparison of State Employers and the Fortune 500.” Health Affairs. 23(2): 182-90. 
 
Mayes, R. 2004. “Causal Chains and Cost Shifting: How Medicare's Rescue Inadvertently 
Triggered the Managed-Care Revolution.” Journal of Policy History, 16(2), 144-174. 
 
Mayes, R. and. R. Blendon. 2006. Medicare Prospective Payment and the Shaping of U.S. 
Health Care. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Mays, G., G. Claxton and B. Strunk. 2003. “Tiered-Provider Networks: Patients Face Cost-
Choice Trade-Offs. Issue Brief no. 71. Washington, Center for Studying Health System 
Change. 
McCubbins, M., R. Noll, and B. Weingast. 1987. “Administrative Procedures as Instruments 
of Political Control.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3(2): 243-277. 
201 
McCubbins, M, R. Noll, and B Weingast. 1989. “Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies.” Virginia Law Review 
75: 431-482. 
McDonough, J., B. Rosman, et al. 2006. “The Third Wave Of Massachusetts Health Care 
Access Reform.” Health Affairs. 25(6):420-431. 
McDonough, J. 2001. "Using and Misusing Anecdote in Policy Making.” Health Affairs. 
20(1): 207-212. 
McKethan, A., D. Gitterman, A. Feezor, and A. Enthoven. 2006. “New Directions For Public 
Health Care Purchasers? Responses To Looming Challenges.” Health Affairs. 25(6): 1518-
1528. 
McKethan, A., C. Koster, and W.  Joines. March 2007. “SCHIP in North Carolina: Evolution 
and Reauthorization Challenges and Opportunities.” Report to the North Carolina Health and 
Wellness Trust Fund Task Force for a Healthy North Carolina. The Lewin Group. 
McNollgast. 1992. “Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory 
Interpretation.” Georgetown Law Journal 80(3): 705-742. 
Milbank Memorial Fund. 2004. “State Health Care Expenditure Report: 1998-2003.” URL:  
http://www.milbank.org/reports/05NASBO/index.html. 
Milbrath L. 1970. “The Impact of Lobbying on Governmental Decisions. In Policy Analysis 
in Political Science, ed. I Sharkansky, Chicago: Markham. 
Mintrom, M. and S. Vergari. 1998. “Policy Networks and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of 
State Education Reforms.” Journal of Politics. 60:1:126-48. 
Mitchell, D. Speech at the Massachusetts Health Care Data Consortium. November 2006. 
Moe, T. 1990. “The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy.” 
In Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond, ed. O. 
Williamson. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Moran, D. 2005. “Whence And Whither Health Insurance? A Revisionist History.” Health 
Affairs. 24(6): 1415-1425. 
Morgan D., and S. Watson. Spring 1991. “Political Culture, Political System Characteristics, 
and Public Policies Among the American States.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism. (21): 
31-48. 
New England Health Institute. “Super Cluster: Ideas, Perspectives, and Updates from the 
Massachusetts Life Sciences Industry.” April 2007. URL: 
http://www.nehi.net/CMS/admin/cms/_uploads/docs/Super%20Cluster%20-
%20MA%20Life%20Sciences%20Report.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2007. 
202 
North Carolina Commission on Prepaid Health Plans. Interim Report: Findings, 
Recommendations, and Executive Summary. 1979. Volume 1: Raleigh, NC. 
North Carolina Department of Insurance. 2000. Historical Health Plan Data. Raleigh, NC.  
North Carolina Office of the State Auditor. 2003. Teachers' and State Employees' 
Comprehensive Major Medical Plan-CAFR and Single Audit. Report Number FIN-2002-
8410. 
North Carolina State Health Plan (NCSHP). 1993–1998. Enrollment by Health Plan Option. 
Raleigh, N.C. 
Nownes, A., and P. Freeman. 1998. “Interest Group Activity in the States." Journal of 
Politics. 60: 86–112. 
Oliver, Thomas R. 2004. “Policy Entrepreneurship in the Social Transformation of American 
Medicine: The Rise of Managed Care and Managed Competition.” Journal of Health 
Politics, Policy and Law. 29: 701-33. 
Paul-Shaheen, P. 1998. "The States and Health Care Reform: The Road Traveled and 
Lessons Learned from Seven that Took the Lead." Journal of Health Politics, Policy and 
Law. (2):319-61. 
 
Peterson, P. and M. Rom. 1990. Welfare Magnets: A New Case for a National Standard.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 
Plotnick, R., and R. Winters. 1985. “A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution.” 
American Political Science Review. 79:458-473 
Polsby, N. 1984. Political Innovation in America: The Politics of Policy Initiation. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Poterba, J. 1994. “State Responses to Fiscal Crisis: The Effects of Budgetary Institutions and 
Politics.” Journal of Political Economy 102:799-821. 
Reutzel, T., 1989. "Medicaid Eligibility, Benefits, and Provider Payment: State Preferences 
and the Implications for National Goals." Health Policy. 11(3):209-26. 
Ricketts, T., S. Greene, P. Silberman, H. Howard, and S. Poley. “Evaluation of Community 
Care of North Carolina Asthma and Diabetes Management Initiatives: January 2000-
December 2002.” North Carolina Rural Health Research and Policy Analysis Program. Cecil 
G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research. 
Rogers, Everett. 1995. Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free Press. 
Rom, M. 1999. “Transforming State Health and Welfare Programs.” In Politics in the 
American States, ed. V. Gray and H. Jacobs. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 
203 
Roubini, N., and J. Sachs. 1989. “Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in 
the Industrial Countries.” European Economic Review 33:903-33. 
Savage, R. 1978. “Policy Innovativeness as a Trait of American States.” The Journal of 
Politics. (40):1: 212-224. 
Schon, D. 1971. Beyond the Stable State. New York: Norton. 
Skocpol, T., M. Abend-Wein, C. Howard, and S. Goodrich Lehmann. 1993. “Women's 
Associations and the Enactment of Mothers' Pensions.” American Political Science Review.
87: 686-701. 
Segal Company. 2003. “Segal State Health Benefits Survey.” URL: http:// 
www.segalco.com/publications/surveysandstudies/2003statesurvey-medicalbenefits.pdf 
(accessed 11 September 2006). 
Sharkansky, I. 1969. “The Utility of Elazar's Political Culture,” Polity 2:66-83 
Smith, R. 1995. “Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress.” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly. 20: 89–139. 
Soule, S. and Y. Zylan. 1997. “Runaway Train? The Diffusion of State-Level Reform in 
ADC/AFDC Eligibility Requirements, 1950-1967.” American Journal of Sociology.
103:733-762. 
Starr, P. 1982. Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign 
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry. New York: Basic Books. 
Sundquist, J. 1988. “Needed: A Political Theory of the New Era of Coalition Government in 
the United States.” Political Science Quarterly. 103:613-35. 
Thomas, C., and R. Hrebenar. 1996. “Interest Groups in the States.” In Politics in the 
American States, ed. V. Gray and H. Jacob. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
 
Thomas, C., and R. Hrebenar. 1999. “Who's Got Clout? Interest Group Power in the States.” 
State Legislatures 25(4): 30–34. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 2005. Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. State Personal Income. 2006. U.S. Department of 
Commerce. URL: http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/sqpi_newsrelease.htm. 
Accessed 13 February 2007. 
Walker, J. 1969. “The Diffusion of Innovations among the American States.” American 
Political Science Review. 63:880-899. 
204 
Walker, J. 1971. “Innovation in State Politics.” In Politics in the American States: A 
Comparative Analysis. ed. H. Jacob and K. Vines. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Walker, J. 1981. “The Diffusion of Knowledge, Policy Communities, and Agenda Setting: 
The Relationship of Knowledge and Power.” In New Strategic Perspectives on Social Policy.
ed. J. Tropman, M. Dluhy, and R. Lind. New York: Pergamon Press. 
Watts, C., J. Christianson, et al. 2003. “The Role of Public Employers in a Changing Health 
Care Market." Health Affairs. 22(1): 173-180. 
Weingast, B. and M. Moran. 1983. “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: 
Regulatory Policymaking by the FTC.” Journal of Political Economy 91: 765-800. 
Weissert, C. and Weissert, W. 2002. Governing Health: The Politics of Health Policy. Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
West, D., D. Heith, and C. Goodwin. 1996. “Harry and Louise Go to Washington: Political 
Advertising and Health Care Reform.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 21(1):35-
68. 
West, D., and B. Loomis. 1999. The Sound of Money: How Political Interests Get What They 
Want. Washington, D.C.: W. W. Norton & Company.Williams, B. and A. Matheny. 1984. 
"Testing Theories of Social Regulation: Hazardous Waste Regulations in the American 
States." Journal of Politics 46(2): 428-59. 
 
Zeigler, H. 1983. “Interest Groups in the States.” In Politics in the American States, ed. V. 
Gray, H. Jacob, and K. Vines. Boston: Little, Brown and Co. 
 
Yin, R. 1989. Case study research: Design and methods. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publishing. 
 
Yin, R. 1993. Applications of case study research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publishing. 
